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NATIONAL SECURITY
MANAGEMENT SERIES

THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE

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I

NATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT SERIES

THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SCENE

An anthology with an introductory chapter and introductions to chapters by Edwin Timbers, Eston T. White, and Harrison W. Fox, Jr.

National Defense University
Washington, D.C.
1987

II

National Security Management Series

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
Washington, D.C.

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PREFACE

Major policies and decisions on the Nation's security are made through the political process. The President and the Congress determine national security requirements and the level of the Nation's preparedness for the possible use of the Armed Forces to attain national objectives. These decisions are influenced by the system of values that has been developed by the whole of American society, and by the perceptions of threats, foreign and domestic. The political process encompasses a wide spectrum of influences, some related to governmental institutions, others to the citizenry and the private sector.

This volume aims to provide an appreciation of the domestic political scene and give a better understanding of the political aspects of national security. The introductory chapter explains fundamental concepts relating to the political system and process and provides background for the reading of the remaining chapters. The second chapter discusses values in American society and in politics. The following chapter assesses the changes in the strengths of the Democratic and Republican parties and the contours of the realignment of voters since 1980. The role of the President as a leader in the governmental process is explained in chapter IV. The trend toward decentralized and collegial decisionmaking patterns and the related problems for leadership in the Congress are discussed in chapter V. The next chapter, on the role of the judicial branch, focuses on the positions the United States Supreme Court has taken on matters relating to national security and points up the hesitancy of the Court during crises to interfere knowingly with the efforts of the policymaking branches to safeguard the Nation. The following chapter, on public opinion and foreign policy, describes the shifts in public opinion and the constituencies for defense in the period following the Vietnam war. The last chapter underlines the importance and influence of interest groups in the American political process.

This volume replaces the anthology by the same title, dated 1983. The several discussions of governmental functions and related activities contribute to an understanding of many topics covered in other texts, for example, national security policymaking and decisionmaking, the politics of national economic policy, and the politics of defense procurement. The readings included here are selective and it should be understood there are different interpretations and sometimes conflicting views on many of the subjects presented.

The contributions of Edwin Timbers, who wrote chapter VI and several of the introductions to chapters, merit particular recognition. Harrison Fox, a former ICAF faculty member, and Eston T. White, NDU Correspondence Programs, wrote some of the material retained from the 1983 volume. The selections in the present work resulted from a cooperative effort of Edwin Timbers, ICAF faculty, Major James N. Keagle, NWC faculty, and Eston T. White, NDU Correspondence Programs.

The work of Mr. Calvin B. Kelley in the editing and preparing the manuscript for printing is gratefully acknowledged.

ESTON T. WHITE

National Defense University
Washington, D.C.
March 1987

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I

INTRODUCTION

Harrison W. Fox, Jr., Eston T. White, and Edwin Timbers

An understanding of American politics is important to defense managers and the military generally, because politics has a major influence on policymaking and decisionmaking about national security. Defense policies, military strategy, and military-force size, structure, and deployments are largely the result of the political process involving the executive branch and the Congress. The subordination of the military to civilian authority, moreover, is a fundamental concept of the American political system. Military power, one of the instruments available for achieving national objectives, is usually a last resort, used only when all other means have failed. Perceptions of military power, however, may have considerable influence on the effective use of political, economic, and other instruments of power. The abilities of strategists and military planners to contribute to the achievement of national objectives are substantially enhanced by a keen understanding of the processes by which these objectives are formulated and decisions made.

Karl von Clausewitz, the noted writer on strategy, observed in 1832, ". . . the political object, as the original motive of the war, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made."[1] He believed that a military commander in chief need not be a learned historian or a political commentator, but he must be familiar with the higher affairs of state, current issues, and the leading personalities in the government, and he must be able to form sound judgments. While there has traditionally been a need for the military to know the political objectives of war and something about the affairs of state, developments since 1950 have forged an even closer relationship and increased the interplay between the political, economic, social, and military factors that enter into national security.[2]

Fundamental to an understanding of the American political scene is an appreciation of the characteristics and values of American society. Generalizations about American national character tend to be hypothetical in nature, but the reflections of historians, journalists,

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[1] Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited with an introduction by Anatol Rapoport (Middlesex, England: Penguin Press, 1968), p. 109.

[2] Other texts in this series include discussions of domestic politics relating to national security, for example, *National Security Policy Formulation* (1984) and *Defense Requirements and Resource Allocation* (1982).

anthropologists and philosophers include some persistent themes and patterns of behavior. Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote of the America of the early 1830s, had such a prophetic perception that much of what he wrote is still applicable to basic patterns of our behavior today. He observed that Americans place an extraordinary emphasis on worldy and private values and gratifications at the expense of public and spiritual values. He also saw the extraordinary competitiveness with which Americans pursue their welfare. Twentieth century historians have, in consonance with de Tocqueville's views, noted a strong American inclination toward pragmatism and materialism.[3] Since Americans place a high premium on achievement, the success ethic has received much attention in studies of the American character. As have many other observers, de Tocqueville perceived a tendency toward periodic outbursts of evangelism which create a moral dualism in American character. Consequently, Americans have sometimes crusaded for moral causes, while their own record has fallen short of their demands upon others.

The national culture which has evolved in America is distinctive, although other nations of the Western World share similar values. Contemporary American political values have been shaped by many influences, including the English heritage, the colonial experience, and developments in perfecting the governmental process since the Declaration of Independence. In chapter II, the first reading discusses traditional American values, while the second reading treats the current state of American values. At first glance, it may appear that many of the values presented–for example, the value of the individual and equality of opportunity–may be taken for granted. But upon reflection, it becomes apparent that these values have evolved only through great conflict over civil rights and liberties.

While basic American political objectives and aspirations have remained relatively constant, at least until the 1960s, the environment in which they evolved has undergone revolutionary changes. The end of the frontier and our evolution from a relatively simple agrarian society to a complex urban society have significantly reduced the personal independence and capability of the individual to chart his or her own destiny. The rural society of 19th century America, which fostered individualism, has been succeeded by a technologically oriented urban society which fosters conformity and interdependence.

The social unrest following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., and our failure to win the war in Vietnam gave rise to considerable criticism about traditional American values. Youths developed a feeling of frustration from their perception that many values were being forced on people by technology and science, and they believed that they suffered from majority tyranny. In recent years, the widespread and growing abuse of drugs, sexual permissiveness, public welfare, and passive entertainment have tended to weaken individuals and the fiber of American character.

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[3] For additional discussion of the American character, see Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1950) and Henry S. Commager, *The American Mind* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950).

Overall, since the 1960s, pluralism has become more evident, as reflected in public attitudes on foreign policy and domestic issues. The loosening of the cohesiveness that was evident in the 1950s and 1960s is disquieting for those responsible for developing and implementing national policies. Richard Bolling, a widely respected member of Congress in the early 1980s, believed that government is effective only when there is broad consensus to give it legitimacy and direction. But following the social unrest of the late 1960s, the chasm deepened between the American people and the major institutions of national leadership–the executive branch of the Federal Government, the courts, Congress, the large corporations, and the media. Such polarization tended to paralyze the country. After 1980, this trend was reversed, and America experienced a renewal of spirit, morale, pride, and patriotism.

THE PRESIDENCY

The Presidency is a major force in American policymaking and provides leadership for accomplishing national objectives. It has variously been described as "the pinnacle of power," "the splendid misery," "the center of U.S. society," and "the dynamic spirit and energy of government." The requirement for the President to lead is evidenced in President Harry S Truman's observation that being the President of the United States is like riding a tiger: either you stay on or get swallowed.

Although the President is expected to provide initiative and direction in the affairs of state, major constraints are provided in the Constitution, such as the system of checks and balances. Despite his designation as Commander in Chief, the President enjoys no monopoly in the direction of military power but shares controls with the Congress, which may deny resources essential to achieve military objectives. Despite these curbs, the men who have distinguished themselves as Presidents were able to centralize authority and put the stamp of their own personality on the office and the Nation.

During the post-World War II period, the responsibilities of the Presidency have become awesome, and various proposals have been made to relieve the chief executive of some major tasks. The responsibilities for domestic programs – such as social welfare, internal improvements, and regulation – demand a high order of leadership in addition to that required to carry out tasks concerned with international politics and economics.

To function effectively and provide leadership, the President must have a base of power, which includes public opinion, media support, the cooperation of Congress, the backing of strong interest groups and lobbyists, and the support of the bureaucracy. These elements of support often vary from issue to issue.

Over the past decade, several elements have hindered the President's efforts to achieve a strong leadership position. First, the public's trust in government and political leaders has been weakened by the events which forced President Richard M. Nixon to resign, by the congressional bribery scandals of 1980 and 1981, known as "Abscam," and most recently by the Iran-Contra affair. Second, the cohesiveness of the major political parties has deteriorated, and the President often has been unable to win the full support of his party on important issues. In 1983, for example, President Reagan was unable to get the complete backing of his party in his efforts to increase the Defense budget by approximately 10 percent, and at the time of this writing, the new 100th Congress, led by the Democratic Party in both houses, is expected to reduce significantly the President's request for higher Defense appropriations. Third, the diversity of American society and the lack of a broad consensus have made the task of presidential leadership more difficult.

Identification of the sources of power for a particular President is somewhat difficult. Each President has his own opinions and makes his own choices concerning the importance and availability of each of the many sources of power that can contribute to his getting a policy accepted or a program implemented. For example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, through his fireside chats and other speeches, was able to enhance his power by drawing support from the masses. During his first term of office, President Reagan was also able to broaden his base of power by establishing a generally cooperative relationship with the Congress.[4] The evolution and institutionalization of the role of President and its growing difficulty and complexity are discussed in chapter IV.

CONGRESS

The role of Congress has its roots in the Constitution, and every President since George Washington has had to contend with some degree of opposition from Congress. Congress represents diverse interests, and with its members less inclined to vote along party lines in recent years, policymaking has become increasingly complicated and time-consuming. Since the mid-1960s, moreover, the legislative branch has shown an increased willingness to challenge the President across a broad spectrum of issues. Examples of congressional-presidential confrontation include the American withdrawal from Vietnam, Watergate, and the unraveling of the Iranian-Contra affair.[5]

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[4] For further information, see Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1980), a classic on this aspect of the Presidency.

In the foreign policy and related national security decisionmaking process, the two decades following World War II were marked by a reasonable balance of power between Congress and the President. Presidential foreign policy initiatives were generally accepted and given bipartisan support in the Congress. Policymaking was facilitated in an environment in which the noncommunist world perceived the United States as a reliable ally and accepted its leadership with a high degree of confidence. Congressional involvement in national security policy and related defense issues has not only increased since the late 1960s, but Congress has also expanded its legal, structural, and political capacity to participate.[6]

Defense managers and the military should be familiar with the defense structure of Congress, including its committees, leaders, and procedures. The Armed Services Committees of the two houses, the House and Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittees, the Budget Committees, the House Committee on Governmental Operations, and the Senate Government Affairs Committee are the major shapers of defense policy. The Committees on Foreign Affairs and Intelligence are also important. The defense community and Congress interact extensively both formally and, at the working level, informally. Service, agency, and DOD legislative liaison activities are the official means of interacting with Congress. The Department of Defense and the Services provide both advice and information for the legislative process and respond to requests from members of the Congress and its committees.

Many changes in the Congress over the past two decades deserve attention by defense managers. The power structure within the two houses has been revised. The stature of committee chairmen has been reduced, while the power of the subcommittee chairmen has been enhanced. The political parties no longer have their former ability to influence the behavior of members of the Congress, while lobbyists and interest groups have increased their influence over the legislative process. Public pressures, moreover, have induced individual Congressmen to be more independent and less subservient to committee chairmen. Congress has significantly increased its oversight role and has become involved in defense-resource allocation and the acquisition of defense materiel and weapons to a much greater extent. Many of the above developments are discussed in chapter V.

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[5] Richard Haas, "Congressional Power: Implications for American Security Policy," *Adelphi Papers* No. 153 (London; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), pp. 1-39.

[6] The role of Congress in national security policy, resource allocation, and acquisition for defense is discussed in some detail in other texts in this series, including *Defense Requirements and Resource Allocation* (1982). Also see John G. Tower, "Congress versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981/82, pp. 229-246.

THE JUDICIAL BRANCH

The judicial branch of government, a coequal partner with the execution and legislative branches, exerts major influence on the manner in which American society is governed. Although it cannot initiate programs, it influences government policy as the interpreter of the Constitution and by its reviews of actions taken by the other two branches. The Court's work of interpreting the Constitution falls into five broad categories: Federal-state relations, property rights and economic regulations, civil liberties, criminal justice, and the equal protection of the laws.

While the authority of the judicial branch is provided by the Constitution, the Court's power and prestige have been established largely through experience. Chief Justice John Marshall, who played a prominent role in the U.S. Supreme Court from 1801 to 1835, contributed significantly in establishing the power and prestige of the high court. In Marshall's time and after, the Court helped to promote a strong national Government and establish Federal authority over the states. From the Civil War to 1937, the Supreme Court frequently used the legal concept of substantive due process of law to limit government regulation of property and the protection of civil liberties. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a member of the Court from 1901 to 1932, and famed as "the great dissenter," vigorously fought the denial of civil liberties on numerous occasions, but the Court remained basically conservative during his long tenure.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt's appointments, beginning in his second term, removed obstacles to the expansion of Federal programs and cleared the way for liberalization on economic issues and civil liberties. The Court continued to be liberal under Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, but it became less so with President Truman's appointments. Under Chief Justice Earl Warren, appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953, there was frequent controversy, but the Court retained considerable support for civil rights and liberal causes. The appointment of Warren Burger as Chief Justice in 1969 and other appointments by President Richard M. Nixon and Ronald Reagan gave the Court a more conservative character, particularly on the access of defendants and plaintiffs to Federal courts to enforce their civil rights. In the 1980s, moreover, the Court became still more conservative.

The members of all Federal courts are appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, and once appointed, they are not dependent on the electorate for their positions. Although this appears undemocratic, it enables the Federal judiciary to be objective and free from political pressure and, consequently, to act as a stabilizing force in government. The work of a Justice calls not primarily for narrow technical skills, but judgment, experience in or knowledge of political affairs, sensitivity to human needs and national objectives, and an understanding of the principles upon which a free society is based. Appointees generally have not had long experience as judges but have been persons with qualities which include both judicial and political competence.

The historical role of the Court in the national security arena and its relations with the President acting as Commander in Chief are examined in chapter VI. While the Court is the final arbiter of the law, it will usually defer to the decisions of the President during a grave national crisis.

PUBLIC OPINION

One of the features of a democratic society that distinguishes it from authoritarian societies is the frequent opportunity for public opinion to influence public policy. The modes of influence include elections, town meetings, interest-group politics, public-opinion polls, demonstrations and protests, and various types of expression through the media. In the United States, the policy process usually involves a consideration of citizen preferences and reactions. This results from the fact that key policymakers have obtained their positions through the elective process. The President, defense officials, and the Congress spend much of their time in activities designed to gain public support. Public opinion may not always be directive or decisive, but it may act as a formidable veto, denying policymakers certain options.

Public opinion is a major influence on the whole spectrum of issues on which policymakers act. It has had a major impact on defense policy in the last two decades, and it promises to be a major factor in the future, especially on issues concerning national commitments, deterrence strategy, nuclear weapons systems, and sources of manpower for defense.

Public opinion is frequently cited as the source of wisdom that has given the American government system a uniquely democratic cast and has resulted in correct choices on policy issues. The validity of this broad generalization will not be discussed here, but it should be noted that public opinion, sometimes confused with media opinion, is only one of several possible influences that may bear on a particular issue. Pressures from interest groups such as the Chamber of Commerce or the AFL-CIO, the influence of leaders in the executive branch and the Congress, and the views of the media are among the other sources of influence which determine choices.

Public opinion polls have come into wide use by the media, government leaders, and others concerned with elections and policy issues. From the mid-1960s until 1981, every poll designed to measure public confidence in government had shown a precipitous decline in this vital element of democratic government. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter in a public address warned that a "crisis of confidence" was "threatening to destroy the social and political fabric of America." In the fall of 1979, as the presidential campaign got under way, Ronald Reagan said that there was no "failure of the American spirit" but only a "failure of our leaders" and that people lacked confidence in government and not in themselves. The reading in chapter VII by Russett and Deluca illustrates the powerful influence of public opinion on foreign policy. Defense officials should take heed of the influence of public opinion and opinion polls because of their possible impact on defense issues.

Interest groups have attempted to make their influence felt in the national political arena from the beginning of the American Republic. The major political parties have attracted varieties of interest groups which have given them their particular hue at any given time. For example, the groups supporting the cotton-kingdom economy of the South were a major pillar of the ante-bellum Democratic Party while the industrial barons of the post-Civil War period were a major interest group in the newly formed Republican Party.

In recent decades literally thousands of interest groups have entered the American scene. They pervade our whole society, and they attempt to exert influence on whatever element of government or society they believe can assist them. The President, the Congress, the media, and all the other organizations and institutions involved in policymaking and decisionmaking are targets. Vast sums of money and media resources are at the heart of interest-group efforts. The result has been fragmentation of power and decisionmaking in national political matters. This phenomenon and the significance of interest groups today are discussed in chapter VIII.

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CHAPTER II

Much of the political process is concerned with promoting and preserving the values that are considered to be American. The origins of these values are found in our heritage from the colonial period and in our experience in developing institutions and processes since the Declaration of Independence. The first reading in this chapter, written in 1960, discusses the cultural and political contributions from England and other foreign lands, and the many other influences that have helped to shape the American system of government. The second reading gives a current overview of American values and personal morality, and emphasizes that during the last two decades some time-honored beliefs, once considered fundamental American values, have been challenged, while new life-styles with different values have come into being.

Together, these articles establish a foundation which will be useful while reviewing our Federal political system. Although values are the most abstract of political concepts, without a clear linkage between values and action, a political system risks failure. Each political and private institution, in its own way, helps to ensure that there is in fact such a linkage. One of the major reasons for the long-lived success of our democracy has been the vigilance paid by our citizens and institutions to this important connection. Our benchmarks of "historic" court decisions, presidential proclamations, laws, and regulations almost always relate values clearly to a specific action.

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II

VALUES

1. TRADITIONAL VALUES IN AMERICAN LIFE

Ralph H. Gabriel

THE TRADITION OUT OF WHICH AMERICAN VALUES HAVE COME

The values that Americans cherish emerge from a tradition that originated in the ancient Middle East and in ancient Greece and Rome. At that time other great and old civilizations flourished in China and India. Inevitably cultural interchange and borrowing took place among the peoples living in those far distant centuries. The Indo-European languages spreading in very early times to the south and to the west established subtle similarities over large areas of Asia and Europe. But Greece, Rome, and the Middle East provided the specific places of origin of the civilization we call Western that has evolved now for 2,500 years on the continent of Europe. Different peoples, such as the French, the Spaniards, the Danes, and the English, developed their own peculiar variants of what became in its turn one of the world's great civilizations. In the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, the people of the United States created their particular variant of this civilization. Because of the common heritage of Western culture, the values of Americans derive ultimately from the same sources as do those of Europeans. The mind of the West has evolved from the Judeo-Christian faith of the ancient Middle East and from the science, philosophy, and art of classical Greece, together with the law of Rome.

The ancient Middle East gave to the West a monotheistic religion from which came two formulations of basic importance for Western (including American) thought.

1. The idea of the importance of the individual soul in the eyes of God.
2. The idea that Deity not only approves righteous behavior but has laid down a moral law to govern the relations of men in society.

From ancient Greece and Rome came a secular humanism also basic to Western (including American) thought. This humanism expressed itself in ideas and attitudes that have lived on into the 20th century.

1. A speculative philosophy that deals with the nature of man and of the larger reality of which he is a part.

Ralph H. Gabriel is with the School of International Service, American University. Reproduced from Ralph H. Gabriel, *Traditional Values in American Life*, 2d revised ed. (Washington: United States National Commission for UNESCO, 1960), pp. 1-8.

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2. The idea that knowledge has a value in itself; that science, based on accurate observation and correct logic, is an instrument for understanding nature; and that history is a means for making man aware of himself and his values.

3. The idea of an order in the universe and in society capable of discovery by human observation and reason.

4. The idea of natural law in human relations embodying the principles of justice that transcend the capricious wills of men and their rulers and justify hope and expectations of progress toward more perfect human societies.

5. The idea of art as disciplined forms reflecting man in his environment and expressing his feelings, his traditions, and his beliefs. From Greece the idea of architecture as an expression of proportion and harmony, and from Rome as an expression of interior space.

The mind of Western civilization including that of its American variant has been conditioned by the events and developments that followed the defeat of the Roman Empire by the people of western and northern Europe. The European followers of the Christian tradition early divided into an Eastern Orthodox Church which had its center at Constantinople and a Roman Catholic Church which had its center at Rome. In the centuries of confusion and disorder that followed the fall of Rome, a feudal system of interpersonal relationships and mutual obligations arose and maintained a measure of social discipline. On the baron rested the obligation to defend with his armed knights and his fortified castle the freemen and serfs of his domain. Birth fixed the status of the individual person, and an oath bound subordinates to their liege lord.

The hierarchical order of feudalism and the universal authority of the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire were shattered by the rise of new nations. Each nation was defended by royal armies using gunpowder, justified by the political philosophy of Machiavelli and Bodin attributing sovereignty to the prince, and came to be unified by vernacular literature made available by the new printing press, making people aware of common language and stimulating loyalty to the nation. The devastating wars of religion led to the peace of Westphalia which assumed an order, universal in principle but at first confined in practice to Europe, of territorial states equal in the fact of their independence, with relations regulated by the law of nature and nations expounded by Francis of Victoria and Hugo Grotius.

During the several centuries in which feudalism provided the primary system for regulating society, the Roman Catholic Church, spreading Christianity over western and northern Europe, existed as a unifying force amid the diversity of peoples and cultures. Churches and monasteries were built from Sicily to Britain and from Spain to the Baltic. The church not only extended its doctrines and its authority in religious matters throughout the area, but its monasteries preserved the writings of the ancient Greek and Roman world. Out of a desire to extend, as well as to preserve, learning, grew the first universities.

For some centuries after the fall of Rome, the Byzantine Empire extended outward from its capital, Constantinople, into central and eastern Europe. It carried to its frontiers the Eastern Orthodox Church and its own variations of the arts associated with Christian worship and those with secular life. A new era began to dawn for the West as increasingly busy trade routes brought commercial and artistic products from as far away as China and the East Indies to the Mediterranean cities of Venice and Genoa. From these centers of commerce, goods from the East found their way to the towns and castles of western Europe. As the trade with Asia became important for Europeans in the 15th and 16th centuries, nation-states already mentioned began emerging from feudalism – in particular, Portugal, Spain, France, and England. The change did not mean that feudalism disappeared but rather that the monarch became supreme among feudal lords and established his rule within the boundaries of a nation. Contemporaneous with the emergence of nation-states came the discovery of a new world and the opening of an age of exploration and of adventuring by Europeans outside their continent. At the same time occurred a rediscovery of and a new emphasis upon the humanism, learning, and art of ancient Greece leading to naturalism in art and to the development of rational and experimental science.

Amid the intellectual ferment caused by the new perspectives opened by the appearance of the nation-state, the widening geographical horizon, and the emerging of a scientific method, there developed in different parts of Europe revolts against the ecclesiastical authority of the Roman church and against the theological doctrines on which that authority rested. The revolts also sought to end abuses that had arisen within the church. As a consequence of the movements of protest, different Protestant churches made their appearance, especially in the German states, in Scandinavia, in Switzerland, in Holland, and in England.

The expansion of Europe beyond its continental limits stimulated trade. The nation-states assisted and regulated the new trading ventures. An economic system of private enterprise appeared in which interpersonal relationships were governed by contract. Because of its emphasis on the accumulation and management of capital it was called capitalism. Like the nation-state, capitalism grew up beside feudalism, affecting it but not supplanting it. The variety of Protestantism originated by John Calvin in Switzerland and in 17th century England, called Puritanism, reinforced capitalism by sanctifying work (the creation of capital) and by emphasizing saving through refraining from luxurious or riotous living (the accumulation of capital).

In the 16th century, Portugal established settlements in Brazil. At the same time Spain, after conquering advanced American Indian civilizations, built an empire that extended over the remainder of the South American continent and in North America as far as California, Texas, and Florida. In the 17th century different groups of Englishmen, with the approval of the King, but not acting under his formal direction, created settlements along the Atlantic coast. Here the scattered tribes of American Indians had not advanced beyond a hunting and gardening stone-age culture. The red men, however, contributed to the Europeans plants they had domesticated; in particular, tobacco and maize. Also in the 17th century France sent pioneers to the valley of the St. Lawrence and to Nova Scotia and, at the beginning of the 18th, to the mouth of the Mississippi.

These 16th, 17th, and 18th century migrants from Europe carried to the New World the Portuguese, Spanish, English, and French variants of Western civilization. The English variant, first planted on the western shore of the Atlantic from Maine to Georgia, became the United States. But in the course of something more than three centuries the population of what became the United States took on an ethnic diversification. Large numbers of migrants came, particularly in the 19th and early 20th centuries, from all parts of Europe and in small numbers from Asia. Beginning in the 17th century Europeans brought Negroes from Africa to the New World to supply the need for labor. At the beginning of the 19th century the United States put an end to the importation of slaves. But Africa had contributed an element of considerable size to the population of the Nation. Back of the mid-20th century generation of citizens of the United States lies, therefore, an extraordinary ethnic mingling. Ethnic diversity, however, has not prevented the evolution of a unified national culture. The discussions that follow deal with that culture.

AMERICAN VALUES IN POLITICS

American values in politics find their source in the political thought of 17th century England. In that century Parliament, after a long evolution that began in feudal times, emerged as a firmly established lawmaking body. In 1688 Parliament achieved supremacy when that body forced the abdication of James II and invited William and Mary to the throne. The event marked the final triumph of the principle that the people, through their elected representatives, should possess ultimate governmental authority.

John Locke, English philosopher, in arguments intended to justify the bloodless "Revolution of 1688," elaborated political theories that in the 18th century made a powerful impact on European and colonial American thought. He reaffirmed Hobbes's theory of compact; namely, that men originally to put an end to the anarchy of life in a state of nature entered into a compact with one another to establish a government. Locke tied to the idea of compact a theory of natural rights. If the author of nature created man as a rational and independent being, consistency required that man possess natural rights to life, to liberty, and to property. By property Locke meant the clothing, habitations, and tools that enabled men to maintain life. Locke insisted that, when men entered into a compact to establish government, they charged that government with the primary responsibility of defending and preserving these natural rights. If an established government fails in this obligation to preserve the rights to life, liberty, or property, it may lawfully be changed. Locke provided a theoretical foundation for the principle of government by consent of the governed.

The circumstances of the founding in the 17th century of English colonies on the mainland of North America helped the transfer of British political institutions and values to the New World. The English Government as such founded no colony. The Crown rather gave legal authorization to private companies, to groups of persons, or to single persons on their own initiative to found colonies. In the New World the colonists, after difficult first years of adjustment, found ample natural resources to make possible self-sufficient settlements. The American Indians who lived neighbor to these settlements, although they posed a threat, did not represent a danger of such magnitude as to require rigid discipline on the part of the settlers or the maintenance of military garrisons for defense. The conditions of this first English frontier in North America tended to give importance to the individual colonist. He must chop out a clearing in the forest and establish a farm. He must be prepared, as a militiaman, to defend his settlement against an occasional Indian attack. The task of establishing civilization in the 17th century American wilderness was of vast magnitude, and the men to accomplish it were few. This ratio of few men to land extending endlessly westward from the ocean established the importance of the individual person in the society of the 17th century frontier.

The settlers who came from England to occupy and to extend this frontier considered that they brought with them the rights of Englishmen. Colonial charters, either specifically or by implication, confirmed that the rights possessed in the motherland would be retained in the colonies. Chief among their rights was that to share in government through elected representatives. Beginning with Virginia in 1619, colonials in all the provinces elected representative assemblies which made local laws and levied local taxes. In each colony the franchise was limited by property qualifications or for religious reasons. In more thickly settled New England, the men of the towns came together periodically in town meeting to decide by the method of direct democracy upon the disposition of the affairs of the town. The conditions of life on the 17th century frontier, therefore, with its large measure of freedom and with its emphasis on the importance of the individual person, provided an auspicious setting for the principle of government by consent of the governed.

In the 18th century the British colonies in North America expanded, increased in population, and prospered in a favorable environment. Germans and Scotch-Irish who immigrated in substantial numbers at this time, when added to the Swedes and Dutch who had come in the 17th century, created an ethnic complexity that was to characterize the American population increasingly in the later national period. But the political ideas and patterns derived from England continued to be the norms.

In 1776, after a decade of efforts on the part of the British Government to increase and strengthen imperial control, the colonies on the mainland of North America revolted and declared their independence. The rebellion against imperial authority began, however, as a fight for the "rights of Englishmen," threatened by a succession of measures that tended to reduce the authority of the colonial assemblies by enabling the imperial government to tax colonials or to take other measures to assert directly the authority of the King over his American subjects. The American Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the Continental Congress, affirmed that the primary reason for the action was the attempt on the part of the imperial government to make free men in the colonies subject to external power in the direction of which they had no share. The Declaration made the classic statement of the doctrine of political liberty as held by 18th century Americans and by their successors to the present. It follows:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness – that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government . . . .

During the Revolutionary War most of the newly independent states substituted written constitutions for the old colonial charters. The constitution of Massachusetts contained the specific affirmation that it was a compact. It also included a Bill of Rights which, spelling out natural rights in detail, gave them legal status as civil rights. In 1781 Americans established a confederation to which the states ceded claims to western lands be governed by the Congress until carved into new states. George Washington, commander in chief of the armies of the rebellion, led the Revolution to its successful conclusion in 1783, nearly eight years after he accepted his commission. When peace came, Washington in an action intended to confirm the supremacy of civil over military authority appeared before the Continental Congress and surrendered his commission to its President.

In 1787, four years after the close of the Revolutionary War, representatives of the states meeting in convention at Philadelphia drafted a written constitution for the United States that, superseding the Confederation, established the Nation as a Federal Republic. The ratification of this Constitution by the states made it the supreme law of the land. The people of the United States, through their representatives in the Constitutional Convention and in the ratifying conventions of the states, had of their own will established their own government. Almost immediately after the inauguration of the new government, a Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution. These first amendments enumerated the necessary rights of free men in a self-governing nation and gave them the legal status of civil rights.

Out of the heritage from England, the experience with government in the colonies, the struggle for independence, the weakness of the Confederation, the creation of the Federal Republic, and the experience of more than a century and a half of independence, including four years of civil war (1861–65), have come American values in the area of politics.

1. The concept of the state as a utilitarian device created to provide for the common defense and to further the general welfare.

2. Freedom and responsibility of the individual adult citizen to have a voice in the government under which he lives as exemplified in the right and responsibility to vote.

3. Freedom of access to knowledge of all kinds save only when disclosure of particular information would endanger the whole community. This access is achieved through a system of public education, the practice of academic freedom, and the existence of a free press.

4. Freedom to express orally or in writing opinions honestly held concerning economic, religious, political, or social matters. In the case of political opinions, this freedom is limited by the requirement that actions to carry opinions into effect must conform to the procedures for changing the policies or structure of the state as set forth in the Constitution of the United States. A further general limitation is that expression of opinion must not be so inciting as to create a clear and present danger of panic or disorder.

5. The protection of the free citizen against unreasonable invasions of privacy by officers of government.

6. The right of free citizens to assemble peaceably.

7. The supremacy of civil authority over the military in conformity with the principle that the civil authority is the decisionmaking power and the military is the instrument, when needed, to carry decisions into effect.

8. The concept of the American Federation as a "permanent union of permanent states," firmly established after the Civil War, maintained by judicial enforcement of the Constitution and forbidding nullification or secession on the part of the states.

Efforts throughout our national history to realize fully the principle of citizen participation in government suggest the evolutionary character of American values. By the end the first third of the 19th century practically all of the states had extended the right to vote to all male citizens 21 or over. As the century ended, most of the states had passed laws requiring that a voter cast his ballot in secret. These laws were intended to prevent the improper manipulation of elections by threats or bribery of electors. In 1920 an amendment to the Constitution gave to women citizens the right to vote. In the first half of the 20th century, the states in the southern part of the United States where Negroes were very numerous sharply limited by legislative enactment or by administrative procedures the number of Negro citizens permitted to vote. In the middle decades of the century, the Supreme Court of the United States struck down these enactments and administrative procedures that came within its jurisdiction on the ground that they were contrary to the Constitution, which by amendment after the Civil War forbade any limitation of voting on grounds of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude." In 1960 Congress enacted a second measure which gave to the Federal courts specific powers to ensure the right to vote to any citizen illegally deprived of it.

American experience has proven that even constitutional government does not nullify the validity of the ancient adage that power tends to corrupt. In the fierce competition for public office, candidates have occasionally been guilty of venality or have practiced fraud. Also elected and appointed officials have sometimes used the powers of public office for private gain. To correct abuses in political campaigns Congress has enacted legislation regulating contributions to political parties and dealing with their expenditures in such contests. Through appropriate committees Congress has investigated officials and agencies charged with administrative responsibilities. It has turned its attention to the formulation of rules of behavior for the guidance of public officials. The misdeeds of a small minority have emphasized, however, that for the majority public office is a public trust.

Since the establishment of the Nation, each generation of Americans has faced in one form or another the problem of maintaining freedom of speech and of the press. The exercise of these rights has at one time or another been threatened in local communities where tensions arising out of religious, racial, or political issues exacerbated the relations between a dominant majority and a dissenting minority. In the decade following the close of World War II some public anxiety concerning the extent of subversive activities within the Nation raised the problem again. The conviction on grounds of conspiracy of the leaders of the American Communist Party added to tensions created by the discovery that certain government employees had passed classified information to a foreign power. These and later political developments of a related nature precipitated a series of widespread official investigations in public spheres, in private industry working under government contract, and among private institutions and organizations. This in turn led to a series of highly publicized accusations and counteraccusations and public hearings which were covered by press, radio, and television and given national and to some extent international publicity. This episode, occuring just after the turn of mid-20th century, is one that is so well known at home and abroad that it needs no further elaboration. Among the results of this dramatic period there emerged a general strengthening of public appreciation of the importance of the basic freedoms and the necessity for constant vigilance to protect those freedoms.

2. THE STATE OF AMERICAN VALUES

Suzanna McBee and the domestic bureaus of
U.S. News and World Report

Rarely, if ever, in American history have questions of morality been so troubling for ordinary people.

The Nation's leadership – political, religious, and scholastic – is sharply divided on issues ranging from family values to business ethics to sexual behavior to drug abuse.

Every day seems to carry new challenges to old codes of conduct. Headlines and television screens bring into homes disturbing news about corruption in government, business, sports, and centers of learning. Just this year:

– The Pentagon launches an investigation of 45 of the Nation's top 100 defense contractors for bribery, kickbacks, false claims, bid rigging, and overcharges.

– E.F. Hutton & Company, the stockbrokerage, pleads guilty to defrauding banks of tens of millions of dollars and is fined 2 million dollars.

– Major student cheating scandals are disclosed at Stanford University, the University of California at Berkeley, and the University of Southern California.

– Professional baseball players admit to using cocaine, a major point-shaving scandal hits the Tulane University basketball squad, and several other schools are cited for recruiting violations.

– Kickbacks to Salvation Army officials are admitted by two Philadelphia exporters who said they sought favored treatment in purchasing used clothes from the charitable organization.

– A New York socialite whose ancestors go back to Mayflower Pilgrims is set free with a token fine after confessing that she ran a million-dollar-a-year prostitution ring.

Now, in reaction to disclosures of scandals and to unresolved ethical questions, many people are reexaminiming their values and searching for guidance. Some are confused by contemporary practices. Those who are firm in their moral convictions – who do not cheat on their spouses, business deals, taxes, or tests – wonder why so many others seem at such a loss in knowing right from wrong.

Theologian Robert McAfee Brown, a Dartmouth fellow, observes that those struggling with issues of morality are "developing a much stiffer spine. Here and there, you see marvelous instances of personal integrity, of people standing up, taking risks."

The reasons for Americans' moral dilemmas are matters of argument on political circuits, in religious conferences, in university seminars,

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and at family dinner tables. Opinions fly in all directions. To put the debate in focus, *U.S. News & World Report* posed a broad range of questions to experts in social behavior and just plain folks across the country. The following report is a sampling of current attitudes and trends.

WHY ARE QUESTIONS OF MORALITY SO POPULAR

"Morality is more discussed now that it was 10 years ago because people are up in the air," says Rabbi Robert Hirt of Yeshiva University. "They're asking, 'Where am I? Where do I fit in? What is important to me? They are looking for anchors."

Philosopher William Prior of the University of Colorado says, "Morality is more popular because of the attention the national media have given to such issues as abortion, euthanasia, and the right of the elderly to health care. Things of that sort have caused the society to focus on ethics in a way that people didn't 20 years ago. Ethics is very much in the public eye."

Michael Novak, specialist in religion and public policy at the American Enterprise Institute, contends that the problem dates back to the 1930s. "Many millions of American parents, born poor during the Depression, didn't know how to bring up their children during conditions of affluence. We knew how to bring them up under conditions of poverty because that's how we were brought up. But we didn't know what to do with affluence." As a result, says Novak, "the whole Nation made many serious mistakes, and the whole Nation almost lost its way."

Perceiving a vacuum, religious figures are all over the public arena. Catholic bishops, rabbis, and leaders of other denominations become activists against the nuclear-arms race. The Christian Right pushes abortion, pornography, and homosexuality to the fore of political debate. Jesse Jackson, a Baptist minister who ran for the Presidency in 1984, argues the fate of Soviet Jewry with Kremlin boss Mikhail Gorbachev. Evangelist Pat Robertson, President of the Christian Broadcasting Network, prepares a run for the White House in 1988 on a morality ticket.

Americans have always been concerned with moral issues. Monumental topics of right and wrong are the chapters of U.S. history–the Salem witch trials, emancipation of slaves, Teapot Dome scandal, prohibition, McCarthyism, desegregation, Vietnam, and Watergate.

Today, however, the focus is more on personal morality. The subject has even become a partytime diversion. This Christmas, "Trivial Pursuit" has been succeeded by "A Question of Scruples" as the hot new

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board game. Invented by Canadian writer Henry Makow, who calls morality "one of the last great subjects to come out of the closet," the game "raises questions of the small and large moral dilemmas we face every day but don't talk about." Examples: Your car will soon need a new transmission: do you sell it without telling the buyer? A friend forgets about a book you borrowed, want to have, and can't find anywhere else; do you keep it? You're pregnant, and you're not sure the child is your husband's; do you tell him? Different players give different answers, and the winner is the one who best anticipates the answers of others.

Consensus on many such moral questions does not exist.

From parents and from the President come pleas for schools to teach youngsters the difference between right and wrong. Higher education is already trying to respond to such demands: colleges and universities are offering 11,000 courses on applied ethics in fields ranging through business, medicine, engineering, nursing, and social work. These courses, observes Clark University philosopher Christina Hoff Sommers, are attracting unprecedented numbers of students. Yet Sommers, whose new book, *Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life*, has attracted wide attention, laments: "Too little attention is paid to the personal aspects of morality–courage, compassion, generosity, honor, and self-respect, or, on the negative side, hyprocrisy, self-deception, jealousy, and narcissism."

HOW HAVE THE NATION'S VALUES CHANGED?

In many respects, morality is a moving target.

On certain subjects, Americans have simply changed their minds. Gambling used to be widely condemned. Now, many more churches run bingo games, and 22 states and the District of Columbia operate lotteries. Drinking used to be widely condemned. Now, nearly two thirds of Americans drink at least occasionally.

Premarital sex used to be widely condemned. Today, it is commonplace, although many still consider it a moral lapse. Federal statistics show that about half of the women who married during the early 1960s said they had sex before their weddings. Now, more than four fifths report they had sexual experience. On average, U.S. girls have their first sexual intercourse at age 16, boys at 15½. "Premarital sex is seen as part of discovery," says Alexander Sedgwick, dean of arts and sciences at the University of Virginia. "Some young people would rather know their partner in all respects before making a final commitment."

Notes a woman college student at Northwestern University: "There has to be concern about birth control and getting an education before people engage in premaritial sex, but it's not wrong. It's perfectly natural."

When Nebraskans were polled about their attitudes toward the relationship between Governor Bob Kerrey and actress Debra Winger, including her occasional stays at the governor's mansion, 76 percent said they were not troubled and an additional 12 percent said it was nobody's business.

Attitudes don't seem to have changed about adultery, considered wrong since Old Testament days. Behavior has altered, however. Studies in the 1950s and 1960s indicated women then were far less likely than men to have extramarital affairs. But a recent Yale University study for *Psychology Today* of 7,500 readers showed that 45 percent of women as well as 45 percent of men said they had cheated on their spouses or longtime lovers. The study's coauthor, Peter Salovey, explains, "With greater emphasis on sexual freedom and with more women working outside the home, it's not surprising to find them behaving similarly to men."

Yet promiscuity is sometimes seen in a different light these days. During the past couple of years, people have been forced to weigh promiscuity against the hazards of acquiring diseases such as herpes and AIDS.

For some, honesty depends on the circumstances. As sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset of Stanford observes: "Everybody lies. But the question is, to what extent do you consciously deceive others? Do you exaggerate to impress a girl or a guy? Do you fudge on your curriculum vitae to impress an employer? Do you twist the truth to succeed in your job?"

No one knows whether the truth is more twisted today than in the past. But some scholars think it is. Alexander Astin, director of the Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA, finds in his annual surveys of some 250,000 college freshmen that young people "are less concerned with altruism, with helping society, and more concerned with making money and getting power and status than they were in the past." He speculates, "When you put these things ahead of everything else, it becomes easier to rationalize lying or cheating in pursuit of your goals."

Nevertheless, many continue to be trustworthy. Explains religious historian Martin Marty of the University of Chicago: "A lot of morality comes from fidelity. People say: 'I am not going to do something that would embarrass or hurt my spouse or family.' "

Has cheating risen over the years? Experts are unsure. A 1961 national study revealed that at least half the students surveyed had cheated since coming to college. Today, Stanford University, while investigating 23 students accused of collaborating on psychology tests, claims that its cheating rate has remained constant, and low, over the last two decades. However, Watson Laetsch, vice chancellor for undergraduate affairs at Berkeley, says, "We see an anything-I-want-to-do-is-right attitude. Some carnivorous parents put on such pressure for good grades that their kids will do just about anything to get them."

WHAT DILEMMAS CONFRONT AMERICA?

It is not easy to make moral decisions today. Truth is complicated, and often the whole truth cannot be known. This fact, observes Brandeis Professor Sissela Bok in her popular treatise *Lying*, allows many people to excuse dishonesty on grounds "that it does not matter whether or not we lie when we have a good reason for doing so."

Jim Krile, sociology researcher at the University of Minnesota, notes, "There seems to be an informal value that basically it's O.K. to do some things because everybody does it. If you're on expense account and don't claim the full per diem allowed, you're nuts. If a guy steals a wrench off the assembly line, that's wrong. But if a guy takes 2 hours for lunch – in effect, steals an hour from the company – that's O.K."

A major legal and ethical dilemma for Americans is abortion. Before 1973, it was illegal in most states and practiced *sub rosa*. Today, it is legal in most cases, widely practiced, and under furious attack. Noting that many Catholic women are having abortions, Giles Milhaven, religious-studies professor at Brown University, says, "The debate becomes, how can you justify your actions when they are at odds with the theory and morality you were brought up with?"

In the *U.S. News* survey, people were asked whether, if they had a 15-year-old unmarried daughter who had recently become pregnant, they would advise her to have an abortion. Fifty-seven percent said no; 25 percent said yes; 9 percent said it would be up to the 15-year-old, and another 9 percent said they did not know what they would do.

Teen pregnancy has become so acute that groups across the Nation are trying to combat it. One approach: Girls Clubs in Omaha, Memphis, Dallas, and Wilmington, Delaware, are trying to teach teens to say no to sexual activity. Another effort – by Delta Sigma Theta, the largest black women's sorority in the country – is aimed at helping single mothers financially and spiritually. Noting that 55 percent of black children are born to single mothers, sorority leaders have called illegitimacy "a national problem." Marty of the University of Chicago says, "The issue that plagues me the most is our numbness, our paralysis toward our permanent underclass." John Noonan, a Berkeley law professor and nominee to the U.S. Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, notes that numbers of the aged and medical costs for them are soaring. "How the old and infirm are cared for will be one of the great moral issues of the coming decades," he says. As the late French author Simone de Beauvoir said "By the fate it allots to its members who can no longer work, society gives itself away."

Decisions on prolonging the lives of elderly and terminally ill patients are causing some of the deepest anxieties, prompting many to sign living wills or to grant trusted friends or relatives the power of attorney to make decisions in the event that they can no longer decide for themselves.

Willingness to serve society is yet another concern. Washington sociologist Amitai Etzioni cites a recent study showing that young people "believe their right to be tried by a jury is critical to a free society, but practically none of them said they would serve on a jury. Also, they said they want to be defended, but they don't want to serve in the armed forces. So there has been a decline in such commitment."

DO DIFFERENT STANDARDS PREVAIL AT WORK?

The conventional wisdom is that standards are higher at home. And most experts agree that it is easier to be dishonest at work because ties are less personal.

"People used to identify with their company. Now, they regard work more as an economic relationship and less as a moral relationship," says University of Colorado philosopher Prior. "There's far less loyalty."

The economic costs of disloyalty are enormous. By one estimate, American workers will "steal" at least 160 billion dollars from their employers this year by arriving late, leaving early, and misusing time on the job.

Cheating, stealing, and lying at work have "really popped to the surface since the recessions of the early 1980s," says James Walls, whose firm, Stanton Corporation of Charlotte, N.C., provides businesses with "honesty tests" for job applicants. Walls reports that about 3 of every 10 prospective retail workers admit stealing from a previous employer and adds: "It's enough to knock you over."

Business may not be the "society of wolves and coyotes" that author-lawyer Louis Auchincloss claims it is. But the boss is not always a role model either. Consider the former president of E. F. Hutton, who told a skeptical congressional committee in November that he was unaware of the check-kiting scheme that reaped millions of dollars in interest income for the brokerage in the early 1980s.

To curb corruption, business after business is adopting stringent codes of ethics. Arms makers, some on their own and some prodded by the Pentagon, are going back to basics. McDonnell Douglas Corporation, for instance, gives employes a laminated code based on the Boy Scouts creed. General Dynamics – heavily fined by the Navy for overbilling and gift giving – now makes every one of its 99,000 employees sign a document forbidding "bribes, kickbacks, or illegal payments of cash."

The extent to which bribery has become rampant in some places was shown this year by the New York City Department of Investigations. Officials caught a veteran building inspector taking a bribe, got him to cooperate with their probe, then wired him with a recording device and sent him on daily rounds. He visited homes and businesses of 15 ordinary New Yorkers and in each case was offered cash. In three months, he collected more than $4,000 without asking for a penny. "It's one of the most disturbing cases that we've handled," observes Commissioner Patrick McGinley. "These good citizens offered the inspector money on a totally unsolicited basis. If you can't get the man in the street to do the right thing, there's no way you can really stop corruption."

HOW DO PEOPLE DECIDE ON MORAL QUESTIONS?

Americans used to take their cues from family, school, and religion. They still do but to a lesser extent. Today, a fourth of all young children grow up in single-parent families. Studies show many such youngsters have less self-esteem, less sense of responsibility.

"Teaching values has always been a cooperative effort by the family and the social institutions," says philosopher Sommers. "Parents could count on honesty being taught in the church or the synagogue, or in the Boy Scouts. Now, you have TV instead, but it is hard to see what moral values, if any, are taught by TV. The institutions where moral values are usually reinforced have fallen apart."

Frank Newman, President of the Education Commission of the States, says that "by the time the typical student graduates from high school, he or she has spent more hours with TV (15,000) than with teachers (12,000). The most important point is not, however, what a child experiences while in front of the television set but what he or she does *not* experience. Increasingly, the child is cast as an observer rather than a participant in life's events."

Children – and adults – are less influenced today by authority figures. More and more, people seek guidance from one another. Some 15 million Americans who find they cannot cope alone have latched on to self-help groups – clubs for people with similar problems. There are a half-million support organizations, from the grandparent of them all – Alcoholics Anonymous – to newer offshoots such as Tough Love, an organization for parents with rebellious children.

Religion still plays a role, however. In the *U.S. News* survey, 38 percent of adults under 30, about half of those 30 to 44, and 60 percent of those over 45 said religion affected their ethical and moral behavior "a great deal."

Yet pollster George Gallup, Jr., told a Christian symposium on November 2, "Church attendance makes little difference in people's ethical views and behavior with respect to lying, cheating, pilferage, and not reporting theft."

IS THE LAW DOING ITS JOB?

On most issues of personal morality, the pervasive American attitude is: Leave me alone, keep the law out. As Father Richard McCormick of Georgetown University puts it: "The aspirations of the law should be modest." Alexander Horniman of the University of Virginia adds that "the law sets parameters, beyond which is the jungle." It may be true, as the saying goes, that you can't legislate morality, but the law does enforce values on such matters as marriage, divorce, drugs, prostitution, and pornography, as well as rights for minorities and women. Abortion again is before the Supreme Court, which legalized it in 1973 and reaffirmed the ruling a decade later. Congress, too, is weighing an administration-backed bill to ban Federal funds for family-planning clinics that inform clients about abortion as an alternative to unwanted pregnancy.

Local governments and businesses are attempting to legislate a broad range of moral issues. Wisconsin, trying to combat teenage pregnancy, has adopted a law holding parents financially responsible if their daughters under 18 have babies. New York, Virginia, and North Carolina have passed new pornography laws banning the display of sexually explicit reading matter in stores. Thirty-one states, prodded by Congress, have passed measures raising the legal drinking age to 21. Some telephone companies are asking courts to decide whether they are obliged to carry phone messages supplied by "adult entertainment" firms.

Countering social-control efforts is a bill gaining support in Congress that would bar use of lie-detector tests in the workplace. Such tests, often inaccurate and not admissible as court evidence, are used by industry to screen about 2 million workers every year. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is fighting the proposed ban, arguing that employee theft raises the cost of consumer goods by as much as 15 percent.

WHERE IS THE COUNTRY HEADED?

"Every time you think the place is falling apart, you see signs that people are concerned, that they still have their humanness."

The sentiment is from Joseph Lee, 29, a first-generation American of Chinese descent, a seminary graduate in San Francisco and soon to be associate minister of the Chinese Presbyterian Church in New York City. "There is a greater acceptance of diversity," he adds, "and somewhere in that acceptance, morality comes in."

Over the last several decades, minorities, the poor, and the elderly have benefited from a raft of social programs. "Our sensitivity to people is probably unprecedented," says Brown University's Professor Milhaven.

Yet against that progress comes worry over drug use, in addition to promiscuity and family breakup. The *U.S. News* poll showed that 20 percent of young adults have tried cocaine and half of those under 30 have smoked marijuana. Attorney General Edwin Meese, citing the Nation's 24 million cocaine users, warns, "A national disaster is in the making."

Some social critics find hope in the mere fact that morality is now a topic of concern. "The discussion of character was missing from American life for more than a generation," says Novak of the American Enterprise Institute. "The Nation's return to this discussion is one of the decisive events of the last 20 years."

In business and professional fields, for example, leaders are engaged in considerable soul-searching. The Hastings Center, a key force in medical ethics, reports that its newsletter has grown rapidly to 10,000 subscribers. Medical schools also are moving fast to include more ethics courses that deal with such questions as how and when to use modern medicine's life-extending technology.

Among other professions, the banking industry is working on a stricter code to curb conflicts of interest. However, law is still lagging behind other fields, according to the Rev. Gerald Cavanagh, a business professor at the University of Detroit and author of *American Business Values*. The American Bar Association, he says, rejected the toughest proposals suggested by a committee to tighten the ethics code for lawyers. Ethics codes aside, Cavanagh observes that humiliation can be a major deterrent, especially for top executives. He gives the example of Paul Thayer, the former deputy defense secretary and ex-chairman of LTV who is now serving four years in a stock-fraud case. Still, he insists that "most of us have a child's notion of ethics and a graduate-school notion of finance, marketing, and management."

Religious leaders note that many Jews and Catholics, in particular, are looking more to their religious roots and that Christian fundamentalism has grown rapidly because it provides direct answers. The *U.S. News* poll found that 64 percent of Americans believe in a personal God and 26 percent believe in God as a governing force. Jacqueline Wexler, President of the National Conference on Christians and Jews, observes that Americans are searching for real meaning in their lives and that those "with hungry and skeptical minds" will push mainline religion to respond.

IS THE MORAL PERSON FOOLISH?

"From giving the money back, I've had the personal satisfaction of actually doing what my conscience told me was the right thing to do."

That's from William Taylor, 39, owner of a medical-supply firm in San Diego, who was driving home recently when he ran over cash blowing down the street. Taylor and three other drivers stopped. Taylor collected $2,400 and took it to police. They turned it over to the owner, who had withdrawn it from his bank, left it in an envelope on top of his car – and then had driven off.

Taylor says he was later asked: "Why would you want to do this?" His reply: "I felt it was my duty." Since the incident was reported in local newspapers, Taylor says, his company's answering service has gotten about 50 calls from people praising him and offering to send their business to his firm.

Melvin and Linda Dixon of Miami read about the plight of an illiterate farmer facing eviction in Cochran, Georgia, Mrs. Dixon's hometown. In November, the couple arranged to buy his land and let him live on it for life. Linda Dixon explained that the farmer, Oscar Lorick, had been kind to her family when she was a child.

The Taylors and Dixons of the Nation confirm that a large well of decency still exists. Benevolence, order, and trust are what make the society function.

As the late Walter Lippmann once noted: "If you remove authority and discipline and tradition, what you create is an unsatisfied need, a vacuum, which is then filled by some other tradition and by some other form of authority."

Lippman concluded: "The ideals of a good life are not a code of rules defined by busybodies and old gentlemen with gray beards. These ideal standards of what is good and what is honorable define the hygiene of the spirit by which the good life becomes possible."

Where individuals should be cautious, warn social scientists and theologians, is in forcing their own standards upon others. In the words of the Reverend McKinley Young of Big Bethel AME Church in Atlanta: "When you find somebody waving all those flags and banners, watch closely. Morality, if you're not careful, carries a sense of self-righteousness. Whenever you pat yourself on the back, it creates all kinds of cramps."

CHAPTER III

The rapidly growing strength of the Republican Party since 1980 has enabled it to challenge the Democratic Party throughout the Nation in Federal, State, and local elections and give the country a balanced and highly competitive two-party system. Each party, however, represents a shifting coalition of disparate elements, some of which have only a transient allegiance to the party stemming from the salient issues of the moment. Since these issues constantly fluctuate in importance, the composition of each party changes from election to election. The Democratic Party, moreover, is often more liberal than the center of gravity of its constituent elements, and the Republican Party similarly is often more conservative than its center of gravity. Furthermore, since the tendency within each party is for it to distance itself increasingly from the interests of a majority of its constituents, cyclical swings are common, even within periods of one-party dominance.

In their 1985 article, "The New Two-Party System," Cavanagh and Sundquist have traced the rise of the Republican Party since 1980 to a position of near parity with the Democratic Party, and they have documented this growth at the Federal, State, and local levels in all parts of the country. They have interpreted this trend as indicating the probability of a major party realignment. At the end of their article, however, they recognize the impact of shifting public moods and the propensity of each party when long in power to wear out its welcome and to introduce its own set of problems. To illustrate this point, they mention several areas in which the Reagan Administration has adopted policies in opposition to the preferences of a majority of the electorate, foreshadowing the shift in popular support evidenced in the 1986 elections. Since that election, the credibility and popular support of the Reagan Administration have suffered severely as a result of the Iran-Contra affair, the report of the Tower Commission, and the congressional hearings. One of the lessons to be learned from this experience is that unforeseeable domestic and/or international crises can swiftly reverse political trends which logical extrapolation would deem highly probable and make long-term prediction extremely hazardous.

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III

THE NEW TWO-PARTY SYSTEM

THOMAS E. CAVANAGH AND JAMES L. SUNDQUIST

Each time a Republican President has been elected or reelected by a landslide in the years since World War II – and that has happened five times in the last nine elections – Republicans have jubilantly proclaimed the final collapse of the modern era of Democratic dominance. After the first four of those victories – in 1952, 1956, 1972, and 1980 – they were disappointed. When things settled down, the Democrats remained dominant everywhere but in the White House. They continued to hold most of the seats in Congress and the state legislatures and to elect most of the governors and big-city mayors most of the time. And after two of those landslides, 1956 and 1972, they snapped back to win the White House at the next election.

From a reading of the election returns alone, one might quickly add 1984 to the list of Republican disappointments. GOP (Grand Old Party (Republican)) strength was not strikingly evident below the presidential level on Ronald Reagan's reelection day: The Democrats posted a net gain of two seats in the Senate, and they lost only 15 or 16 in the House (depending on a recount in Indiana), one governorship, and five of the Nation's 98 state legislative houses that are chosen through partisan competition.[1] These modest setbacks were not enough to wipe out their gains in the midterm election of 1982. The Democrats are actually stronger by a couple of seats in the Senate, a dozen in the House, and a half dozen governorships than they were when President Reagan was first inaugurated. Though still outnumbered 53 to 47 in the Senate, they hold 34 of the 50 governorships, 66 of the 98 partisan state legislative houses, and 58 percent of the U.S. House of Representatives.

Nevertheless, if one looks beyond the election returns to a more fundamental indicator of basic party strength, 1984 does differ from the earlier Republican landslide years. That indicator is party identification, the number of people who consider themselves to be members of a

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[1] The Republicans gained four houses while one, in New Mexico, reverted to a tie. The New Mexico legislature is effectively controlled by a conservative coalition of Republicans and boll weevil Democrats, however. Nebraska's unicameral legislature is nonpartisan and hence excluded from the total.

party. When a voter tells a pollster, "I am a Republican" or "I am a Democrat," he or she is expressing a commitment far deeper than that of one who merely says, "I voted for the Republican [or Democratic] presidential candidate this year." Party identification structures an individual's voting choices over time and over the various levels of office; it represents what the voter professes to be his normal political behavior.

By the measure of party identification, the Republican gains during the 1984 campaign season were impressive. The GOP did not replace the Democrats as a new majority party in the Nation, but it appears to have drawn almost even. For the first time since 1934 the country may now have a well-balanced, competitive two-party system at the national level instead of the one-and-one-half-party system it has known since the great realignment of the New Deal era. If the Republicans can solidify most of their gains, American politics will have entered an era quite distinct from that of the half century that separated Franklin Roosevelt from Ronald Reagan.

CONTOURS OF A NEW ALIGNMENT

A new political era is marked by a new structure of party competition, and the passage from an old era to a new is usually called a realignment. But that term has acquired a variety of meanings, frequently vague and sometimes contradictory, as it has passed from the realm of political science into common usage. Before the shape of a new era can be sketched, the word *realignment* and some concepts related to it need to be defined – not necessarily for others, but at least as they will be used in this discussion.[2]

For our purposes the *strength* of a party is measured not by the number of people who vote for it in any given election but by the number of people who feel they belong to it. The *alignment* of the party system reflects the composition of the strength of each competing party in terms of identifiable groups – demographic, occupational, religious, ethnic, ideological, or whatever – to which individuals belong. The *line of cleavage* between the parties is created by the combination of issues and circumstances that have generated the partisan attachments. A *realignment* denotes a relocation of the line of cleavage, with a redistribution – enduring rather than transitory – of some members of some voting groups on opposite sides of the line, resulting in reconstitution of the parties' strengths.

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[2] For a more detailed discussion of the realignment concept, see James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, rev. ed. (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1983), pp. 3-14.

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Realignments occur when a change in the agenda of politics causes established voters to reconsider and alter the party affiliations they had formed on the basis of the previously prevailing agenda and causes new voters to form party affiliations different from those that persons of like origin and circumstances formed in the preceding generation. In other words, a realignment occurs if, and only if, the parties quarrel over a new set of issues, and the displacement of one set of conflicts by another leads to a lasting shift in the parties' electoral bases of support. If the shift is massive, as when a major party is supplemented by a new party, or when a minority party becomes the majority party, a major realignment has occurred. If the restructuring is on a lesser scale, the realignment is a minor one. To complicate matters further, separate realigning forces can be operating simultaneously, set in motion by different issues that cleave the electorate along different lines.

Historians and political scientists have identified five successive systems of party competition in the country's history, each so distinct from its predecessor that the realignment that brought it into being could clearly be classified as major. Each era was ushered in by one or more critical elections that centered on a set of issues hotly contested between the parties and that resulted in extraordinary and lasting alterations in the composition and strength of the two major parties. The first party system, which pitted the Federalists against the Jeffersonian Republicans (and which succeeded a brief period without parties after the Constitution was adopted), was established in the Adams-Jefferson presidential contests of 1796 and 1800. After the slow disappearance of the Federalists, the Jacksonian victory of 1828 ushered in a new era of competition between Democrats (descended from the Jeffersonian Republicans) and Whigs. As the slavery issue came to the fore, a new Republican party eclipsed the Whigs in the 1850s and enjoyed a narrow edge over the Democrats for the next four decades. The election of 1896, fought between a conservative GOP and a Democratic party radicalized by the absorption of the Populist movement, resulted in a regionally based party system with a solid Republican majority entrenched everywhere outside the Deep South and the border states. Finally, in the turmoil of the Great Depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt assembled a new majority Democratic coalition of blue-collar ethnics in the northern cities, liberal activists, southern whites, and blacks.[3] Though frayed and tattered in the following decades, the Democratic majority remained – at least until the 1980s – as the recognizable lineal descendant of the Roosevelt coalition, united by the same ideological approach to government and confronting the Republicans along the line of cleavage defined by the issues of the Depression era.

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[3] William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham, eds., *The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development*, 2d ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

On the basis of historical experience, then, a major realignment is overdue. Yet applying to the circumstances of the 1980s the conceptual apparatus derived from the study of major realignments of the past yields considerable ambiguity. The line of cleavage established in the 1930s has not been superseded by a new one cutting across the electorate in a different direction, carved by a fresh and powerful issue that arose to dominate political discussion – as the issue of slavery did in the 1850s, free silver in the 1980s, and relief of Depression hardship in the 1930s. The quarrel between the parties in 1984 centered on the same set of issues that impelled the New Deal realignment: What is the proper role of government? How big, how active, and how expensive should it be? How much should the haves be taxed for the benefit of the have-nots? How activist should the government be in redistributing wealth and income and opportunity from the more to the less favored and in protecting citizens against the hazards of life?

To some extent the debate has been carried on in the familiar language of the past half century. When the Republicans appear to threaten broadly based social security and medicare and the Democrats spring to the defense of those creations of their golden years, the New Deal alignment is reinforced. The arguments of 1981 over how the benefits of tax reduction should be distributed found the parties in their accustomed roles, the Democrats striving to appear more solicitous of working men and women and painting the GOP as partial to the corporations and the rich. Of late the advantage of this debate appears to have gone to the Republicans as skepticism toward governmental intervention has grown, particularly when that intervention has concentrated its benefits on minorities and the poor. Many Democrats have edged away from the liberal activism that the party has traditionally espoused, and some have moved so far as to cross the old line of party cleavage and declare themselves Republicans. This is not a realigment in our usage of the word as long as the line of cleavage remains as originally defined; it is simply a shift in the party balance within the existing alignment.

Yet the debate between the parties on the old role-of-government and economic policy issues has been placed in such a new ideological context in the 1980s by the radicalized Republican party of Ronald Reagan that the distinction between the parties may have taken on quite new meanings, especially for young people whose political awareness does not go back to New Deal days or even to the era of the Great Society. To that extent the line of party cleavage can be seen as having shifted, with much the same impact on the party system that a new line born of wholly new issues might hypothetically have had. The

Republican party is no longer the party of austerity, the party of balanced budgets and tight money that, in its obsession with inflation, produced recessions under Presidents Eisenhower, Nixon, and Ford. The adoption of supplyside economics has given it a new rhetoric of growth and opportunity, and its policies have given priority to tax reduction for both individuals and corporations with an almost casual disregard for deficits far larger than those for which it used to castigate the Democrats. Meanwhile, Walter Mondale chose to seize the mantle of austerity for his party, proclaiming the virtues of fiscal responsibility and tax increases. By election day of 1984 it seemed clear that substantial numbers of voters were forming or reforming their party identities on the basis of new party images. The Democratic party was seen not as the traditional defender of the middle class but as tax collector for the welfare state, the Republican party not as the tool of Wall Street and the rich but as the instrument to bring about widespread economic growth and opportunity. To the extent that the pattern of allegiances was being redrawn in response to new perceptions of the parties, a realignment can be said to have been taking place, whether or not the Republicans emerged as the majority party when the process was complete.

In addition, two new clusters of issues have arisen during the past two decades that cut across the traditional economic alignment altogether, and on these issues the two parties have taken distinguishable stands. In the past when such new crosscutting issues have been of sufficient power to dominate the country's politics, they have produced major realignments. The crosscutting issues of the 1980s have not possessed that magnitude of impact, but they have undoubtedly contributed to the party choices of some voters and hence can be classed as minor realigning forces.

The first of these sets of issues concerns the relative weight to be accorded military strength and negotiation in dealing with the Soviet Union and the third world. The bitter conflict between hawks and doves over the Vietnam War led to the capture of the Democratic presidential nomination by the antiwar McGovern insurgency in 1972. The American withdrawal removed much of the intensity from the dispute, but the same players have generally lined up on the same sides in subsequent fights over détente, the Panama Canal treaty, President Carter's human rights policy, the SALT II treaty, and the Reagan military buildup.

The second cluster of new issues, often given the catchall label "the social issue," has arisen from conservative objections to liberal Federal policy (especially on the part of the courts) on such questions of values and morals as school prayer, abortion, women's rights, busing, affirmative action, crime, gun control, pornography, and homosexual

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rights. While the Republicans have staked out increasingly conservative–or, literally, reactionary–positions on these concerns, the Democrats have blunted the realignment potential of some issues, especially the racially tinged ones of busing and affirmative action, by straddling them. But in other cases, such as the equal rights amendment, clear policy differences between the parties have emerged, and probably in every case a difference in the degree of fervor and commitment is evident to the single-issue or religiously motivated voter who looks to some aspect of the social issue as the basis for political decisions.

MEASURING PARTY ATTACHMENTS

A realignment implies a lasting change in partisanship, and to endure, such a change must be attitudinal as well as behavioral. Merely voting for one or more of a party's candidates is not in itself sufficient proof of partisanship, because a member of one party may cross the party line in a particular election without in any sense belonging to the opposition party. If the defection is motivated by the characteristics of the candidate rather than of the opposition party, then the defector's underlying partisanship remains essentially undisturbed. And of course a true independent can vote for years without feeling attached to any party at all.

Political affiliation is much like church affiliation. Being a Democrat or a Republican, like being a Catholic or a Baptist or a Presbyterian, is a part of one's identity. Once acquired, the affiliation is not quickly and easily changed. One may not go to services regularly–may even go to another church on occasion–but will still remain a member of one's denomination. Similarly, a party member may visit another political church on election day, attracted by the music or the sermon or the charisma of the preacher, without undergoing conversion and gaining a new political identity.

Much has been written about the process whereby individuals acquire a partisan identity. In its infancy this literature drew heavily upon the discipline of social psychology and tended to emphasize the influence of parental socialization in the development of partisanship. Because it was assumed to be extremely stable, partisanship was considered the primary determinant in the attitudinal "funnel of causality" leading up to the choice to support a given candidate in a given election.[4] In *The Responsible Electorate*, V. O. Key, Jr., described partisanship as a standing commitment on the part of the voter, a judgment that one or the other major party was preferable on most of the important issues most of the time. Key believed that this standing commitment would be honored at each election unless some intervening factor, a new issue or a specific candidate, induced a reevaluation.[5] The application to an analysis of realignment is straightforward: if a series of issues consistently deflects a voter away from a standing commitment, then at some point the voter will realize that his commitment has changed. More recent treatments have demonstrated in a variety of ways that party identification can indeed be a consequence of a voter's reactions to issues and candidates at successive points in time. In other words, party clearly affects the choice of candidates, but candidates and issues also affect the choice of party.[6]

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[4] Angus Campbell and others, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

In recent years the debate over the causes and effects of partisanship has been partially superseded by a debate over whether partisanship can be said to exist any longer in any meaningful way. Proponents of the theory of dealignment argue that the electorate contains fewer partisans and more independents than formerly, that the remaining partisans are less firmly attached to their parties, making them more likely to defect or split their tickets, and that the decline of party attachments makes a realignment in the traditional sense virtually impossible. According to this view, shifts in the party vote are largely issue- and candidate-specific. They are therefore unlikely to carry over from one election to the next and structure an individual's voting behavior along party lines in a lasting way.[7]

A third point of view, associated with conservative analyst Kevin Phillips, holds that a "split-level realignment" has already taken place and that the country now has a normal Republican majority at the presidential level, a competitive system in the Senate, and a system that favors the Democrats in the House of Representatives and below the Federal level. A voter might therefore consider himself a

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[5] V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[6] Several models have been specified to test the assumption of an interactive relationship among party identification, issue positions, and candidate choice, both at a given point in time and across time. See, for example, Morris P. Fionna, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981); John E. Jackson, "Issues, Party Choices, and Presidential Votes," *American Journal of Political Science* 19 (May 1975); Gregory B. Markus and Philip E. Converse, "A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice," *American Political Science Review* 73 (December 1979); and Benjamin I. Page and Calvin C. Jones, "Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote," *American Political Science Review* 73 (December 1979). While there are significant differences in the conceptualizations and findings of these analysts, these differences are less fundamental than the broad agreement that party indentification can function as a dependent as well as an independent variable in the process of electoral choice.

[7] Typical statements of this position can be found in Walter Dean Burnham, "American Politics in the 1970s: Beyond Party?" in Chambers and Burnham, eds., *The American Party Systems*, and Everett Carll Ladd, "The Brittle Mandate: Electoral Dealignment and the 1980 Presidential Election," *Political Science Quarterly* 96 (Spring 1981).

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Republican in national politics and a Democrat in state and local politics.[8] Such a hypothesis implies a certain stability in the ticket-splitting behavior of individuals and the electorate as a whole, as well as a lengthy period of divided party control of government in Washington.

Measuring party attachment in order to sketch the contours of an existing alignment and detect and analyze any realignment that may be going on is a rather more formidable task than defining it. Democrats and Republicans do not pay dues or carry membership cards, so one must proceed by indirection, diagnosing the inward attitudes by cataloging the outward symptoms. The 19th century has left us few indications, beyond election returns themselves, of the party attachments of the many sectors of the electorate. In this century, with the introduction of voter registration, a new body of evidence became available, but it is limited to states that require voters to declare a party affiliation in order to vote in primary elections. Even for these states, registration data must be interpreted with caution. The majority party's registration is usually inflated, partly because that is the party whose primaries are significant and partly because the governing party can offer rewards to those who identify with it and threaten penalties for those who do not. Moreover, a particularly exciting primary contest among contenders for the presidency or for state office may stimulate a flurry of registration changes that have little or no relationship to underlying partisanship.

The invention of public opinion polling has opened new opportunities to probe directly into party affiliation and the attitudes that may underlie and determine it. The voter can simply be asked. "Do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an independent?" The Gallup poll has asked this question in the same wording more or less regularly since 1937. Many organizations now competing with Gallup ask some version of the question as well. The resulting data have become the most important measure of the trends in party strength and in the alignment of the party system and are a rich source of inferences as to the causes of political change.

Yet party identification data have their weaknesses too. During the heat of a presidential campaign, a respondent's party identification may simply reflect the party of the presidential candidate he has decided to support. This is especially likely in the case of the Gallup poll, which prefaces its question with the words "as of today" rather than a phrase such as "generally speaking" that most other polls use in order to divert the respondent's attention from current preferences among candidates.

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[8] See the discussion in Phillips' biweekly newsletter, *The American Political Report* 14 (January 11, 1985).

Given these weaknesses, whatever shifts in party identification the polls reveal may have to be discounted, at least until later polls confirm their durability. One can, however, invert the logic of the argument and search for the phenomena one would expect to find if a realignment of significant magnitude were occurring. While the existence of those phenomena would not be sufficient to prove the existence of such a realignment, they would at least establish a hypothesis to be tested through continuing observation of political behavior and more sophisticated analysis of attitudes. The measurements employed can be considered a series of leading indicators, but the direction and scale of any realignment would not be confirmed until the changes in the leading indicators demonstrated staying power instead of vanishing at the next election.

To the extent that a realignment of the party system may be under way, it should be reflected in some departures from the historical norm in the patterns of any party identification. Moreover, one would expect to find new patterns of partisanship most dramatically evident among groups possessing the most tentatively developed party attachments, because the newly emergent partisan cleavages would operate most strongly upon such voters. Thus a distinctive pattern of partisanship among younger voters and newly registered voters should appear, as should a consistent pattern of issue-based party defections, which may extend over several successive elections. In the aggregate there should be a tendency for many individuals, constituting definable electoral groups, to shift their party attachments to accord with shifts in their voting behavior. And because realignment is by definition a partisan phenomenon, the proportion of independents in the affected segments of the electorate should decline, and the share of partisans should rise.

Taken at their face value, party identification data suggest that all these criteria were indeed met in 1984. The Republican gains were most notable among young and first-time voters; there was an issue-based consistency to the pattern of defections to the GOP; and one important voting bloc (white southerners) has clearly been in the process of adapting its aggregate partisanship to its aggregate preferences in the last several presidential elections. There is even evidence that the long-lived trend toward political independence may have reached a plateau in the mid-1970s and begun to reverse. In short the data show exactly the pattern that would appear if a substantial partisan realignment were in progress. All that is in question is the durability of the changes. If the current trends persist into 1988, one would probably be justified in declaring that a realignment – not one as decisive as that of the 1930s but one of a second order of magnitude – had occurred.

TRENDS IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION

From 1950 until the summer of 1984, Gallup polls showed a consistent and substantial Democratic advantage over the Republicans in party identification (*figure 1*). In the Nation as a whole the Democrats always claimed more than 40 percent of the electorate, and usually 45 to 48 percent, while Republican identification was always below 35 percent and, for the last quarter of a century, 29 percent or less. But this longstanding, one-and-one-half-party relationship gave way during the fall campaign when all the major polling organizations found the GOP nearing parity with the Democrats.

Surprisingly, the movement toward the Republicans as measured by successive Gallup polls was not gradual; it took place in a single ten-week period. Until then the election and inauguration of Ronald Reagan and the first three ane one-half years of his administration had brought the GOP no accretion of strength above its historical base. In his first campaign, Reagan had brought the Republicans some new adherents, as a winning presidential candidate usually does, but they were only enough to recoup the losses the party had suffered during the Watergate scandals and President Nixon's resignation. Through the first half of 1984, party identification figures still displayed the familiar three-to-two ratio – virtually identical with the pre-Watergate 1972 figures.

But a shift in strength from the Democrats to the Republicans began to appear in late June and continued through Labor Day – essentially the period spanning the two party conventions (*figure 1*). Reagan pollster Richard Wirthlin has stated that the Democratic convention did substantial harm to the party's standing with the electorate, notwithstanding the brief surge of support for Mondale toward the end of the convention week. The Republican tracking surveys found that "a lot of Americans applauded selecting a woman as the running mate. But we also found that because she was a woman and a liberal, the decision strengthened our position in the southern states," a pattern that was reinforced by the controversy over dismissing Georgia Democratic party chairman Bert Lance from the chairmanship of the Mondale campaign. Wirthlin also felt that the Democratic candidate's pledge to raise taxes enabled the Republicans "to link Walter Mondale to the most negative aspects of the past" at a time when most voters were reasonably satisfied with the present.[9] One may speculate whether other negative factors may have impelled Democrats to leave their party – the prominence of Jesse Jackson

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[9] Ben J. Wattenburg, "Moving Right Along? Campaign '84's Lessons for 1988," *Public Opinion* 7 (December 1984/January 1985), p. 60.



SOURCE: *Gallup Report*, nos. 228 and 229 (August, September 1984).

FIGURE 1. POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION, 1937-85

at the convention, perhaps, or the alienation of supporters of Gary Hart. Whatever the causes, by early September the partisan balance had shifted to 39 percent Democratic, 35 percent Republican, and 26 percent independent, where it remained essentially unchanged for the rest of the campaign and through the first three months of 1985.[10]

What remained of the Democratic advantage by then was entirely accounted for by the overwhelming commitment of blacks to the Democratic party, a preference that appears to have strengthened somewhat during the Reagan years. According to the CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls, 73 percent of black voters identified themselves

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[10] Given the margin of error in each of the successive Gallup polls (about 3 percent), some doubt must remain as to the exact timing of the shift in voter sentiment. The CBS *New York Times* polls found the traditional Democratic margin among party identifiers continued until October. See *Public Opinion* 7 (December 1984/January 1985), p. 39.

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as Democrats and 10 percent as Republicans in 1980; four years later, the margin was an even more massive 77 to 7 percent (*table 1*). Reagan initiatives on civil rights and social spending cutbacks have threatened programs considered vitally important by many blacks. Moreover, the economic recovery has largely bypassed the black community, leaving blacks distinctly unimpressed by Reaganomics.[11]

A smaller minority, the Hispanics, moved strongly in the opposite direction; their preference shrank from 67 percent Democratic and 15 percent Republican in 1980 (a difference of 52 prcentage points) to a more modest 56 and 27 percent, or 29 points, in 1984. This change of 23 points represents one of the strongest pro-Republican shifts among any group in the electorate. But the movement should not be surprising, because the GOP has vigorously courted Hispanics for several years in the belief that the party needs to offset the heavily Democratic propensity of the black vote.

Table 1 also compares the 1980 and 1984 CBS/*New York Times* exit poll data on party identification among white subgroups to identify those in which the Republican tide was running most strongly. The most dramatic shifts in partisanship occurred among younger voters and southerners. (In fact, southern whites under the age of 30 exactly reversed their partisan allegiance in the four-year period from a 45–33 percent Democratic plurality to a 45–32 percent edge for the Republicans.) The unemployed were the only major white subgroup to strengthen their Democratic allegiance, no doubt because of the severity of the 1982 recession. Some other white constituencies displayed continuing Democratic loyalties; union households, residents of large cities, northeasterners, and Jews, groups that overlap substantially. While Jewish allegiance to the Democratic party may have briefly been shaken by Jesse Jackson's anti-Semitic remarks and by his association with Louis Farrakhan of the Nation of Islam, the allegiance appears to have been strongly reinforced by the prominence of the Reverend Jerry Falwell and other Christian fundamentalists in the Reagan campaign.

The recent Republican gains have produced the narrowest gap in the parties' strengths since the 1940s. Some of the changes of the past year may ultimately prove to be short-lived – merely part of an election year surge to the winning party such as has appeared on occasion previously in Gallup polls. The Johnson landslide of 1964, for instance, was accompanied by a gain of 6 percentage points in Democratic identification that vanished shortly thereafter. But if party identification stabilizes at or near current levels, a major equalization of the two-party competitive balance will have occurred.

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[11] Thomas E. Cavanagh, *Inside Black America* (Joint Center for Political Studies, forthcoming).

TABLE 1. CHANGES IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION, BY DEMOGRAPHIC CATEGORIES, 1980–84

(percentage of eligible voters)

Category	1980			1984			Change in Democratic margin
	D	R	I*	D	R	I*	
Blacks	73	10	17	77	7	16	+7
Hispanics	67	15	18	56	27	17	−23
Whites	42	32	26	34	39	27	−15
White subgroups							
Men	39	33	28	32	38	30	−12
Women	44	31	25	36	39	25	−16
Age 18–29	40	32	28	30	42	27	−20
Age 30–44	38	30	32	33	35	32	−10
Age 45–59	44	32	25	34	37	29	−15
Age 60 and over	45	37	18	38	42	19	−12
Northeast	41	30	29	36	33	30	−8
Midwest	38	33	29	32	41	28	−14
South	46	30	24	33	39	28	−22
West	41	36	23	34	44	22	−15
Professional/managerial	36	34	30	31	40	29	−11
Other white collar	41	32	27	34	36	30	−11
Blue collar	48	25	27	38	30	32	−15
Agricultural	41	38	21	35	49	16	−17
Unemployed	37	37	26	42	26	32	+16
Union household	50	24	26	46	26	28	−6
Less than high school education	52	29	19	47	35	18	−11
High school graduate	47	29	24	37	37	26	−18
Some college	37	33	30	30	41	29	−15
College graduate	35	34	31	31	39	30	−9
Protestant	35	41	24	28	47	26	−13
Catholic	48	23	29	43	28	29	−10
Jewish	63	15	22	61	15	23	−2
Born-again Christian	40	37	23	29	45	26	−19
Large city	49	26	25	46	28	26	−5
Small city	43	27	30	35	37	28	−18
Suburban	37	35	28	33	41	26	−10
Rural	42	34	24	32	40	28	−16

SOURCE: CBS News/*New York Times* exit polls.

*D = Democratic, R = Republican, I = Independent.

The data in figure 1 show 1974 as the high-water mark of political independents. After a steady increase since the dawn of public opinion polling and a burst beginning in the mid-1960s, the share of the electorate outside the two parties has remained more or less constant for the past decade and may even be starting to decline. It is especially striking that only 27 percent of whites under the age of 30 now consider themselves independent compared with 32 percent of those 30 to

45 (*table 1*). Because the tendency of the youngest voters to be most independent has been one of the most reliable constants in all studies of political attutides and voting behavior,[12] the sudden appearance of a curvilinear relationship is startling. It may suggest that the generation of the 1960s was socialized into independence while the newer generation is developing a stronger sense of partisanship.[13] As noted earlier, an increase in the partisanship of the youngest voters is precisely one of the patterns that typify a realignment period.

Voter registration data confirm the pro-Republican direction of the trend, although they are of little use in gauging its magnitude. Relatively few people have gone to their courthouses to change registration from one party to the other – as many did in the New Deal era – but new voters, most of them young, appear to have given the Republicans the edge. The Committee for the Study of the American Electorate found GOP registration gains exceeding those of the Democrats in ten states, compared to four with a better Democratic showing. A *Washington Post* survey gave the Republicans the lead in nine states and the Democrats in five, with three even.[14]

THE GOP'S YOUTH MOVEMENT

The dramatic rise in the turnout among minorities, the aged, and the unemployed in the 1982 midterm election encouraged many Democrats to believe that get-out-the-vote drives concentrated on groups disadvantaged by Reagan's policies could yield the margin of victory in 1984. In some respects the strategy was successful; the Census Bureau found that black turnout increased by 5.3 percentage points over its 1980 level.[15] The CBS/*New York Times* exit poll likewise found that 11 percent of black voters and 13 percent of Hispanic voters were first-time registrants, as opposed to 7 percent of white voters.

What threw the Democrats' assumptions awry was a remarkable countermobilization of younger, more conservative whites by the Republicans. To some extent the GOP registration surge was spontaneous and self-generating; a postelection survey by the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate found that only 33 percent of newly registered whites had been signed up by organizations, as opposed to 47 percent of newly registered blacks. Nonetheless, the targeting of such groups as born-again Christians, recently transferred business executives, military personnel, college students, and suburban women provided such a boost for the Republicans that they emerged as the victors in the registration war. The CBS/*New York Times* exit poll found new voters supporting Reagan by a margin of 61 to 38 percent–the same proportions as established voters–but they were identifying with the Republicans in greater numbers, giving the GOP a margin of 38 to 35 percent over the Democrats while the electorate as a whole maintained a Democratic plurality. An upscale and therefore conservative and Republican bias is especially apparent if one isolates first-time white voters, 75 percent of whom were under 30 years of age. Of this group, 47 percent were college educated, and 40 percent had incomes greater than $25,000, which is above the national median income of $24,600 in 1983. Fully 71 percent supported Reagan, and they gave the Republicans the edge over the Democrats in party identification by 44 to 28 percent.

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[12] Campbell and others, *The American Voter*, pp. 146–67. The tendency of the youngest voters to be the most independent appears in every Survey Research Center study between 1956 and 1974; note the table in Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 60.

[13] The new curvilinear relationship between age and independence is especially striking in the NBC News exit poll data from the last two elections. In 1980 the level of independents ranged from 21 percent among those aged 18 to 24 to a peak of 29 percent among those 35 to 49 and a trough of 19 percent among voters 65 and older. The corresponding figures for 1984 were 22, 32, and 21 percent. See Laumly K. Epstein, "1984 – A Realigning Election?" *Election Politics* 2 (Winter 1984–85), p. 4.

[14] Mike Feinsilber, "Tuesday's Voters," United Press, press release, November 1, 1984; and Thomas B. Edsall, "New Voter Sign-Ups May Favor the GOP," *Washington Post*, November 2, 1984.

[15] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, no. 397, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1984" (Advance Report) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), table A.

The significance of the GOP's youth movement becomes clear when one recalls that the surge of new voters and young voters toward the Democratic party was one of the most important factors in the rise to dominance of the New Deal coalition during the 1930s.[16] The tendency of voters under 30 to favor the Democrats disproportionately has been one of the most durable of all of the legacies of the Roosevelt-era realignment (*table 2*). It may be considered the most important as well because it has ensured a constant replenishment of the supply of Democrats as previous generations of the party faithful died. Thus the abrupt departure from this tendency in 1984 is perhaps the most momentous of all the leading indicators suggesting that the Democrats' status as the majority party may no longer be secure.

POLICY ISSUES AND PARTY IMAGES

As the movement of younger voters toward the Republicans began to attract attention during the autumn of 1984, commentators speculated that young people's perceptions of the two parties had been almost wholly shaped by their reactions to the two most recent Administrations. Whatever one's own policy predilections, one must concede the

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[16] Kristi Andersen, *The Creation of a Democratic Party Majority, 1928–1936* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

Table 2. Deviation from Democratic Presidential Vote, by Age, 1936–84
(percent)

Year	Democratic percentage, all ages	21–29	30–49	50 and over
1936	62	+6	+3	−6
1940	55	+5	+1	−4
1944	54	+4	−1	−3
1948	53	+4	+2	−4
1952	45	+6	+2	−6
1956	42	+1	+3	−3
1960	50	+4	+4	−4
1964	61	+3	+2	−2
1968	43	+4	+1	−2
1972	38	+10	−5	−2
1976	50	+3	−2	+2
1980	41	+6	−3	0
1984	41	−1	−1	0

SOURCES: *The Gallup Political Almanac for 1946* (Manchester, N.H.: Clarke Press, 1946), p. 204; *Gallup Reports*, November 1984, pp. 8–9; and Gallup study no. 432, made available by the Roper Center, University of Connecticut.

stark difference between the leadership and managerial images projected by Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan – the one seemingly overwhelmed by events and forces outside his or the Nation's control, the other confidently articulating and pursuing a vision of national restoration. When asked the single most important reason for their presidential choice by the ABC News exit poll, 28 percent of the sample said, "He's a strong leader," more than cited any other reason; and Reagan carried these voters by an extraordinary margin of 83 to 17 percent.

It is not surprising that the perceived success of the Reagan Administration, coming so close on the heels of an Administration widely regarded as a failure, would make such a vivid impression on the young. But there is considerable evidence that an image of Republican competence in coping with the Nation's problems has also caused partisan shifts among older sectors of the electorate. In January 1984 the ABC poll of registered voters found the Democrats favored by 42 to 37 percent over the Republicans as the party best able to handle the Nation's "most important problem" (as each respondent defined it). The two parties were essentially tied on this measure as late as July. In September, however, the Republicans had moved ahead of the Democrats by 49 to 39 percent, and they outpointed the Democrats by 56 to 44 percent among the voters in the ABC election day exit poll. Of the 44 percent who thought the Democrats were the better managers of the country's affairs, 90 percent had supported Mondale. Of those who preferred the Republicans, 95 percent had voted for Reagan.

The image of Republican competence is primarily due to the party's recent record of economic management. In a CBS/*New York Times* postelection survey, 30 percent of the respondents said they had formed a better opinion of the Republican party during the past five years, while only 11 percent had a worse opinion. When those with an improved opinion were asked why, 25 percent said the economy, far more than specified any other single reason.

The contribution of Reaganomics to the Republican surge was foreshadowed in a Gallup poll of early April that found 44 percent of the Nation identifying the GOP as the party that "will do a better job of keeping the country prosperous" – the highest figure recorded for the Republicans since the question was first asked in 1951. Whites, southerners, westerners, and young people preferred the Republicans as the party of prosperity in this survey, even though each group was still showing a Democratic edge in partisan allegiance as late as June.[17] The crystallization of the economy as an issue evidently drew these groups into the Republican fold during the campaign, for by November, pluralities of these groups had come to consider themselves Republicans outright. The salience of the relationship is confirmed by the fact that blacks, labor union families, and low-income households, who had more confidence in the Democrats as the party of prosperity in April, still retained their Democratic party allegiance in November. The correlation suggests that a seemingly detached, "objective," and perhaps tentative judgment in the spring on the parties' comparative merits as economic managers was becoming internalized as a change in self-definition for sizable numbers of voters by the fall.

The defense issue also aided the Republicans. For most of the public, Reagan's tough posture vis-à-vis foreign powers contrasted favorably with an impression of indecisiveness and drift during the Carter years that seemed confirmed by the humiliation of the Iranian hostage crisis. The October CBS/*New York Times* survey found the Republicans favored over the Democrats by 64 to 18 percent as the party "more likely to make sure U.S. military defenses are strong." The fear of conflict acts as a partial counterweight to the GOP advantage on this issue, however; the Republicans were seen as the party "more likely to keep us out of war" by a much more narrow margin of 37 to 34 percent.[18] Evidently, military strength is popular as long as it is unlikely to be used. This public schizophrenia also carried over into candidate preference. According to ABC, 84 percent of voters whose top priority was to "keep America strong militarily" supported Reagan. But voters whose top priority was to "keep us out of war" went for Mondale by a mirror-image 85 percent. There were more of the former (14 percent of the voters) than of the latter (9 percent), so the issue of war and peace in toto worked to the net advantage of the Republicans.

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[17] *Gallup Report*, May 1984, pp. 17-18, August-September 1984, pp. 31-32.

[18] David E. Rosenbaum, "Growing Support for Republicans Found in Survey," *New York Times*, October 7, 1984.

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While the Republicans polished their image, the Democrats managed to tarnish theirs. The CBS/*New York Times* postelection poll found 23 percent of voters saying they had a worse opinion of the Democrats than they had had five years before, while only 7 percent of voters had a better opinion. Remarkably, even among Democrats 18 percent had a worse opinion of their party and only 9 percent a better opinion, which may presage further erosion in the party base. When asked why they had lost faith in the Democrats, the poll's respondents gave a wide range of answers with no single reason dominant.

When Democratic defections to Reagan indicated by the CBS/*New York Times* exit poll data are analyzed, however, the economy and America's military posture appear to have been the key issues. Reagan carried a comfortable 59 percent majority of the Democrats who believed the economy had improved during his first term. He also won 48 percent of the Democrats who considered stronger defenses a higher priority than a nuclear freeze. These issues were bound to exert an even stronger pull among independents. Self-declared independents who perceived economic progress cast 85 percent of their votes for Reagan, as did 84 percent of those preferring military strength to a nuclear freeze. With over half of the independents falling into each of these categories, a large group of Reagan supporters is perhaps edging toward identification with the Republican party.

To be sure, the Republicans have their liabilities. In the CBS/*New York Times* postelection survey, among those who had developed a worse opinion of the Republicans, 10 percent gave the economy as a reason (undoubtedly a reference to the 1982 recession), 6 percent cited unemployment, 5 percent resented cutting back social programs, 6 percent dismissed the GOP as the party of the big business or the rich, and 5 percent found it unrepresentative.

The Democrats were favored over the Republicans by 46 to 36 percent as the party more "concerned with the needs and problems of people like yourself," by 43 to 34 percent in running "a government that is fair to all people," and by a wide 54 to 24 percent when it came to preserving social security and medicare.[19] The 1982 recession has brought the fairness issue to the fore in the elections of that year; in tandem with concerns over Reagan's confrontational foreign policy style, it was responsible for the prominence of the gender gap. And the fairness question is still with us; it was, along with fear of war, Mondale's most potent issue in the 1984 campaign.[20] In the midst of a general economic boom, however, it was overshadowed by approval of the Reagan Administration's economic performance: the economy was considered a priority issue by 40 percent of the voters, exactly double the share concerned about fairness toward the poor. This shift in the relative salience of the two issues should raise a cautionary flag: the very success of the Reagan Administration's economic program in winning support for the Republican party has left the GOP hostage of the performance of the economy over the next several years. Should the recovery continue, the Republicans are well positioned to claim a large share of the credit, but another slowdown would almost certainly revive the fairness issue once again.

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[19] Ibid.

[20] In the ABC/*Washington Post* exit poll, Mondale carried the 22 percent of the voters who said fairness was the most important issue by 90 to 9 percent, and the 9 percent most concerned with peace by 85 to 14 percent.

The social issues may also impede the efforts of Republicans to solidify their new party strength. Controversies over abortion, gun control, school prayer, and the equal rights amendment (ERA) cut across the current economic alignment in ways that are not necessarily helpful to the GOP in the long term. The ABC News exit poll found that 63 percent of the voters especially concerned about abortion voted for Reagan, but 76 percent of those keying on the ERA voted for Mondale, and 58 percent of self-described environmentalists voted for him. Those saying "the Moral Majority's backing of Reagan" was "very important" in their presidential choice voted for Reagan over Mondale by only 55 to 44 percent, less than Reagan's aggregate margin. From various polling data we know that young voters are especially cross-pressured by their economic and cultural preferences. Reagan's economic performance is most popular with those under 30, yet the young are also more supportive of abortion rights, women's rights, racial tolerance, and environmentalism and less supportive of the Moral Majority than any other age group. Should the prominence accorded the religious right in Republican circles begin to overshadow the attractiveness of the Republican economic package, young voters might well revert to the independent column or even shift to the Democrats.

Despite these caveats, however, the emerging lines of conflict between the two parties are currently working to the net advantage of the Republicans. The GOP is coming to be seen as the party of economic prosperity, military strength, and ultraconservative social views; the Democrats as the party of peace, fairness, and cultural diversity. In the aggregate the former package is currently more attrative to the electorate than the latter. In the CBS/*New York Times* postelection survey, 60 percent of the voters had a favorable image of the Republican party in general, but only 47 percent had a favorable image of the Democrats. More ominously for the Democrats, these divergent party images were highly correlated with the 1984 presidential balloting. Those with a favorable image of the Republican party voted for Reagan by 87 to 12 percent, according to the same postelection survey; those with an unfavorable opinion of his party rejected

Reagan by 85 to 13 percent. These lopsided margins are comparable to those cited earlier among the voters who perceived one or the other party as best able to handle the Nation's problems. The voters' perception of a party's competence and their image of the party in general are necessarily interdependent. One may argue that the election was a referendum not merely on Reagan's first term but also on the relative attractiveness of the two parties, and it was largely the Republican party's perceived success in office that enhanced its general appeal.

THE REPUBLICAN TIDE IN THE SOUTH

Along with Hispanics and whites younger than 30, white southerners showed the largest swing toward the Republicans (*table 1*). Similarly, the Gallup poll found the GOP claiming the loyalties of 40 percent of whites in the South at election time – the largest Republican share of the white electorate in any region – compared with 28 percent just four months earlier. The ABC News exit poll found that 61 percent of all southern voters thought the Republicans would better cope with the Nation's problems than the Democrats, again the best Republican showing in any region.

The election returns confirm the clear impression from the polling data that a Republican party tide was running in the South, as distinct from idiosyncratic support for a popular President. Half the party's gains in the House of Representatives came in the South: Republicans captured four Democratic seats in Texas, three in North Carolina, and one in Georgia, while losing one in Arkansas. The GOP picked up one governorship, in North Carolina. It returned every one of its four incumbent senators seeking reelection – in the erstwhile unshakably Democratic states of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Mississippi – while holding the seat of retiring Republican John Tower in Texas. The GOP defeated an incumbent Democratic senator in a border state, Kentucky, while losing the seat held by retiring Majority Leader Howard Baker in neighboring Tennessee.

In some states at least, the Republican surge extended to lesser offices. In Texas, Republicans increased their share of the 150-member state house of representatives from 37 to 53 seats, the highest level ever, and gained more than a hundred county offices. In a postelection statewide poll, 49 percent of Texans identified themselves as Republicans or Republican-leaning independents compared with only 33 percent on the Democratic side. If that poll is accurate, Texas alone could account for more than a million new Republicans.[21] In North Carolina the GOP gained 25 state legislative seats.

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[21] The Texas poll, conducted by Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc., was cited in David S. Broder, "A Republican Texas," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1984. The growth of voting for Republicans for local offices in urban Texas has been extraordinarily rapid. The number of Republican judges in Dallas County has zoomed from none in 1978 to 61 of 68 in 1984. See Paul Taylor, "3 Dallas County Judges Switch to GOP Ranks," *Washington Post*, February 9, 1985.

That the Republican party should be rising spectacularly in the South should not surprise anyone. The wonder is that its ascent has been delayed so long. Ever since the Democratic party committed itself in the 1930s to an activist, interventionist economic and social policy, conservatives have not had a congenial home in it. But changing party loyalties is like changing churches; people do not do so easily. Moreover, the South had always seen its one-party system as the bulwark of white supremacy. So the movement of southern conservatives to the Republican party was slow. The region remained the solid South for nearly two decades before the first ripples of the coming GOP tide could be observed.

Two events in the early post-World War II period shattered the South's solidity: the Democratic party's embrace of civil rights and the Republican nomination of Dwight D. Eisenhower, a war hero and native Texan. The one cost the Democratic party its standing as the defender of southern traditions; the other made the GOP, stigmatized for nearly a century as the party of the carpetbaggers, respectable at last. In the Eisenhower era, metropolitan areas in the Rim South (as opposed to the Deep South) conformed their presidential voting to the national pattern, dividing on class lines; upper-income voters preferred the Republicans and those of lower income the Democrats. On this beachhead zealous Republican organizations could be built, and the GOP could begin to compete effectively for local and, after that, state offices. But in the Deep South and in most rural areas throughout the region, white voters found themselves adrift. They were severed from the national Democratic party, but they were not yet ready to embrace a Republican party whose President had sent troops to enforce school desegregation in Little Rock. Eventually, however, the Republican leadership passed from Eisenhower to a man who sent white southerners an unmistakable message that he was on their side – Barry Goldwater. As one of the few nonsouthern senators who had voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he was the first Republican nominee who spoke the states' rights language that segregationist southerners wanted to hear. Goldwater turned the political map upside down. He lost ignominiously in the North, but five of the six states he carried were in the Deep South.[22]

The Watergate scandal set the Republicans back everywhere, including the South, and their revival in that region was stalled further when the Democrats chose a native son, Jimmy Carter, as their leader. But Reagan was able to pick up where Goldwater had left off. Indeed, his achievement was even greater than Goldwater's, for once in office he could send a clear signal that not just the presidential candidate as an individual but the Republican party as an institution was sympathetic to southern views on social questions. Under Reagan, the Justice Department's stance on mandatory busing for school desegregation switched from support to opposition. The Administration's proposed tuition tax credits for private schools would aid the "segregation academies" set up by whites who had found desegregated public schools intolerable. Moreover, Reagan arrayed the GOP with southern conservatism on some potent new issues thrust into the political arena by court decisions–school prayer, abortion, and the teaching of evolution in public schools. In so doing he mobilized millions of Christian fundamentalists, led by their pastors, as a virtual adjunct of the Republican party in his campaign for reelection.[23]

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[22] Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System*, rev. ed., pp. 277–97, 352–75.

The dramatic racial polarization of the vote in the South has led some observers to express concern over white flight out of the Democratic party in response to the highly visible role of Jesse Jackson and other black leaders in the party's affairs. None of the exit polls included questions that directly tapped racial sentiments, making the proposition difficult to test directly. However, the mid-1984 Gallup study of black and white opinion commissioned by the Joint Center for Political Studies included some questions designed to measure racial backlash. Not surprisingly, antiblack sentiments were more common among southern whites than among other sectors of the electorate. Thirty percent of southern whites said blacks had too much influence in national politics, as opposed to 16 percent of whites nationally. Surprisingly perhaps, southern hostility to Jackson did not appear especially intense. Nineteen percent of southern whites said they were less likely to vote for Mondale because of Jackson's endorsement, while 8 percent said they were more likely to vote for Mondale. (The figures for whites nationally were 17 percent less likely and 10 percent more likely.) By way of contrast, as Harold Stanley has noted, "in 1956 and 1960, between one-third and a majority of southern whites claimed a Negro group's endorsement of a candidate would make them less likely to vote for the candidate."[24] Given that Mondale lost the southern white vote by 71 to 29 percent, the net loss of 11 percentage points on the Jackson question seems relatively modest, particularly because many of the anti-Jackson voters would probably have voted against Mondale for other reasons.

Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of southern white voting patterns is the extent to which they can be explained without reference to racial issues. As we have seen, approval of the Nation's economic performance and a strong defense posture were key predictors of a preference for Reagan. These views were especially prevalent among southern whites. In the CBS/*New York Times* exit poll, fully 68 percent of southern whites felt the economy had improved, and 86 percent of this group voted for Reagan. Fifty-eight percent of southern whites preferred strong defenses to a nuclear freeze, and 72 percent of this group voted for Reagan. The President received the votes of a massive 93 percent of southern whites who considered a strong military one of their two highest-priority issues and 85 percent of the voters of those who considered the economy most important. On these two issues conservative Republican policies are striking a very reponsive chord in the South.

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[23] Among southern whites, those who claimed to be born-again Christians had been somewhat more Democratic in 1980 than the group as a whole, according to the CBS/*New York Times* exit poll, but in 1984 they moved to the Republican party in disproportionate numbers, bringing their support to the level of the region's white population as a whole.

[24] Harold W. Stanley, "The 1984 Presidential Election in the South: Race and Realignment," in Robert P. Steed and others, eds., *The 1984 Presidential Election in the South* (New York: Praeger, forthcoming).

Democrats can take some comfort that the full fury of southern resentment against them is still limited to the national party. State and local Democratic candidates and leaders have been able to hold the allegiance of enough traditional Democrats to retain most state and local offices so far in every southern state. Before the 1984 election, ten of the eleven governors of the region were Democrats; afterward there were still nine. Democrats control both legislative bodies in all the states, most of them by overwhelming margins. Except in metropolitan areas and in mountain counties whose tradition goes back to the Civil War, the GOP has made little progress in local politics.

Yet Southern Democratic leaders walk a tightrope; they have to speak and act progressively enough to retain the allegiance of blacks, whose votes are crucial to their election, while not speaking or acting so boldly liberal as to earn the antipathy reserved for northerners. As of 1984 they were maintaining their balance, but it is difficult to see how they can do so much longer.

The experience of the last three decades suggests that conservatives who become accustomed to voting regularly for Republican presidential nominees find it easier every year to accept GOP candidates for other offices. The 1984 shift in the party identification of white southerners simply brought their expressed partisanship into line with their recent presidential voting history (*table 3*). Southerners have already extended their presidential Republicanism into U.S. Senate races, with ten of the region's 22 senators now representing the GOP, and into a steadily rising number of congressional districts. As the news from Texas indicates, many are now thinking of themselves as Republicans and voting that way for offices from the top to the bottom of the ticket. It is only a matter of time until the South too is finally realigned on the national pattern, with conservatives firmly ensconced in the party in which they have belonged for fifty years.

This does not mean that the solid Democratic South will become a solid Republican South. The GOP's failure to make headway with the

TABLE 3. REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE FOR SOUTHERN WHITES, 1960–84
(Percentages of eligible voters)

Year	Republican presidential preference	Republican party identification	Democratic presidential preference	Democratic party identification
1960	43	21	45	60
1964	38	22	52	55
1968	36	21	20	46
1972	75	25	20	40
1976	45	24	48	45
1980	45	25	40	48
1984	69	40	26	31

SOURCE: Gallup final preelection surveys.

black vote will prove a serious obstacle to attaining majority status in the region. The 1982 experience also suggests that an economic downturn could revive a potent populist coalition of blacks and lower-income whites in many parts of the South. But at the least the entire region will see a reasonably balanced two-party competition. And Republican gains in the South should be sufficient to bring the party into a fairly even balance with the Democrats nationally.

IF A NEW DIRECTION, WHICH?

Before his reelection, President Reagan suggested hopefully that his anticipated triumph might bring about the historical political realignment that Republicans had vainly heralded whenever the Democrats showed signs of slipping from the peaks to which Franklin Roosevelt had carried them. The public opinion data summarized above fall short of confirming the President's aspirations, but they do support the thesis that something historic is indeed happening to the party system. The Republicans have approached parity with the Democrats, finally establishing a genuine two-party system. What that portends, however, is far from clear. Will the Republicans continue their triumphal march and supplant the Democrats as the country's majority party and its normal party of government? Or did their tide crest on Inauguration Day? Analysis of past cycles of party domination can illuminate the possibilities, but it cannot provide sure answers. Divergent scenarios of what may lie ahead can be sketched, and each can find support in aspects of American party history.

One scenario, wishfully propounded these days by the Republicans and dreaded by their opposition, rests on the premises that the Democratic collapse of 1984 revealed weaknesses that are beyond repair. On the morrow of the election, that did not seem a farfetched conclusion. Clearly, the New Deal coalition of labor, white ethnics, racial minorities, and southerners had become hopelessly uncompetitive at the presidential level. The Democrats had lost four of the last five elections – three of them by landslides. Their electoral college base had shrunk to an undependable hard core of Frost Belt industrial states (which can be defined as those states that Mondale lost in 1984 by margins of fewer than 10 percentage points). The Republican base was far more formidable and far more consistent, anchored by a solid wall of Great Plains and Rocky Mountain states that had become as staunchly Republican in presidential voting (though they still chose a fair share of Democratic governors, senators, and representatives) as the South used to be unswervingly Democratic. Add just a few states from either the industrial belt or the South, plus California, and the Republicans could count on a comfortable majority. The continuing flow of population to the South and West would be likely to increase the Republican advantage in the electoral college following the post-1990 reapportionment.

True, the Republicans had not done as well below the presidential level, but in this scenario that would change. The split-level realignment discerned by Kevin Phillips was the result of two passing phenomena: the unnatural lag in Republican progress in the rural South and the power of incumbency. But "yellow dog" southern Democrats had had their day; party supremacy built on tradition alone could not much longer survive the nationalization of politics in the age of television, and the extension of Republicanism to lesser offices was only a matter of time. The presence of ten southerners in the Republican Senate majority where there were none at all as recently as 1960 seemed proof of that. Where the South could once count a hundred safe Democratic House districts, hardly twenty could be numbered now. And even that number would decline, for every southern district had now given a majority at least once to a Republican presidential candidate. As entrenched Democratic incumbents in the House retired, Republicans would pour their limitless campaign funds into those districts and win them one by one. After that, to vote Republican for both House and Senate candidates would be normal too. Then would come the races for state legislatures and county courthouses. It might take some time because the GOP's organizational base was still virtually nonexistent in many areas, but – so goes the argument – it was bound to come.

Meanwhile, in national politics the Republicans had the tremendous advantage of possessing a vision for the future and a program, while the Democrats were squabbling and groping for philosophy and direction. They had no coherent national agenda. In their post-Watergate revival they had enacted most of their unfinished legislative program, including consumer and environmental protection legislation and the creation of Federal departments of energy and education. That left only such high-expenditure items as a Federal takeover of welfare payments and adoption of national health insurance. But the political appeal of such proposals was overwhelmed in the late 1970s by the growing concerns over inflation, taxes, and diminishing American influence in the world. The coincidence of high unemployment and high inflation soured many policymakers on the Keynesian model for managing the public economy, but it caught the Democrats bereft of an alternative. In 1981 enough congressional Democrats followed Reagan's lead to drain the Federal revenue stream for years to come, vitiating any aspirations for new social programs and leaving the party with precious little to talk about.

By 1984 the Republican vision of national prosperity and military strength contrasted with a Democratic image of intellectual and institutional exhaustion. Even to those who saw Mondale as the last in the New Deal lineage of Democratic party leaders, it was far from clear just where a party revitalization could spring from. The Democrats could mimic the Republicans in pledging governmental shrinkage and low taxes – Walter Mondale had tried the alternative, to the party's sorrow – while promising greater fairness in distributing the pain of budget cuts. But that would only emphasize that the Republicans had redefined the terms of policy debate. Indeed, the GOP was beginning to sound and act like the normal party of government, the Democrats like a party resigned to opposition. Even with their big majority in the House, Democratic leaders were advancing no program of their own. They waited for the President to take the lead, then fretted and complained; but they avoided confrontation.

Some analysts saw in all this the beginning of a new era. In their reading of history, one party was always dominant, outshining its opposition as the sun outshines the moon, in Samuel Lubell's felicitous simile.[25] Since 1800 the parties have reversed positions every half century or so; the Democrats were the sun, the Federalists and Whigs the moon, from Jefferson to Lincoln; the Republicans were dominant from Lincoln to Franklin Roosevelt, the Democrats since. Tracing parallels among these periods, A. James Reichley, for one, finds portents of a new era of Republican hegemony beginning in 1980. In his view the GOP supremacy would be sustained by a congruity of the party's philosophy with contemporary national beliefs: conservatism in world affairs, confidence in the market as the director of economic life, and a renewal of traditional moral and religious values.[26]

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[25] Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, 2d ed (New York: Doubleday, 1956).

The second scenario is pressed nowadays by Democrats, albeit with more anxiety than confidence. In brief, it sees an early revival of their party. Their present agony of soul searching, in this view, is mostly an overreaction to the election, something a losing party always goes through. One need but recall the Republican party's identity crisis after its searing defeat in the Lyndon Johnson landslide twenty years ago. Yet the GOP won the very next presidential election, not because it had a systematic philosophy and program but because it was the alternative when Johnson, puffed with reelection hubris, led his party into fatal errors. Sooner or later, Reagan or his successor will do likewise, the Democratic optimists argue, and the Democratic party need only show that it has heeded the lesson taught by its recent defeats–and be available.

Indeed, the spring of 1985 found the Reagan Administration taking intransigent and unpopular stands on a variety of issues. To rein in Federal spending, the White House proposed significant reductions in Federal assistance to farmers, many of whom were in severe distress, and to middle-income college students. So many other constituencies were threatened with cutbacks that even the Senate Republican majority treated the President's budget as dead on arrival in Congress. In particular, many of the 22 incumbent Republicans facing reelection in 1986 were distancing themselves from Reagan's more unpopular policies.

Just as the Republicans emphasize their strength at the presidential level, the Democrats point to their own power bases: the House of Representatives, the governorships (currently 34 of 50), the state legislature, the major city halls. The split-level realignment, they contend, can be resolved in two ways. While the Republicans may be able to extend their presidential voting strength to balloting for lesser offices, it is also possible for the Democrats to parlay their local power into presidential victory.

Even the optimists concede, however, that the task is formidable. Almost from its founding but particularly in this century, the Democratic party has been riven between its northern and southern wings–the one urban, Catholic, liberal, and allied with labor, the other rural, Protestant, conservative, and cool or even hostile to union influence. The northern wing has dominated the presidential nominating conventions by force of numbers, but that has served the party well, because Democrats could take the South for granted and needed candidates who could add the necessary electoral votes from the North and West. With the breakup of the solid South, however, the party's problem is quite different. It must now find presidential candidates with appeal across the whole Democratic spectrum. But what southerner will stir a mass response in the cities of the North? And what northerner will not be so liberal, so urban, so ethnic, so beholden to organized labor as to antagonize large elements of the party's southern wing?

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[26] "Religion and Political Realignment," *Brookings Review* 3 (Fall 1984), pp. 34-35.

The distinctiveness of the various party factions was outlined with unusual clarity during the 1984 nomination campaign. The party's structural and ideological center (labor and party officials) supported Mondale, blacks supported Jackson, yuppies (young urban professionals) backed Gary Hart, and conservative southern whites preferred John Glenn and stopped voting in the presidential primaries after he was knocked out of the race in the early going. Dissatisfaction with Mondale was so intense among the latter two groups that large portions of each defected to Reagan in the fall.

The crosscurrents within the Democratic party are less ideological than generational. Surely this is one of the portents of the Hart campaign. While the Hart constituency is somewhat more conservative than the Democratic norm on economic issues, the senator's call for new ideas was not so much a programmatic manifesto as a simple rejection of the shopworn style of leadership exemplified by Mondale. This spirit also fueled much of the impetus behind the Jackson insurgency, which became the vehicle in many communities for the emergence of a new cadre of black political leadership less wedded to traditional (white-dominated) party organizations.

The difference in styles also helps explain the prominence of the issue of "special interests" in Democratic party circles. For many voters the party appears to be dominated by the concerns of distinctive groups–minorities, women, labor unions, homosexuals–to the exclusion of a broader vision of the national interest. Yet these special interests are by no means equally unpopular. When the Joint Center for Political Studies/Gallup study asked respondents whether a variey of groups had "too much influence over national policies and programs," the economic interests were the main targets of resentment: 62 percent of whites and 43 percent of blacks singled out labor leaders, while 51 percent of whites and 58 percent of blacks mentioned business leaders. By comparison, the groups Jackson hoped to include in his Rainbow Coalition finished well down the list. Sixteen percent of whites thought blacks had too much influence; well below 10 percent considered women, Hispanics, poor people, and the elderly too influential. These data suggest that the damage inflicted on the party by its association with the special interests other than labor may be overemphasized in the party's self-examination. And while the Democrats' alliance with labor may be a problem, it is not significantly more troublesome for them than the public opprobrium for business interests can become for the Republicans, particularly if the economic climate becomes less favorable.

Democrats can also take comfort from the GOP's internal schisms. The Republican party may be somewhat more homogeneous in composition than the Democrats can ever claim to be, but its divisions are nevertheless apparent and will become more so as the next nominating convention approaches. Centered in the South and Southwest is an ultraconservative, New Right wing, uncompromising in foreign policy, libertarian in economic policy, fundamentalist in social policy, and crusading in its style. Arrayed against the New Right are the inheritors of the older strain of conservatism that was for a long time the party's mainstream. They are more moderate now in foreign, economic, and social policies alike, and more pragmatic in exercising governmental responsibility. As the struggle over the succession to Reagan waxes, the internal strain will be intensified, and at the point where one group defeats the other the Reagan coalition of 1984 could well come unglued.

The two key swing groups are white southerners and yuppies. Both were important contributors to the Republican surge of 1984, yet they were attracted to the party for contrasting reasons. White southerners fear hard times and dislike the GOP's country club image, but they admire Reagan's foreign policy toughness and his social conservatism. Yuppies' preferences are almost precisely reversed: they are attracted by Reagan's free market philosophy and his promises of economic growth and affluence but are relatively progressive on social issues and dovish on foreign policy. To get both groups, along with big business and the Moral Majority, to enter the Republican tent for a single revival meeting is one thing; to maintain them as a happy congregation is quite another. Should attempts to legislate morality come to dominate the political agenda, the Republican gains among young people could vanish as quickly as they emerged.

Underlying the Democratic scenario is a different reading of historical political cycles. While the sun-moon simile may accurately depict most of the country's history, no theoretical reason has been advanced to explain why a highly competitive two-party system is not equally possible. Indeed, there have been a number of periods (the 1840s, the 1880s, the 1910s) when the two major parties have been about evenly balanced nationally. Many periods of one-party dominance can be explained by traumatic national events – the Civil War, the Great Depression – that destroyed the standing of one of the major parties in much of the country. In the absence of such an event, as at present, there appears to be no compelling reason why one party must of necessity maintain a lasting advantage over the other.

In the Democratic scenario, then, control of the national government is likely to swing back and forth between the parties in much shorter cycles. Recent history seems to support this view. While the Republicans can boast of their four victories in the last five presidential elections, that claim embodies the statistical trick of choosing the most advantageous base date. To say that the Republicans won four of the last seven or six of the last fourteen would be less impressive but no less accurate.

The interpretation of the modern party system as one normally characterized by short-term alternations has a solid theoretical foundation. It is based on the fact that most voters are neither pure liberals nor pure conservatives but exhibit a bundle of attitudes that incorporate elements of both and tend to be equivocal, changeable, muddled, and often contradictory. The typical voter is suspicious of both political extremes; he may be labeled centrist (accounting for the normal-curve distribution of the electorate across the ideological spectrum), but the middle position is not so much a rational and fixed centrism as the product of ambivalence. The modal voter looks both ways on almost any issue: in favor of a strong defense but against militarism; for a tough stance against communism but against another Vietnam; for helping the deserving poor but not the undeserving; for increased spending for education, health, and a variety of other services but against increased taxes; for economic development but without damage to the environment; for cutting budgets but not services; for the right to abortion in some circumstances but against complete freedom of choice; for progress by blacks but not at the expense of whites; for regulating the economy but not stifling enterprise with regulatory burdens.

The political party in power can be ambivalent, too, but only for a while; on most issues it must ultimately take a stand, and when it does, it comes down on one side of the voters' ambivalence. So it is either to the left or the right of the "centrist" electroate. In either case it is out of sync. In a two-party system, then, the liberal party is always more liberal then the voting public, the conservative party more conservative. Whichever party is in power, grievances accumulate as time passes. The gap widens between what the governing party offers and what the people expect and want – and think they voted for. At some point the electorate expresses its dissatisfaction in the only way it can: by turning to the other party. That party takes office, reverses the policies and satisfies the old grievances, but at once introduces its own set. When it in turn has worn out its welcome, the pendulum swings once more.

Even within periods of one-party dominance, the short-term cycle is evident. The country was in a conservative mood and elected conservative Presidents in the 1890s, the 1920s, the 1950s, and now the 1980s. But it was in a liberal mood and backed liberal presidential candidates in the 1910s, the 1930s, and the 1960s. There is no reason to believe that it is any more permanently attuned to the Reagan-Republican philosophy now that it was immovable in its support of the credo of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society twenty years ago. This interpretation is supported by a wealth of data showing a wide gap now exists between the electorate's policy preferences and the Reagan policies. To cite only a few examples: in contrast to the Republican position, most of the electorate supports the equal rights amendment, is opposed to prohibiting abortion altogether, strongly favors arms control (here the resumption of negotiations has now brought the GOP closer to the majority position), believes military spending should be increased no further, and is opposed to further reductions in spending for almost every enumerated domestic social purpose.

Finally, one cannot omit recognizing the elements of skill, and serendipity, in coping with events. Just as the recent rise of the Republican party has come in large part from the achievements of Reaganomics in the President's first term, so is it dependent on the continuing success of economic policy in his second. The President has staked his party's fate on a gamble – not supported by all the economists of even his own party – that the current enormous deficits in the national budget can be overcome through economic growth alone before they precipitate a new inflationary crisis or a breakdown of the international trading and monetary systems. Foreign affairs always presents risks to any President, as Jimmy Carter learned when the Tehran embassy was sacked. In Reagan's case a breakdown in arms negotiation, a deeper involvement in Central America, a new flare-up in the Middle East, or any of a dozen other dangers could shatter the confidence of many voters in the Republican competence in foreign policy. The poll responses to the question, "Which party do you think would do the best job of . . . ?" have always been volatile. Of late those answers have moved strongly in favor of the Republicans, but they reflect the day's headlines, and they can go down as well as up.

The two scenarios sketched above are by no means mutually exclusive. Even if the Republicans prove correct in their anticipation of a new long-term cycle of GOP dominance, there will still be a short-term alteration of control of the presidency and probably of the Congress, as there has been throughout much of U.S. history. Elections will still be decided by the fluid multitudes of voters who are independents or weakly attached to a party. While some of the Republican gains of recent months may not survive the Reagan presidency, at least those in the South appear to be the durable product of longer-term trends. It would require only a small—and likely—increment of additional permanent strength from the party's new adherents elsewhere, particularly from its generation of young recruits, for 1984 to take its place as the critical election year that gave the country a new, balanced, and highly competitive two-party system.

CHAPTER IV

In designing the executive branch of our national government, the Framers at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 desired to create a strong executive who could give the country the leadership and direction it lacked under the Articles of Confederation but which would be sufficiently constrained to avoid the abuses of executive power the colonies had suffered under King George III. The President was therefore given the power to execute the laws of Congress, to make appointments to high executive and judicial positions with the advice and consent of the Senate, to negotiate treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, to veto bills passed by Congress but which could be overridden by a two-thirds majority vote of both houses, to oversee the administration of government in the executive departments, to serve as commander in chief of the armed forces, to summon Congress into special sessions, and to recommend to Congress necessary and expedient legislation. He was also required to report to Congress annually on the state of the union. While the general grant of executive authority in Article II gave the President broad discretion in the execution of the law, his authority in formulating policy was extremely limited.

As the result of a combination of crises and strong Presidents, the powers of the President and the Presidency have grown immensely by law and precedent. Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War exercised powers approaching dictatorship when he declared martial law and had civilians tried by military tribunals where the courts were open and operating, when he suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and when he imposed a blockade on the South. Pursuant to his theory that the President was the "steward of the people," Theodore Roosevelt helped cause a revolution in Colombia, recognized the independence of insurgents in Panama, and entered into an agreement with them to construct the Panama Canal.

When Congress enacted the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, it created the Bureau of the Budget and made its Director the right arm of the President for the administrative management of the Federal Government. This act added an important new dimension to the role of the President–administrative chief–and gave the President the responsibility to estimate the financial needs of the departments and agencies of the Government on an annual basis. This role was greatly enhanced by the creation of the Executive Office of the President in 1939, which ushered in the structure of the modern presidency. With the establishment of the Executive Office, the White House became the personal extension of the President, and the Budget Bureau became the institutional extension of the Presidency which coordinated the policymaking functions of the departments and imposed a presidential perpsective throughout the executive branch.

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These institutional developments, coupled with Franklin D. Roosevelt's unusual effectiveness in communicating to the American people by radio, his astute use of the press, and his broad conception of his powers as chief executive and commander in chief during World War II, brought the presidency to new heights of power and added two new roles to the President's job – communicator in chief and chief policymaker.

In the following chapter on "Presidential Leadership," Edwards and Wayne have delineated these developments and the enormous increase in the complexity and difficulty of the Presidency which the evolution of this office has created.

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IV

PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP: AN INTRODUCTION

George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne

No office within American government, or for that matter most other systems, has commanded the attention, stirred the imagination, and generated the emotions that the presidency has. Considered the first among equals, it has become the dominant institution in a system designed for balanced government, the prime initiator and coordinator among separate and independent institutions, the foremost mobilizer among disparate and, often, competing interests, and the principal communications link from and to a multitude of groups and individuals. It is a many-faceted, dynamic office – charged with a plethora of responsibilities, a variety of roles, and a large range of powers.

Within it, the President is clearly the chief. Executive officials look to him for direction, coordination, and general guidance in the implementation of policy; members of Congress look to him for establishing priorities, exerting influence, and providing services; the heads of foreign governments look to him for articulating positions, conducting diplomacy, and flexing muscle; the general public looks to him for enhancing security, solving problems, and exercising symbolic and moral leadership – a big order to be sure.

Unfortunately for the President, these expectations often exceed his abilities to meet them. It is not simply a question of his skill or his personality, although both contribute to his capacity to do his job and to do it well. The problem is the system, particularly its constitutional, institutional, and political structures. The Constitution divides authority; institutions share power; and parties lack cohesion and often a sustained issue-ideological thrust.

Despite the President's position and status, he has difficulty overcoming these constraints. Nor can he easily ignore or reduce what is expected of him. As a consequence, disappointment is frequent regardless of who occupies the Oval Office.

To some extent, this has always been the case. But in recent times, the gap between expectations and performance seems to have widened. Disenchantment has increased; confidence has declined; the popularity of many Presidents has plummeted during the course of their Administrations. Presidential leadership has thus become more difficult and more vital if the American system is to work.

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THE ORIGINAL PRESIDENCY

The Creation of the Institution

The contemporary presidency bears little resemblance to the one the framers of the Constitution artfully designed in 1787 in Philadelphia. Their executive had more limited authority, less functional responsibility, and no explicit institutional structure or operating procedures. The times, of course, were different.

While the Constitution's framers saw the need for an independent executive empowered with its own authority, they did not begin with a consensus on the form this executive should take nor the powers it should possess. At the outset of their deliberations, two basic questions had to be answered: Should the office be entrusted to one person or to several individuals? and What combination of functions, responsibilities, and powers would yield an energetic yet safe executive?

The first of these questions was resolved early in the convention after a short but pointed discussion. James Wilson, delegate from Pennsylvania, had proposed that only a single individual could combine the characteristics of "energy, dispatch, and responsibility." Critics immediately responded that such an executive would be dangerous, "the foetus of monarchy" in the words of Edmond Randolph.

In denying the allegation that what they really wanted was a king, Wilson and James Madison sought to contrast their more limited executive with the powers of the king. As the debate intensified, Madison proposed that the institution's authority be established before the number of executives was decided. This constituted one of the most astute parliamentary moves of the Constitutional Convention. Wilson had previously declared that the prerogatives of the British monarch were not a proper guide for determining the executive's domain. They were too extensive. The American executive, he argued, should possess only executive authority, the power to execute laws and make those appointments that had not otherwise been provided for. The Convention accepted Wilson's delineation, a delineation that made it safe to entrust the office to a single individual. This was promptly done. Only later were those powers expanded through enumeration.

Wilson was primarily responsible for this enumeration as well. As a member of the committee charged with taking propositions approved by the Convention and shaping them into a constitution, he detailed the executive's powers with phraseology taken from the New York and Massachusetts constitutions. Surprisingly, his enumeration engendered little debate. The powers were not particularly controversial. Couching them in the language of two state constitutions made them more palatable. Most were quickly and quietly adopted.

Agreement on the checks to secure and restrain the executive was a little more difficult. Abuses of past executives combined with excesses of contemporary legislatures made the maintenance of an institutional balance essential. The problem was how to preserve the balance without jeopardizing the independence of the separate branches or impeding the lawful exercise of their authority. In the end the framers resolved this problem by checking those powers that they believed to be most dangerous, the ones which had been subject to greatest abuse in the previous period (appointments, treaty making, and declarations of war), while protecting the general spheres of authority from encroachment (in the executive's case by a qualified veto).

Presidential responsibility was also encouraged by the provisions for reeligibility and a short term of office. Reappointment was the great motive to good behavior. For those executives who flagrantly abused their authority, impeachment was the ultimate recourse.

The traditional weapon to defend executive authority was the veto. Theoretically, it could function to protect those executive prerogatives that were threatened by the legislature. In practice, it had frequently been employed to preclude the enactment of laws that the executive opposed. Herein lay its danger. The compromise was to give the President the veto but allow two-thirds of both houses to override it.

In summary, the relative ease with which the presidency was empowered indicates that a consensus developed on the bounds and substance of executive authority. Not only had certain traditional prerogatives been rejected but others had been readily accepted. In deciding which of these powers should be given to the new institution, the framers turned to the tenets of balanced government as articulated by the French theorist Charles de Montesquieu in his well-quoted treatise, *The Spirit of the Laws*, and practiced to some extent in the states of Massachusetts and New York.[1] Those powers which conformed to the basic division of authority were accepted; those which actually or potentially threatened the institutional balance were rejected.

Fears of potential abuse led to differing opinions on how best to constrain the branches without violating the principles of separate spheres of authority. The majority of the delegates opted for sharing powers, particularly in foreign affairs, and principally with the Senate. Their decision, reached toward the end of the convention when the pressures to compromise were greatest, exacerbated the fears of those who believed that the Senate would come to dominate the President and control the government.

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[1] Charles de Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, vol. 1 (New York: Hafner, 1949).

Many of the opponents of the Constitution saw the sharing of powers as far more dangerous than the general grant of executive authority that was specified in Article 2. While each of the President's powers engendered some objection during the ratification debate, the most sustained criticism was directed at the relationship with the upper chamber. In the end, the proponents of the Constitution prevailed, but the debate over the efficacy of shared powers between executive and legislative branches has continued through the years.

The Scope of Article 2

In one sense what the framers did is obvious. It is written in Article 2. In another sense, however, their deliberations and decisions have been subject to constant interpretation. Unlike Article 1, where the Constitution detailed the legislative powers that were given to Congress, executive authority was stated in a more general way in Article 2: "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." For years scholars have debated whether this designation provides the President with an undefined grant of authority or simply confers on him the title of the office.

Although the answer to this question remains in doubt, the executive portion of the President's responsibilities is relatively clear. The framers charged the President with the administration of government. He was given the task of faithfully executing the law and the capacity to do so by overseeing the executive departments. The departments were not designated by the Constitution. They were established by legislation during the first Congress. The President, however, was to have a hand in choosing the people who ran them.

The need to provide the executive with some discretion to respond to emergency or extraordinary situations was also considered essential. Heading the only institution with continuous tenure and the only one with a national perspective, the President was thought to be able to respond to events more quickly and decisively than the Congress. Traditionally, this type of emergency power resided in the executive.

In his *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, the British philosopher John Locke had written of the need for such a power, which he termed a prerogative.[2] The framers agreed. Having themselves experienced a legislature unable to respond to emergencies, they desired to provide such a capacity in their constitutional arrangement and give it to the President.

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[2] Locke wrote: "Where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, as they are in all moderated monarchies and well-framed governments, there the good of the society requires that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power. For the legislators not being able to foresee and provide by laws for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common law of Nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society, in many cases where the municipal law has given no direction, till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it." John Locke, "Second Treatise of Civil Government," in Thomas I. Cook, ed., *Two Treatises of Government* (New York: Hafner, 1956), p. 203.

The debate over the war powers illustrates their dilemma as well as their solution. Initially, the Congress was given the authority to make war. Fearing that the word "make" might preclude the executive from responding to an attack if Congress were not in session, the framers agreed to substitute the word "declare." This provided the President with flexibility but did not alter the basic intent – to have Congress decide whether or not to go to war. Even after making that decision, Congress retained powers that affected the conduct of hostilities. These powers serve to limit the President's discretion as commander in chief.

Similarly in foreign affairs, the President was limited in what he could do alone without the approval of the Senate or both houses. He did, however, share the treaty-making role with the upper chamber. The President exercised the initiative. But even here, the wording of the Constitution suggested that the Senate was to have a role in the negotiation of treaties as well as in their ratification.

Although executive powers were expected to expand during emergencies, they were never without limits. The exercise of discretionary powers by the executive was always tied to legislation. The President could summon Congress into special session; he was obligated to report to it on the state of the union; he could recommend necessary and expedient legislation; but it was the Congress that in the end had to decide what laws, if any, to enact. Even in the case of the veto, two-thirds of both houses would have the last word.

In short, the relatively general grant of executive authority gave the President broad discretion in the exercise of this principal responsibility – the execution of the law. Some of his powers were exclusive but others were shared. Some of them were enumerated but that enumeration was not exhaustive. The President had considerable freedom to oversee subordinates of his own choosing in his administration of government. On the other hand, his discretion in formulating policy was extremely limited. Congress, not the executive, was expected to assume that role in the normal course of events.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY

Policymaking Roles

Although the President's constitutionally designated authority has not been formally amended, the scope of that authority has been expanded by law and precedent. Over the years, the President's policymaking powers have grown dramatically. Chief executives beginning with Washington set the contours of foreign policy. Beginning with Jefferson, they shaped it to the point of actually defining what the war policy would be. There were other early examples of presidential initiatives in foreign affairs, notably Monroe's famous doctrine that pledged United States protection of the independent states on this side of the Atlantic.

Crisis situations expanded the President's powers still further as Lincoln's actions during the Civil War demonstrated. Lincoln justified his exercise of power by the gravity of the situation. "Was it possible to lose the Nation and yet preserve the Constitution?" he asked. To his own question, he replied, "I felt that measures otherwise unconstitutional might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the Nation."[3]

Lincoln was not challenged by Congress during the war, but after it Congress reasserted its authority. Throughout the remainder of the century, Congress, not the President, dominated the relationship between the branches. In fact, when, as a professor of politics, Woodrow Wilson wrote his perceptive study on the American political system in the mid-1880s, he titled it *Congressional Government*.

Wilson wrote at the end of an era. By the time he became chief executive, the President's roles in both foreign and domestic affairs had expanded, and Wilson revised his book. Demands for a more activist government had encouraged Presidents McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt to work more closely and harmoniously with Congress to fashion major policy initiatives. Roosevelt was responsible for much of this activity.

Assuming an assertive posture in both foreign and domestic affairs, Roosevelt expanded the President's policymaking roles. He sent the navy halfway around the world (and then requested appropriations from Congress to return it home); he announced a corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, further involving the United States in hemispheric activities; he helped instigate a revolution in Colombia, quickly recognized the independence of insurgents on the Isthmus of Panama, and promptly entered into an agreement with them to build a canal. He was the first President to travel outside of the United States (to Mexico) and the first to help settle a war for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Within the domestic sphere, Roosevelt busted trusts, crusaded for conservation, and mediated a major coal strike. He was also instrumental in getting Congress to enact important legislation, including the Pure Food and Drug Act, the Meat Inspection Act, and the Hepburn (railroad) Act.

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[3] Abraham Lincoln, "Letter dated April 8, 1864," reprinted in Harry A. Bailey, Jr., ed., *Classics of the American Presidency* (Oak Park, Ill.: 1980), p. 34

Roosevelt's theory of the presidency justified and accommodated his activism. Writing in his autobiography after his political career had ended, Roosevelt stated:

> My view was that every executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high position, was a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people, and not to content himself with the negative merits of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin.[4]

In contrast, William Howard Taft, Roosevelt's successor, expressed a much more restrained conception:

> The true view of the executive function is, as I conceive it, that the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise. Such specific grant must be either in the Federal Constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public interest.[5]

Roosevelt's *stewardship* theory has prevailed. With the exception of the three Republican Presidents of the 1920s, occupants of the Oval Office in the 20th century have assumed active political and policymaking roles. Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, in particular, expanded Theodore Roosevelt's initiatives in international and domestic matters.

Wilson was the first President to propose a comprehensive legislative program and the first to be involved in summitry. He was the architect of the proposal to establish a League of Nations, although he was unable to persuade the Senate to accept the treaty ending the war.

Franklin Roosevelt enlarged the President's role in economic affairs. Coming into office in the midst of the Great Depression, he initiated a series of measures to deal with the crisis and succeeded in getting Congress to enact them. He maintained the posture of an international leader, maneuvering the country's entrance into World War II and participating in the initial conferences to end the war. He also made the critical decision to develop the atomic bomb.

The modern presidency is said to have begun in the Franklin Roosevelt era. It is characterized by presidential activism in a variety of policymaking roles. Many of the practices which Roosevelt initiated or continued have been institutionalized by his successors and/or required by Congress.

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[4] Theodore Roosevelt, *The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Scribner's 1913), p. 197.

[5] William Howard Taft, *Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916), p. 138.

Organizational Structure

The structure of the modern presidency also developed during the Roosevelt period. In 1939 the Executive Office of the President was created. Prior to that time Presidents had depended largely on their department heads for administration and advice.

The Constitution did not explicitly provide for an administrative structure. It did, however, contain oblique reference to one. There was a provision in Article 2 that the President could demand in writing the opinions of subordinate officials. It was up to the first Congress to establish the executive departments as the principal administrative units of government. It created three departments (Foreign Affairs, Treasury, and War) and appointed an attorney general and a postmaster general. Since then, nine more departments and more than one hundred agencies have been established.

Throughout most of the 19th century it was Congress, not the President, who dominated the administration of government. Statutes specified many organizational details of the departments including their jurisdiction, staffing levels, and even operating procedures. For the most part, there was little oversight from the President.

The autonomy of the departments contributed to the influence of their secretaries, who headed them. Since the department heads were the President's principal advisers, they exercised considerable leverage in helping to design Administration goals and in mobilizing congressional support. With the exception of the Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln Administrations, strong department secretaries and weak Presidents characterized executive advisory relationships.

This began to change at the outset of the 20th century as a consequence of the President's growing influence in Congress. As that increased, the potency of the department secretaries, individually and collectively, began to decline. They lost their privileged position between President and Congress. Their support of Administration proposals became less critical than it had been to the President's legislative success.

The concern that Theodore Roosevelt and, particularly, William Howard Taft evidenced toward the organization of government also contributed eventually to the President's enhanced status and power within the executive branch. Taft appointed a Committeee on Economy and Efficiency to recommend improvements. Reporting in 1913, the committee urged the creation of a more hierarchial structure with the President assuming a larger administrative role.

Initially, Congress was reluctant to comply. However, sizable budget deficits, inflated by United States involvement in World War I, provided the legislature with a financial (and political) incentive to do so.

Unable to control the deficits, Congress turned to the President for help. It enacted the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which made it a presidential responsibility to estimate the financial needs of the individual departments and agencies on a yearly basis and provided the President with an institutional mechanism to do so, the Bureau of the Budget.

When Franklin Roosevelt took office and expanded the President's domestic policy role, he needed more information, more expertise, and more staff. At first he depended on personnel provided by the executive departments. When that did not prove satisfactory, he turned to a small group of experts to advise him on how to make the organizational structure of the executive more responsive to his needs. The group, headed by Louis Brownlow, issued a report that said:

> The President needs help. His immediate staff assistance is entirely inadequate. He should be given a small number of executive assistants who would be his direct aides in dealing with the managerial agencies and administrative departments of government.[6]

The Brownlow committee urged the creation of a separate presidential office. In 1939 Congress approved the act that established the Executive Office of the President. Initially the office consisted of five units: the White House, Bureau of the Budget, and three World War II agencies (the National Resources Planning Board, the Liaison Office for Personnel Management, and the Office of Government Reports). Eventually over forty different councils, boards, and offices have been housed at one time or another in this office.

The creation of the Executive Office provided the President with a structure directly responsive to his interests. The White House became his personal office. Presidential aides performed political tasks that were dictated by the President's immediate needs, actions, and goals. Having no constitutional and statutory authority of their own and no political base other than the President's, their influence was dependent on their access to him. They did his calling.

Whereas the White House functioned as a personal extension of the President, the Budget Bureau became an institutional extension of the presidency. It coordinated the policymaking functions of the department and agencies, imposing a presidential perspective on the executive branch in the process.

During subsequent administrations, the duties of the Executive Office have been expanded and its organizational structure redesigned. Staffed by civil servants and run by political appointees, it continues to perform a variety of critical tasks. It is considered essential for an activist presidency, but its large size, its many roles, and its organizational autonomy make it difficult for the President to oversee, much less to control.

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[6] President's Committee on Administrative Management, *Report with Special Studies* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1937), p. 5.

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Public Dimensions

In addition to the development of the presidency as an institution and the growth of its policymaking roles, the public dimension of the office has expanded as well. This too has been a relatively recent phenomenon. Franklin Roosevelt was the first to use the mass media (radio) to communicate directly with the American people on a regular basis. His successors have used television to the same end.

For most of the 19th century the presidency was not a particularly visible office, although the President received his share of critical commentary. Jefferson was the first to claim a partisan mandate and Jackson the first to claim a public one.[7]

A variety of factors contributed to a more active public posture by Presidents toward the beginning of the 20th century. The growth of newsgathering organizations and the newspaper chains made it possible to communicate with more people more quickly. The advent of yellow journalism combined with the increased activism of government generated more interest in the opinions and behavior of public officials, particularly the President.

Theodore Roosevelt, more than any of his predecessors, took advantage of these developments to focus attention on himself, his policies, and his activities. He was the first President to give reporters a room in the White House and the first to hold regular meetings with the press. Using his position as "a bully pulpit," Roosevelt rallied public support for his positions and proposals.

Roosevelt's presidency prompted Professor Woodrow Wilson to revise his view that the governmental system was dominated by Congress. The President could be as big a man as he wanted, Wilson asserted in 1908. He could use his position as party and national leader to enhance his political power and thereby exert influence on Congress:

> His capacity will set the limit; and if Congress be overborne by him, it will be no fault of the makers of the Constitution – it will be from no lack of constitutional powers on its part, but only because the President has the Nation behind him, and Congress has not. He has no means of compelling Congress except through public opinion.[8]

Wilson attempted to heed his own words. The enactment of his legislative program can be attributed in large part to his political leadership and public oratory. His greatest disappointment, however, his inability to persuade the Senate to ratify the treaty ending World War I, stemmed from his failure to exercise these skills successfully. Wilson, who went on a public speaking tour to build support for his position, overestimated his ability to lead public opinion and underestimated his opponents' capacity to do so.

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[7] It was during the 1820s that the electorate began to choose presidential electors directly rather than have them selected by state legislatures. This increased the value of obtaining and maintaining public support for the President. Tradition, however, required that this be done in a manner that befitted the dignity of the office. Public addresses were permitted; personal campaigning was discouraged. The party was expected to shoulder the electoral burden for its candidates. Not until William Jennings Bryan's quest for the Nation's highest office in 1896 did candidates take to the stump themselves.

[8] Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), pp. 70-71.

While Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson used the presidency as a podium, neither of them was as skillful at manipulating the press as was Franklin Roosevelt. In his first term, Franklin Roosevelt held more press conferences than any of his predecessors. Meeting frequently with small groups of reporters in the Oval Office, he used these sessions to articulate his views and float trial balloons. He also made extensive and productive use of radio in his fireside chats.

By the end of the Roosevelt era, the presidency had been permanently altered by the media. It had become the most visible national office. Coverage of the White House was constant. The President was always in the news.

The intensive and extensive media focus on the President has had three principal effects. First, it has permanently added a new role to the President's job, that of communicator in chief, and has required that skills commensurate with this role be exercised. Second, it has heightened public expectations of presidential performance. Advances in communications have enabled organized groups to promote the desires of their membership more effectively. The President has become the focal point for many of these increased demands on government. Third, media coverage has linked public approval more closely to the exercise of presidential power. Now more than ever, Presidents need to build support outside of government to gain support within it. Taken together, these factors indicate why increased public exposure for the President has, at best, been a mixed blessing.

PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPORARY LEADERSHIP

These changes, singularly and together, have created new demands on the President which, in turn, have generated new roles and obligations for him and new criteria by which he is to be judged. These new roles and criteria, in turn, have affected perceptions of leadership. In the past, the people did not look to the President to solve most national economic, social, and political problems. Today they do. The President is expected to be a chief policymaker. He is expected to exercise a wide range of powers. Ancillary coordination, communication, and cooptation functions have followed from these expanded roles and powers.

Institutional growth has been another consequence of a more activist presidency. The size of the office has increased enormously. Prior to

1939 the President was assisted by a few aides, most of whom were detailed from executive departments and agencies. The total budget for the salaries and expenses of those working for the President was $125,804.98 in 1925. In 1939 when the Executive Office was created, it was about $250,000. Today it is about $25 million for the White House alone, and that does not include the one hundred or so detailees paid from other executive budgets. The first Executive Office of the President consisted of five agencies including the White House; forty-five years later it has ten agencies and a combined staff of approximately 1,400.

The larger staff has increased the President's capacity to perform added responsibilities and to do so with less dependence on executive departments and agencies. But the enlargement of that staff has also worked to extend the very functions and responsibilities that the staff was designed to serve. This expansion has limited the President's personal influence over what functions his presidency performs and to a lesser extent how his Administration is organized to perform them.

Not only has the presidential office grown in size and solidified in organization but its policy processes have become institutionalized. Mechanisms for preparing the budget, formulating a program, building support in Congress, and advising the President whether to sign or veto legislation have developed and continued from Administration to Administration. These routines have also worked to shape the functions and processes they serve.

There have been significant changes in the public dimensions of the office as well. The selection process has become more individualized. Parties do not organize and mediate between candidates and the voters as they did in the past. Public expectations have increased as a consequence of longer campaigns, more personalized appeals, and many specific promises made to organized groups. Yet, the electoral coalition needed to win no longer provides the basis for governing. New coalitions have to be formed on an issue-by-issue basis.

The national media seemingly are more critical of the President than in the past. Communications from and to the public are more direct and immediate. Such communication enables the White House to measure the pulse of public opinion more accurately, but it also conditions responses, shortens the time frame, and ultimately, constrains the President's options.

Interest groups have proliferated and professionalized. Moreover, they have become more sophisticated at influencing their members and mobilizing them behind specific policy positions. No institution or individual, not the Executive Office of the President, the White House, or even the President is immune from these pressures.

Lobbying increases the political impact of many presidential decisions. It can force the President's hand, making him compromise for political reasons when he would rather not do so for policy reasons. The proliferation of professionalized interest groups makes the redistribution of resources more difficult. Over time, it increases levels of dissatisfaction among different sectors of the public. It adversely affects the President's relations with Congress.

Changes within the legislature have reinforced this organized pluralism. Congress has decentralized lawmaking, shifting power to a large number of subcommittee chairmen. Ironically, more members of Congress must now be consulted, coordinated, and cajoled at the very time when Congress has involved itself in more issues of executive policymaking and policy implementation. The President must work harder than in the past to achieve his Administration's legislative goals.

He is similarly constrained within the executive branch. The continuing orientation of the bureaucracy to outside groups plus its ongoing relationships with Congress work to limit presidential influence. Most presidential appointees in the departments and agencies soon find themselves with divided loyalties.

And that is not all. External factors within the environment have enlarged policy expectations of the President but at the same time made those expectations less subject to presidential control than they were in the past. The President is expected to manage the economy, but the increasing interdependence of nations limits his ability to do so; the scarcity of some natural resources no longer permits unlimited development and forces decisions that have important political consequences; the vulnerability of the United States to nuclear attack shortens the President's reaction time and broadens the effect of national security decisions. It also contributes to the public's psychological dependence on the President and the security needs that the office serves.

Finally, events of the late 1960s and mid-1970s, United States involvement in Vietnam, the Watergate cover-up, and various congressional scandals have impugned the motives and integrity of high officials, including the President's. He no longer enjoys the benefit of doubt many of his predecessors had. This makes it more difficult for him to rally and maintain public support despite the expectation that he do so.

V

NEW PATTERNS OF DECISIONMAKING IN CONGRESS

Steven S. Smith

Is congressional decisionmaking fundamentally different in the Reagan era? Have an increased emphasis on budget politics and heightened partisanship changed the process? Have congressional party leaders been able to use the more focused agenda and demands for coherent policy to centralize policymaking and control individualism? In short, has the congressional fragmentation of the 1970s, criticized by journalists and academics alike, been overcome in the 1980s? If one looks behind the headlines, the answer to these questions is no. There are changes taking place, but they have other origins and are operating largely independent of these influences.

Two trends in congressional politics – an increase in the number of decisionmaking units and a wider access to decisionmaking processes – are having a pervasive effect on congressional policymaking. New subcommittees, select committees, and party organs have been created as rank-and-file members have sought ways to increase their role in policymaking. The term "decentralization" has been used to label this movement toward a more fragmented, disjointed, and pluralistic decisionmaking process. While this description is accurate in part, it obscures the distinction between participation structured by committees or subcommittees and more opportunites for participation by rank-and-file members. These two patterns of decisionmaking can be labeled "decentralized" and "collegial." Because they are inconsistent with each other in a number of important ways, their coexistence creates a tension in congressional decisonmaking processes.

Party leaders are often called upon to solve the problems that are created; however, they lack the resources to do so to the satisfaction of the membership, and become the targets of repeated complaints of the rank and file. In fact, party leadership is probably the single most common target of complaints by members of Congress about their institution. In both 1976 and 1980, the House class of 1974 reported greater dissatisfaction with party leadership than with committee operations, caucus activities, or staff support. In 1975 a majority of House Democrats, junior and senior members alike, expressed dissatisfaction with Speaker Carl Albert's leadership. Many House members have

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CHAPTER V

Since the late 1960s, both houses of Congress, in varying degrees, have manifested two contradictory trends—decentralization and collegialism—which have greatly complicated the problems of leadership in each. Decentralization has been characterized by the movement toward a more fragmented and pluralistic decisionmaking process, as manifested by the proliferation of subcommittees and the budget committees of the House and Senate. Theoretically, decentralization would mean greater expertise achieved by narrower spans of jurisdiction and consequent specialization of function. It would also permit more direction and control to be exercised by committee and subcommittee chairmen.

Collegialism, on the other hand, represents a shift toward more collegial decisionmaking processes, thereby broadening opportunities for individual members of Congress to participate in the formulation of national policy well beyond their committee and subcommittee assignments. The most important manifestation of this trend was the reactivation of the Democratic caucus in the House of Representatives. In addition, the Steering and Policy Committee was revitalized to represent geographic regions in its deliberations on committee assignments and policy matters. These developments occurred concomitantly with the weakening of party discipline and leadership in both houses and with the increased assertiveness and individualism of members of Congress elected after the 1960s.

Despite the trend toward collegialism in the House, the dominant trend remains decentralization, whereas in the Senate collegialism is by far the stronger, since no significant centralizing changes have occurred there.

These contrary trends have created serious problems for Congress. First, the equal status of members under collegialism is inconsistent with the status of chairmen in a decentralized committee system. The caucuses and ad hoc coalitions often intrude on the jurisdictions of the established committees, and they multiply the decision points at which legislation can be blocked. Coalitions, as a result, must be created to move legislation forward. Second, the increasing tension between decentralization and collegialism requires party leaders to resolve the disputes that arise between decentralized and collegial patterns, for example, to attempt to settle the disputes between committees and other party members. Thus leaders are often forced to devise ad hoc mechanisms to overcome the continuing deficiencies of decentralization while assuaging the sensitive political egos of committee members.

As Stephen S. Smith points out in the following article, the trend toward more collegialism will be difficult to reverse, and the likelihood is that tension between decentralized and collegial processes will continue to increase. The near future thus offers the continuation of a mix of decentralized and collegial decisionmaking processes with the result that party leaders will continue to devise different decisionmaking processes for each major issue before Congress. Thus leadership in Congress will come from even more diverse and unpredictable sources.

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been disappointed that Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill's leadership has not lived up to its original billing. Robert Byrd was roundly criticized for lack of policy direction in his first two years as Senate majority leader, and he received an unprecedented challenge to his reelection as minority leader in 1984 on the grounds that he offered weak leadership. Without exception, leaders respond that the nature of Congress now precludes the kind of leadership offered by Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn in the 1950s.[1]

In the 1980s the tension between decentralized and collegial decisionmaking patterns has increased in several ways, making the job of party leadership even more difficult. This essay puts these developments into the larger context of congressional decisionmaking processes and evaluates recent developments in party and committee operations. It does so by defining the alternative decisionmaking patterns, examining the changes of the 1970s in the context of these alternatives, outlining the consequences of the tension between decentralized and collegial patterns for congressional party leadership, and detailing recent congressional developments and likely new directions.

PARTICIPATION AND STRUCTURE

Most treatments of Congress characterize decisionmaking processes, usually implicitly, as a continuum running from very centralized to very decentralized. At the centralized end, a single leader, or perhaps a tightly knit group of members, makes the important policy decisions for the institution. The number of members and organizational units with an effective role in decisionmaking is very limited. At the decentralized end, members share decisionmaking responsibilities through a division of labor, with successive decisions made by separate individuals or small groups of members. There are many effective participants, all working within the limited jurisdiction of the units to which they are assigned.

The centralization-decentralization continuum has been useful in past analyses of House decisionmaking processes, but is inadequate for analyzing the Senate and many recent developments in the House. For example, the continuum does not capture collegial patterns of decisionmaking. In pure form, the collegial pattern involves a single unit, such as a Committee of the Whole, that gives all members an opportunity to participate in deliberations over all issues the chamber considers. (This would be labeled pure democracy in other settings.) Neither centralized nor decentralized patterns would allow collegial decisionmaking. Centralization limits the number of organizational units involved in effective decisionmaking, but also radically limits participation. Decentralization requires a division of labor that limits members' participation to the issues falling under the jurisdiction of their subunits.

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[1] See Burdett A. Loomis, "The 'Me Decade' and the Changing Context of House Leadership," in Frank H. Mackaman, ed., *Understanding Congressional Leadership* (Washington: CQ Press, 1981), pp. 168-69; William Greider and Barry Sussman, *Washington Post*, June 29, 1975; Daniel Rapoport, "Congress Report: It's Not a Happy Time for House-Senate Leadership," *National Journal* 8 (February 7, 1976), p. 171; Adam Clymer, "Leadership Gap in the Senate," *New York Times*, September 28, 1977; and Robert G. Kaiser, "Majority Leader Byrd Has Made Converts in 2 Years," *Washington Post*, October 28, 1978. On various leaders' views, see Mary Russell, *Washington Post*, March 31, 1974; Steven S. Smith and Christopher J. Deering, *Committees in Congress* (CQ Press, 1984), p. 252; and Robert L. Peabody, "Senate Party Leadership: From the 1950s to the 1980s," in Mackaman, *Understanding Congressional Leadership*, pp. 71-72, 109.

Four Patterns of Decisionmaking

Figure 2 shows four pure patterns of decisionmaking, each of which has important advantages. The collegial pattern comes closest to the pattern intended by members of the first Congresses.[2] In the collegial pattern, the absence of structural barriers to broad participation facilitates a free exchange of ideas and, ideally, produces a process of mutual enlightenment that takes full advantage of all members' talents and knowledge. Such a process, it is often hoped, encourages members to rise above their parochial concerns and discover the larger common good.[3] While this pattern risks atomized individualism, its egalitarianism enables members to broaden their interests and collaborate with colleagues to solve policy problems, unlike a fully decentralized pattern.

The decentralized pattern is consistent with the informal norms of apprenticeship, specialization, and committee reciprocity that governed members' behavior during most of the post-World War II period.[4] A division of labor gives Congress the means to manage a large and diverse work load, allows members to specialize in a limited number of policy areas and develop expertise, and provides specialized units (committees, subcommittees) through which the institution may interact with the executive branch and organized interests. Complex, divisive issues can be partitioned into manageable segments, and conflict can be resolved more readily by the members and outsiders most concerned about the issues. In some policy areas, the fragmentation of jurisdiction facilitates the development of norms of universalism, in which policy benefits are distributed widely among the active participants.

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[2] Joseph Cooper, "The Origins of the Standing Committees and the Development of the Modern House," *Rice University Studies* 56 (Summer 1970), pp. 17–22; Ralph V. Harlow, *The History of Legislative Methods in the Period before 1825* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1917); and Lee Robinson, "The Development of the Senate Committee System" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1954).

[3] The argument for this model of legislative decisionmaking was stated most recently by Arthur Maass, in *Congress and the Common Good* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).

[4] Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (University of North Carolina Press, 1960), chapter 5.


MANY
CENTRAL DIRECTORATE
DECENTRALIZED
NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE DECISIONMAKING UNITS
CENTRALIZED
COLLEGIAL
FEW
NUMBER OF EFFECTIVE PARTICIPANTS
MANY

FIGURE 2. FOUR DECISIONMAKING PATTERNS

The centralized pattern increases the likelihood that Congress will produce well-integrated, coherent policy. A central actor is in a position to set policy and coordinate the construction of legislation. This is especially important for complex problems because the various aspects of policy must be carefully balanced. This pattern permits central decisionmakers to focus institutional resources and makes clear who is responsible for the policy product.

The fourth pattern, with a few effective participants directing the activities of a large number of subunits, perhaps through a central directorate of committee chairmen, is difficult to imagine in Congress. The conditions that limit participation are also likely to limit the number of effective decisionmaking units. But this approach has some of the advantages of the decentralized pattern, such as multiple points of access and the partitioning of policy problems. And it has some of the advantages of the centralized pattern; indeed, rank-and-file members themselves may serve largely as staff to a few core decisionmakers. This combination puts this pattern as close to a hierarchical form as is possible in Congress. Efficiency in decisionmaking in an institution with many members, each of whom must have some organizational assignment, may be an advantage of this pattern. The Senate of the late 1800s came close to this pattern, when a few senior Republican committee chairmen ran the chamber.[5]

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[5] See David J. Rothman, *Politics and Power: The United States Senate 1869–1901* (Atheneum, 1969), chapters 1, 2.

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The Tendency toward Decentralization

It is well understood that powerful forces propel Congress toward a decentralized pattern of decisionmaking. The members' ties with geographical constituencies and the frequency of elections encourage individualism and parochialism. Constituency differences push members in a variety of directions, and the political parties do not provide substitute ties to bind legislators together for more than very short periods. Members enjoy a fragmented structure in which they can freely pursue policies meeting their individual political needs. In contrast, the centralized and central-directorate forms limit participation and impose roles on members that may not be consistent with their individually defined political needs. Collegial decisionmaking may undermine the control over policy exercised by subunit members and their political clienteles by risking the interference of other members.

It is not only the reelection imperative that encourages decentralization. Rank-and-file members pursuing strongly held policy objectives or simply an interest in challenging policy problems prefer the opportunities to participate in significant policy deliberations offered by the decentralized pattern. Decentralization, with its multiplicity of effective decisionmaking units, also gives many members a piece of the institution's power. In sum, decentralization meets well the needs of members with a variety of political objectives, constituency demands, and policy concerns while providing a division of labor required for managing a massive work load.

The important differences between the chambers that continue to shape their decisionmaking processes should not be forgotten, of course. Senators' larger constituencies give them incentives to concern themselves with a broader range of policy problems; there is some breathing room at the beginning of Senators' six-year terms that can be used to pursue personal policy interests; and the Senate's smaller size permits the average Senator to take a more active role in chamber decisionmaking than is possible in the House. All of these factors, each a product of constitutional design, lead the Senate closer to the collegial form than the House.[6] Self-imposed rules and informal practices sometimes reinforce House-Senate differences and sometimes narrow them, but the difference in central tendency has existed since the early Congresses.[7] Consequently, the centralization-decentralization continuum has been more useful in describing change in House decisionmaking processes, where participation and structure have been related more closely.

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[6] See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The United States Senate: A Bicameral Perspective* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1982); and Lewis A. Froman, Jr., *The Congressional Process: Strategies, Rules, and Procedures* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), pp. 7-8.

[7] See Norman J. Ornstein, "The House and the Senate in a New Congress," in Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, eds., *The New Congress* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1981), pp. 363-83, and Smith and Deering, *Committees in Congress*, chapter 1.

Preferences for Decentralized or Collegial Patterns

The trade-off between decentralized and collegial patterns is a difficult one for the typical member. Decentralization constitutes a fragmentation of legislative power, with each subunit autonomous within its jurisdiction. Collegial processes do not fragment legislative power; all power is shared equally by all members. So the trade-off is dominance over a small fragment of jurisdiction versus a little influence over the total jurisdiction of Congress. Several observers claim that members favor fragmented power, and the record for most of this century supports that view.[8] But the record of the last two decades is not so clear.

What would lead members to prefer one pattern over the other? One reasonable speculation is that members' personal political goals shape their attitudes about decisionmaking processes.[9] Those pursuing narrow interests or concentrating on reelection favor a decentralized institution with committee self-selection. Those seeking personal control over policy and staff also have to settle for decentralization. Members with broad policy interests, on the other hand, feel too constrained in a highly structured, decentralized institution. Collegial processes are much more compatible. And members seeking higher office find that the collegial pattern offers opportunities to increase their visibility to new and larger constituencies. Changing admixtures of member goals over time can be expected to produce shifts in aggregate preferences for the two patterns.

A common observation about members is that a "new breed" has arrived since the late 1950s. The first members to be so labeled were the liberals elected to the Senate between 1958 and 1964.[10] With their wide-ranging policy interests, many of them felt constrained by the decentralized system under the domination of conservative chairmen with the aid of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Many also had presidential ambitions. The Senate, in fact, has since "become a veritable breeding ground for presidential candidates," recent observers comment. As a result, "more and more senators are involved in a wide spectrum of policy areas extending beyond their committee assignments and often well beyond their Senate work."[11] Many House Democrats elected since the early 1970s also have been indentified as a new breed, described as "young, activist, nationally oriented, and interested in a variety of issues."[12] Similar tendencies have been noted for House and Senate Republicans elected in 1978 and thereafter. A commentator summarized the characteristics of the "new-style" members: "His absorbing interest is governmental policy. He came to Congress with a sense of mission, even a mandate, to have an impact on the legislative process. He is impatient . . . [and] has no habit of being deferential to the established and the powerful, and he will not be so in the Congress, either in committee or on the floor."[13]

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[8] Lawrence C. Dodd, "Congress and the Quest for Power," in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 270-72; and Rochelle Jones and Peter Woll, *The Private World of Congress* (Free Press, 1979), chaps. 3, 6.

[9] This is Fenno's conclusion about decisionmaking processes within congressional committees. See Richard F. Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).

[10] See Michael Foley, *The New Senate* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), especially chap. 4.

The implication is clear. Those members who can be labeled a new breed should favor collegial processes over decentralized ones. Of course, not all members, even among those elected in the last decade, are a part of the new breed and not all new-breed members have consistent views – after all, the trade-off is difficult. The result is a tension between preferences for the two patterns.

Several related aspects of Congress's environment also shape attitudes toward decisionmaking processes. Members who perceive that their institution's or party's collective image greatly affects their own political fortunes are more likely to seek influence over the relevant issues and thus seek to remove structural barriers to participation. Such a perception may be the product of an out-party's grappling with a popular President or the presence of an unusually salient issue that divides the parties or the branches of government. Members may recognize that their pet legislative causes will be better served, at least in the short term, by expanding the number of members involved and overwhelming those in positions of committee or subcommittee authority. They may find that their political interests are disadvantaged by a particular division of jurisdiction between committees. Or Congress's agenda may be so highly focused, perhaps because of a crisis or an unusual presidential effort, that participation limited to one's committees or subcommittees is meaningless. And finally, shifts in the policy agenda may produce changes in members' preferences for decisionmaking processes. For example, a shift from distributive issues to regulatory or redistributive issues is likely to expand the number of members demanding the right to participate.[14] Such circumstances would reinforce the interest of members with broad policy or higher office concerns in collegial processes and may convince others that a more collective process is desirable. Unlike members' political motivations, however, these conditions are likely to be quite transitory.

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[11] Norman J. Ornstein, Robert L. Peabody, and David W. Rohde, "The Senate through the 1980s: Cycles of Change," in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3d ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 1985), p. 18.

[12] Richard E. Cohen, "Strains Appear as 'New Breed' Democrats Move to Control Party in the House," *National Journal* 15 (June 25, 1983), p. 1328.

[13] James L. Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress* (Washington: Brookings, 1981), p. 371.

[14] Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy and Public Policy*, 3d ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1984), chap. 8.

Over the last two decades several developments have stimulated interest in overcoming the obstacles of decentralized decisionmaking. New regulatory issues in areas such as the environment, energy, consumer protection, and civil rights have attracted the interest of a wide range of members and have not fallen neatly within the division of committee jurisdictions. Sharp institutional conflicts between Congress and Presidents have arisen, as have related divisions between the parties, especially between congressional Democrats and White House Republicans. And the domination of television as a medium of political communication has increased the visibility of and the interest in these issues and conflicts.

THE 1970s IN PERSPECTIVE

Both chambers of Congress undertook major reappraisals of their decisionmaking processes during the 1970s.[15] Although the mix differed, both chambers considered structual changes and ways to improve opportunities for effective participation of rank-and-file members. The search for structural reforms was motivated by a number of concerns: poor alignment of committee jurisdictions with policy problems, unevenly distributed work loads among committees, and severe scheduling problems caused by multiple committee and subcommittee assignments. The drive to increase avenues of participation was aimed primarily at powerful committee chairmen who maintained firm control of committee agendas, staff, and policy development. Both structural and participatory concerns, then, stemmed from the manner in which the chambers had decentralized their decisionmaking processes. The resulting reforms do not fall neatly into categories, but in most cases their basic thrust is readily discernible.

The House of Representatives

House Democrats moved to consider wide-ranging reforms after reactivating their caucus in 1969. Between 1971 and 1974, changes in House and Democratic caucus rules limited committee chairmen to one subcommittee chairmanship, stripped chairmen of their ability to authorize and appoint subcommittees, forced the creation of subcommittees on most committees, granted subcommittees staffs and jurisdictional identities, and guaranteed the minority party significant staff assistance. This set of reforms had a decentralizing effect on House decisionmaking processes and closely tied participation to structure: more subcommittees and more members gained an effective role in decisionmaking. Despite repeated attempts, no significant jurisdictional realignment was adopted in the House, in part because strengthened subcommittee chairmen now had a greater stake in the old jurisdictional arrangement.[16] As a result, the fragmented, overlapping jurisdictions of House standing committees remain, along with the attendant problems of managing complex policy and scheduling problems.[17]

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[15] See Roger H. Davidson, "Two Avenues of Change: House and Senate Committee Reorganization," in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 2d ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 1981), pp. 103-37; and Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, "Adaptation and Consolidation: Structural Innovation in the U.S. House of Representatives," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1 (February 1976), pp. 37-65.

A few House reformers, led by Richard Bolling, Democrat of Missouri, sought to improve policy coordination capability and increase accountability by strengthening centralizing forces. After proposals to add to the functions of the Rules Committee were dropped, the speakership was given new political tools by House Democrats. The Speaker was made chairman of the revitalized Steering and Policy Committee (which was given committee asssignment authority) and gained new powers to refer legislation to multiple committees or to ad hoc committees (with House approval) and the authority to make the nominations of all Democrats on the Rules Committee. The Democratic party leadership also gained additional assistant whips and staff. The clear intent was to counter decentralization by increasing the authority of the Speaker, although the focus on the "service industry" of the committee system (committee assignments, bill referral, floor scheduling, and rules) did not directly reduce the autonomy of the standing committees.[18]

Increased decentralization, qualified by limited centralizing reforms, is only part of the story in the House. The major thrust of the reforms in rules and practices was a shift toward more collegial decisionmaking processes.[19] Collegial reforms came in two forms. One was to create additional opportunities for rank-and-file participation at nearly every stage and level in the decisionmaking process. The most important was the reactivation of the Democratic caucus.[20] While the caucus was not as active as it could have been during the 1970s, it occasionally provided a forum for the expression of views that would not otherwise be heard by committee members. In addition, 12 elected members were placed on the revitalized Steering and Policy Committee to represent geographic regions in its deliberations on committee assignments and policy matters. Caucus rules were changed to require rotation of the elected and appointed members of Steering and Policy and replacement of senior members by junior members. The reform enabled the Speaker to place representatives of junior and minority members on the committee. The reforms of standing committee procedures not only guaranteed subcommittees independence from full committee chairmen but also democratized committee operations by providing for subcommittee self-selection, giving a majority of members the power to call meetings, restricting abusive uses of proxy voting, and forcing full committee chairmen to promptly report legislation approved by their committees. And Democratic party leaders have created numerous informal opportunities for rank-and-file members to influence chamber and party decisionmaking: lengthy whip meetings, Speaker's task forces, and caucus committees.

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[16] Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek, *Congress against Itself* (Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 263.

[17] That overlapping jurisdictions continue to be a problem for the House was most evident in the House reaction to the 1983 scandals in the Environmental Protection Agency. Five separate subcommittees from four different committees stumbled over each other to investigate allegations of mismanagement and political manipulation of agency decisions, eventually forcing Speaker O'Neill to intervene. Despite appeals from the Speaker, the subcommittee chairmen refused to coordinate their activities. See Joseph A. Davis, "House Subcommittees Begin Reviewing EPA Documents: Two More Officials Are Fired," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 41 (February 26, 1983), pp. 411–13; and Howard Kurtz, "Levitas Pact on EPA Documents Faulted by Panel Chairman," *Washington Post*, February 20, 1983.

[18] Academic observers have commented that there may be an ideal mix of centralization and decentralization, labeling the mix "integrated specialization" or "channeled expressiveness." See Charles O. Jones, "House Leadership in an Age of Reform," in Mackaman, *Understanding Congressional Leadership*, p. 122; and Allen Schick, "Complex Policymaking in the United States Senate," in *Policy Analysis on Major Issues*, prepared for the Commission on the Operation of the Senate, 94 Cong. 2 sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 21.

The other type of collegial reform was to make members with special sources of influence accountable to rank-and-file members. Caucus and whip meetings created situations in which top party leaders were obliged to explain their agendas and strategies. The Democratic caucus assumed the power to require the Rules Committee to issue special orders permitting amendments in floor debate. Full committee chairmen were required to face election by the caucus every two years and subcommittee chairmen to be elected by the committee caucuses. During the 1970s, three full committee chairmen and one Appropriations subcommittee chairman were denied election by the Democratic caucus; at least six members in line for subcommittee chairmanships by virtue of seniority were denied election by their committee caucuses; and many others faced substantial opposition.[21]

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[19] Charles O. Jones comes to a similar conclusion, although Jones prefers to view the reforms as opportunities for expression rather than participation. See Jones, "House Leadership in an Age of Reform," p. 131.

[20] It should also be noted that House Republicans rejuvenated their caucus in the mid-1960s. Gerald Ford promised a more active Republican conference when he became its chairman in 1963. The conference was not used as planned, however, although it established a staff and became more active after Melvin Laird took the chairmanship in 1965. See Charles O. Jones, *The Minority Party in Congress* (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), p. 36, and Randall B. Ripley, *Party Leaders in the House of Representatives* (Washington: Brookings, 1967), p. 46.

[21] See Smith and Deering, *Committees in Congress*, chap. 6.

House Republicans played an important role in shaping many important reforms of chamber rules in the 1970s, but were excluded in other areas where Democratic reformers sought the shelter of the majority party caucus to impose reforms on the committees. The Republicans themselves had already increased the number of opportunities for junior members to participate by the late 1960s. New and more active party committees and a more active party caucus had given rank-and-file Republicans a greater voice in party affairs by the time Democratic reformers moved their caucus to action in the 1970s. However, House Republicans lack the formal strictures limiting the power of ranking committee Republicans over the use of staff and other resources. As a result, Republican activities on several House committees remain far more centralized than those of the majority party Democrats.[22]

The net effect of the 1970s was to increase opportunities for Democratic rank-and-file members to participate actively in party and chamber decisionmaking. Change took both decentralized and collegial forms, reflecting the multifaceted nature of the attack of the power of full committee chairmen. And as attacks on the same targets, the two approaches appeared consistent; together, they represented a rightward shift in the patterns shown in figure 2.

Most visible conflicts between the two models during the 1970s, such as committee chairmen's resistance to Democratic caucus discussion of issues under their committees' jurisdictions, could be explained away as "sour grapes" on the part of the older generation of losers in the reforms.[23] More serious conflict between decentralization and collegial patterns generally was avoided because the collegial opportunities were not fully exploited in the 1970s. While the Democratic caucus played a role in Vietnam War and tax issues for limited periods, the use of the caucus late in the decade was limited to organizational matters.[24] Very few meetings of the Steering and Policy Committee were devoted to specific legislation. Both Speakers Albert and O'Neill attempted to avoid meetings in which intraparty factionalism would surface. O'Neill flatly disliked having the caucus or Steering and Policy dictate policy or strategy to standing committees or party leaders.[25] House Democratic leaders repeatedly found themselves as the defenders of decentralized decisionmaking. In any case, there was less demand for caucus involvement than there might have been because of the policy direction offered by a President of the same party. Overall, then, the House became more decentralized, although important collegial processes were put in place as well.

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[22] Ibid., chaps. 6, 7.

[23] See Bruce F. Freed, "House Democrats Dispute over Caucus Role," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 33 (May 3, 1975), pp. 911-15.

[24] On the use of the caucus, see Sundquist, *Decline and Resurgence of Congress*, pp. 383-87.

[25] Ann Cooper, "Democrats Still Arguing Over Party Caucus Role on Legislative Issues," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 36 (April 15, 1978), pp. 875-76.

The Senate

Although Senate Democratic leader Robert Byrd asserted greater control over the staff of his party's Policy and Steering committees and assumed more responsibility in managing legislation on the floor, no significant centralizing changes occurred in the Senate.[26]

The major structural change was the 1977 consolidation of committees and subcommittees. The Senate eliminated two standing committees and several special and select committees; rearranged committee jurisdictions in areas such as energy, the environment, science and technology, and foreign commerce; and, as a by-product of new limits on Senators' committee and subcommittee assignments, abolished over thirty subcommittees. These consolidating changes did not reduce opportunities for participation significantly, however, because 90 subcommittees remained and other reforms had spread subcommittee chairmanships to nearly all majority party members. In 1970 the Senate had limited Senators to no more than one subcommittee chairmanship on the same committee. And at the time of the 1977 consolidation, full committee chairmen were restricted to two subcommittee chairmanships. As a result, Senate decisionmaking was slightly more decentralized by the end of the 1970s as fewer full committee chairmen held multiple subcommittee chairmanships.

The more overwhelming direction of change in the Senate, however, was toward more collegial decisionmaking. In the 1960s Democratic liberals had asserted their independence of the conservative committee chairmen, using the floor to challenge committee recommendations and raise issues blocked in committee. The liberals were tolerated and sometimes encouraged by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, who opened more and more avenues for rank-and-file members to participate effectively, including expansion of the Democratic Policy and Steering committees and floor scheduling more in accordance with individual members' needs.[27] By the early 1970s the committee-centered norms of apprenticeship and specialization, at least in the sense that involvement in noncommittee matters was proscribed, were no longer operative in the Senate.[28] The committee and subcommittee structure retained great significance in Senate decisionmaking, but no longer posed insuperable obstacles to Senators seeking to influence policy outside the jurisdiction of their own committees. As one observer noted in 1973, the Senate combined "high participation and low specialization."[29]

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[26] Smith and Deering, *Committees in Congress*, p. 196.

[27] See Peabody, "Senate Party Leadership." Also see John G. Stewart, "Two Strategies of Leadership: Johnson and Mansfield," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., *Congressional Behavior* (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 61-92; Randall B. Ripley, *Power in the Senate* (New York: St. Martin's, 1969), pp. 91-96, and Andrew J. Glass, "Mansfield Reforms Spark Quiet Revolution in Senate," *National Journal* 3 (March 6, 1971), p. 500.

In the 1970s additional changes institutionalized the power of rank-and-file members. In 1970 rules were instituted formalizing each Senator's right to a seat on one of the top four committees and permitting committee majorities to call meetings.[30] A Mansfield-initiated practice of submitting Democratic committee assignments to his party's conference for approval began in 1971, and a 1972 rule required that Senate delegations to conference committees represent the Senate's majority view. In 1973 the Republicans provided for the election of ranking committee members by the committee caucuses, and in 1975 Democrats decided to permit secret ballot votes on committee chairmen at the request of one-fifth of the conference. Democratic Majority Leader Byrd began in 1977 to submit the Steering Committee's committee assignment nominations to the party conference for approval. And in 1977 rules were adopted giving each Senator additional staff for committee duties and urging committees to give all Senators their first subcommittee choice before any are given two subcommittee assignments. By the end of the 1970s rank-and-file Senators had gained a formal voice in nearly all aspects of party, committee, and floor decisionmaking processes.

The conflict between decentralized and collegial decisionmaking was pervasive in the Senate of the 1960s and 1970s but, in contrast to the House, majority party leaders did not offer a strong defense of decentralization. Indeed, Mansfield, who served as floor leader from 1961 to 1976, has been cited frequently as having stimulated the breakdown of the apprenticeship and specialization norms and the associated increase in the willingness of Senators to challenge committees on the floor. Mansfield believed that even the decision about how to make a decision was best left to the Senate as a whole.[31] "Coequal" was the codeword often used by Mansfield to describe Senators' roles, a word that captures the essence of collegial decisionmaking.

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[28] David W. Rohde, Norman J. Ornstein, and Robert L. Peabody, "Political Change and Legislative Norms in the U.S. Senate, 1957-1974," in Glenn R. Parker, ed., *Studies of Congress* (Washington: CQ Press, 1985), pp. 175-79.

[29] Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees*, p. 182.

[30] The four committees are Appropriations, Armed Services, Finance, and Foreign Relations. This rule formalized the "Johnson rule" initiated by Democratic Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson in the 1950s and adopted by the Republicans soon thereafter.

[31] See Ripley, *Power in the Senate*, pp. 91-96; Rohde, Ornstein, and Peabody, "Political Change and Legislative Norms," pp. 163-65; and Steward, "Two Strategies of Leadership," p. 69.

The Budget Process

The new congressional budget process created by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 offered the potential of radically altering the decentralized fiscal policymaking process in Congress. The process was designed to coordinate, but not undermine, the decentralized process by which Congress had made budget decisions. Budget resolutions provided a legislative vehicle through which Congress could set broad policy objectives and guide or direct the separate appropriations, tax, and authorizations committees to develop specific legislation consistent with the broad policy. As a result, budget resolutions provide a means for centralized decisionmakers to shape a wide range of policies. But the budget act of 1974 did not guarantee that the vehicle would or could be exploited in this manner. New House and Senate Budget committees were assigned the responsibility to write and report the budget resolutions, but they could not impose their will without the endorsement of their chambers, which were stacked with defenders of the role of the old committees. Nor did party leaders automatically acquire the power to see that coherent policy was enacted through the new process.

The record of the 1970s shows mixed results. The occasional success of both Budget committees in overcoming major challenges by other committees often has been interpreted as a victory for a newly centralized decisionmaking process over the "evil" centrifugal forces of Congress. This interpretation misses an important distinction. In the first place, the budget resolutions were constructed with an eye to what would pass the chamber. This required Budget members, and especially their chairmen, to anticipate the preferences of their colleagues. Moreover, the contests between the Budget committees and challenging tax or authorization committees were decided on the floor of the two houses, usually after lengthy debate and the active participation of a cross section of members. The membership of the two houses played a genuine, significant role in setting broad policy that had previously not received formal legislative attention.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLLEGIAL DECISIONMAKING

In the abstract, there are several significant implications of a shift from a decentralized pattern toward a more collegial policymaking process. The most obvious is that it greatly increases the "scope of conflict" by expanding the number of members and the size of the constituency involved in a policy debate.[32] Because more interests are involved, the definition of the issue debated, the salient political divisions, and the balance of power are all likely to be different from those in committees and subcommittees. Setting the agenda is likely to be a more difficult task in the collegial pattern as members with a variety of interests seek meaningful participation. As a result, predicting which issues and political divisions will surface is more difficult.

When compared with the decentralized pattern, in which issues are often partitioned and decided in a piecemeal fashion, the collegial pattern provides opportunities for members to connect parts of policies. Such opportunities make it more difficult to suppress deeply or widely held attitudes. This may mean that underlying ideological or regional divisions will surface more frequently, increasing the intensity of divisions and, ironically, undermining norms of collegiality.

Building coalitions is difficult enough in a large institution where majorities must be re-created frequently. With a larger number of effective participants, however, coalition building is even more difficult, time consuming, and expensive. Efficient means of communication and persuasion are sought by members seeking to shape policy. In fact, coalition building may look like mass marketing. Mass mailings, such as "Dear Colleague" letters, are employed frequently. Members use the media to sell legislation to colleagues. The line between legislative assistant and press secretary becomes blurred. Indirect persuasion – through outside groups – is routine as coalition builders seek to influence members with whom they have little familiarity.

In a collegial setting, rank-and-file members recognize that their political reputations can be molded by their activity on the floor, in party caucus, in the mass media, or wherever policy debates take place. Committee and subcommittee assignments no longer constrain individuals' choices of issues on which to focus or commit staff resources. In the absence of a formal structure that effectively limits interaction between members and funnels individuals' efforts, ad hoc groups may proliferate as members coalesce in multiple combinations to pursue common interests, share resources, and create opportunities to publicize their causes and themselves.

Finally, the less structured participation of the collegial pattern poses the risk that the institution will eventually disintegrate into atomized individualism. In contrast to the decentralized pattern, no member or group of members is in a position to enforce norms of collegiality and courtesy. Committee chairmen are not in a position to

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[32] On the significance of the scope of conflict, see E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (Dryden Press, 1960), chap. 1.

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provide sanctions against violators of institutional norms, and members are reluctant to infringe upon the liberties of colleagues. The collegial pattern entails greater risks because it depends more completely on the cooperation and good will of the membership.

This description captures a great deal of the change that has accompanied the move to more collegial patterns. Other observers have noted an increased number of challenges to committee recommendations on both the House floor and Senate floor, national visibility for more House members, increased salience of ideological divisions within the Democratic party, the spread of ad hoc caucuses, and a breakdown in the observance of the norm of courtesy.[33] But the picture is even more complicated because of the continuing power of the forces of decentralization in both chambers.

An Uncomfortable Mix

The mix of decentralized and collegial patterns creates serious problems for Congress. Most concretely, the combination makes members' relative status more ambiguous. The egalitarianism of collegialism is not consistent with the special status granted to chairmen in a decentralized committee system. To take a current example, how should Republican members of Ways and Means treat Representative Jack Kemp when the committee considers tax simplification? Are they to defer to his expertise even though he has never been a member of the committee? The budget process has posed similar problems repeatedly as Budget Committee members and others shape reconciliation instructions. Chairmen and committee members believe they do not get the credit and deference they deserve, while other members are still careful not to alienate chairmen and committees responsible for acting on their pet legislation. Members complain when a chairman, such as Senator Jesse Helms, Republican of North Carolina, ignores committee duties to pursue interests on the floor, but they demand the right to participate themselves on any issue coming before the chamber.

The combination also enhances the chances that norms of collegiality and courtesy will weaken. The independence granted committee or subcommittee chairmen in a decentralized institution breeds an individualism that is not always well suited to a collegial process in which it is hoped that participants will share ideas and talents, welcome differing views, and seek common ground to resolve conflict. This problem can be expected to be especially acute when the number of chairmen is numerous, as it is in the House and Senate today.

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[33] See, for example, Alan Ehrenhalt, "In the Senate of the '80s, Team Spirit Has Given Way to the Rule of Individuals," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 40 (September 4, 1982), pp. 2175–82; Burdett Loomis, "Congressional Caucuses and the Politics of Representation," in Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 2d ed., pp. 204–20; Ornstein, "The House and Senate in a New Congress"; Norman J. Ornstein, Robert L. Peabody, and David W. Rohde, "The Contemporary Senate into the 1980s," in Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 2d ed., pp. 13–30; Barbara Sinclair, *Majority Leadership in the U.S. House* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), chap. 1; and Tim Cook, "Marketing the Members: The Ascent of the Congressional Press Secretary," paper prepared for the 1985 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.

A combination of decentralized and collegial patterns also multiplies the number of decision points at which legislation can be blocked and coalitions must be built.[34] Both committees and subcommittees retain great independence in initiative and resources, but they lack the autonomy that a truly decentralized system would provide.[35] The scope of conflict changes continually, usually expanding, as legislation passes from one stage to the next. Deals and accommodations devised at one stage cannot be adhered to later because negotiations must be reopened at each stage. Norms of mutual acommodation or logrolling, which made decisionmaking more efficient in many policy areas, are weaker as a result. Legislative outcomes are uncertain until the very end. Consequently, planning for the effective use of legislative talent and political resources is very difficult and fraught with error. The legislative process may be more exciting and challenging as a result, but it also is more frustrating and exhausting.

Problems for Leadership

These problems affect party leaders as much as other members, if not more so. James Sundquist offers this interpretation:

> The headlong trend toward democracy, and dispersal of power, in the Senate and the House has changed the task of leadership. Whereas the problem of Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn, in the 1950s, was to wheedle and plead with committee chairmen who held the keys to legislative action, the problem of Robert Byrd and Tip O'Neill, in the 1970s, was to organize the new individualism – or new fragmentation – into some kind of working whole. And the leaders must do that without seeming to grasp for power, because the resistance of the rank and file of the new-style congressman to any hint of bossism would be instant. In their ambivalence, junior members will accept leadership only on their own terms, and subject to their continuous control. They insist on the right to decide day by day and case by case, without coercion, when they will be followers and when they will assert their right of independence.[36]

The tension is no longer one of centralization versus decentralization, leaders versus committee chairmen, sometimes a tug-of-war and sometimes cooperation Increasingly, the tension is between decentralization and collegialism, with party leaders serving as referees, traffic cops, or fire fighters. As one sports fan in the Senate Republican leadership suggested to me, there is a sense that the party leaders are always playing away games on the home turf of the committees or of the rank and file on the floor and in caucus.

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[34] Bruce I. Oppenheimer has labeled this the "new obstructionism." See his "Congress and the New Obstructionism," in Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered*, 2d ed., pp. 275–95.

[35] See Smith and Deering, *Committees in Congress*, chap. 5.

[36] Sundquist, *The Decline and Resurgence of Congress*, p. 395.

Not surprisingly, this situation yields ambiguities about leaders' roles as well. Leaders are frequently called upon to resolve conflicts between committees and other party members – that is, to resolve the disputes that arise between decentralized and collegial patterns. In a genuinely decentralized system, leaders would feel compelled to protect the prerogatives of committees; in a purely collegial setting, committee recommendations would have no special preference. In a mixed situation, there is no obvious solution. Developing a consensus about the decisionmaking process, let alone meeting the varied policy demands of members, is nearly impossible.[37]

As noted, House leaders have more frequently defended the more entrenched role of committees than have their Senate counterparts. Senate leaders have devised a more comfortable accommodation of the two sets of demands. Senate leaders of both parties have held regularly scheduled meetings with all committee chairmen, for example. These meetings give leaders opportunities to press for committee action at crucial times in a setting that does not single out particular committees. In the House, majority party leaders have felt the chairmen would resent regular leadership supervision. Even House leadership staff have been hesitant to organize meetings of top committee aides, and, when they have attempted to do so, senior committee aides often have been conspicuously uncooperative. But in neither chamber has the pattern been consistent as leaders have attempted to meet the inconsistent demands of their members.

Leaders often are forced to devise ad hoc mechanisms to create policy and build coalitions in this context. Formal and informal task forces of members may be created to devise policy proposals and push others; committees and their staffs may be asked to contribute to packages of party proposals; or temporary committees may be established to write legislation. All of these measures, and others, were tried in some form during the late 1970s. These innovations reflect attempts to overcome the continuing deficiencies of decentralization while being sensitive to the political egos of committee members. They also reflect a desire to accommodate the demands of those who are not members of a particular committee while recognizing that not all members can sit around the same table to write legislation and devise strategy. None is completely satisfactory and none can be applied to each major policy problem Congress faces.

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[37] Sinclair emphasizes this theme in *Majority Leadership in the House*.

Ironically, the expectations for party leadership are higher in this context than they are in the more clearly decentralized situation. Where legislative responsibilities are clearly defined, as they are in a purely decentralized institution, the role of leadership is more narrowly limited to building coalitions at the floor stage on a few major pieces of legislation. In the present context, however, leaders must regularly handle decisions about how decisions are going to be made. Deciding who is going to take the lead, write working drafts, offer alternatives, and set legislative strategy are problems party leaders frequently are called upon to solve. But leaders do not have recipes for solving these problems and they are unlikely to have them in the future. It is hardly surprising that leaders must suffer frequent criticism in this environment.

INTO THE 1980S

The new decade witnessed an even more rampant individualism in the Senate and further moves toward more collegial processes in the House. The changes, reflecting the trends established in the previous two decades, were colored by the dominating items on the agenda of the new Republican Administration, budgets and deficits.

Budget Politics

The 1980s have been dominated by budget politics, beginning in 1980 when the reconciliation procedures of the 1974 budget act were first used successfully to package deep spending cuts. In 1981 the Reagan Administration's supporters in Congress used the reconciliation procedure after the first budget resolution to prevent committees from pigeonholing Administration proposals. Republican leaders in Congress served as "point men" for the President, and much of the Administration's success was due to their efforts.[38] Budgetary stalemate prevailed in 1982 as President Reagan and members of Congress looked toward the midterm elections. Few appropriations bills were passed, and the major struggles were over supplemental appropriations bills and a continuing resolution. Most appropriations bills were passed in 1983 and 1984, although executive-legislative branch confrontation and stalemate ruled most of both years. By 1983 congressional budget making had again become dominated by the centrifugal forces in the committee system.

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[38] Two aides of Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker have provided an account of Baker's role. See James A. Miller and James D. Range, "Reconciling an Irreconcilable Budget: The New Politics of the Budget Process," *Harvard Journal on Legislation* 20 (Winter 1983), pp. 4–30.

The record teaches several lessons about the evolution of congressional decisionmaking. The experience of the House in 1981 demonstrated the inherent weaknesses of party leaders in Congress when they are not reinforced by a President of their party. House Democratic leaders and weakened committee chairmen were in no position to insulate their members from the President and had no resources that could counter his. The "open" Congress was vulnerable to a popular President with a well-focused program.[39]

The subsequent years also demonstrate that 1981 was very unusual and that the centrifugal forces in Congress are still powerful. Both House and Senate committees exercised great independence from Reagan and party leaders after 1981. And many members, including Senate majority party Republicans, expressed concern that congressional decisionmaking processes not be "subverted" in the fashion of 1981 again.[40] In the house, the experience stimulated interest in formal reforms to ensure that the role of standing committees was not undermined again. No action was taken because House Democrats did not want reform to interfere with ongoing developments in budget politics.

The experience also stimulated other innovations. In 1981, for example, Representative Toby Moffett, Democrat of Connecticut, attempted to organize House subcommittee chairmen to write an alternative to the Republican budget plan. Few subcommittee chairmen took much interest and the effort was dropped. Before the Ninety-ninth Congress, Democrat Anthony Beilenson of California proposed that the Speaker be given the authority to appoint the Budget Committee chairman, thereby inserting the leadership more directly into the process of devising budget resolutions. The proposal was set aside by a committee of the Democratic caucus after Speaker O'Neill turned down the offer, indicating, according to a staff member, that "the caucus deserves to select its own Budget chairman."[41] In the absence of clear lines of authority and assignment of responsibility, there is a constant search for new organizational forms in the House.

The House of Representatives

The House majority party Democrats continued the movement toward more collegial decisionmaking that had begun in the 1970s but was now also entwined with the budget politics of the 1980s. The most conspicuous developments occurred in the Democratic caucus. Much of the interest in the caucus was stimulated by the desire of many Democrats to participate in constructing alternatives to Reagan Administration proposals. Both new caucus chairmen – Gillis Long of Louisiana, who served as chairman in the Ninety-seventh and Ninety-eighth Congresses, and Richard Gephardt of Missouri, who was elected at the start of the Ninety-ninth – promised and delivered frequent meetings of the caucus, which had not been active in the Ninety-fifth or Ninety-sixth Congresses. Under Long, the caucus met about once a month while Congress was in session, and Gephardt promised meetings every other week. Long moved to close the meetings to the public so that members would feel free to participate. Among other things, this meant that party members were more willing to question party and committee leaders. In fact, Gephardt has commented that a major purpose of more frequent meetings is to "allow the leadership to talk to us and us to talk to the leadership."[42]

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[39] See Norman J. Ornstein, "The Open Congress Meets the President," in Anthony King, ed., *Both Ends of the Avenue* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1983), pp. 204-10.

[40] The term is Senator Quayle's. See Martin Tolchin, "The Changing Senate: Senators Assail Anarchy in New Chamber of Equals," *New York Times*, November 25, 1984.

[41] Confidential interview with the author, December 6, 1984. The proposal was considered by the Committee on Organization, Study, and Review of the Democratic caucus in November 1984.

Gephardt's proposal for biweekly meetings faced vigorous opposition from several committee chairmen. The chairmen objected to Gephardt's suggestion that committees be barred from meeting at the same time as the caucus. And the more telling complaint concerned Gephardt's plan to use frequent caucus meetings to discuss specific policy proposals, many of which would be pending in committee. The chairmen, believing that the caucus activity would undermine their committees' roles, asked rhetorically, "Why don't we just dismantle the committees?"[43] When the strong objections were voiced in a late January caucus meeting, Gephardt's formal proposal was referred to the caucus's Committee on Organization, Study, and Review and, as of late March, no action had been taken on it. Nevertheless, Gephardt is free to call frequent caucus meetings.

The caucus has created special forums for discussion and for the creation of party policy documents. The most prominent of these is the Committee on Party Effectiveness created by Long in 1981. The committee, which had 43 members in the Ninety-eighth Congress, has attracted the active participation of many new-breed members, most notably Richard Gephardt and Leon Panetta, Democrat of California. The committee has an explicitly collegial purpose. Its members comment that "it's one of the few places where a broad cross section of Democrats can sit down and get to know each other" and "the truth is scattered and the caucus committee is a place for an exchange of

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[42] Diane Granat, "Junior Democrats Gain a Louder Voice, Leadership Panels Will Serve as Forum," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 42 (December 8, 1984), p. 3054.

[43] Confidential interview with the author, January 31, 1985.

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disparate views."[44] The committee produced lengthy statements on economic policy in the Ninety-seventh and Ninety-eighth Congresses that were endorsed by the caucus and helped shape the 1984 Democratic platform.

The caucus was also the site of the first successful effort since 1975 to unseat an incumbent committee chairman. Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, campaigned against 80-year-old Melvin Price of Illinois, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, on the grounds that Price's physical infirmities inpaired his ability to lead to the Democrats on vital defense issues and that his support of the Defense Establishment was out of step with the views of most House Democrats. Aspin's effort, in contrast with the rejection of three chairmen in 1975, represented a personal campaign by a challenger to unseat the incumbent. In 1975 the new chairman played no significant role in deposing the incumbents. Aspin also was the seventh-ranking Democrat on Armed Services, leapfrogging over five other Democrats to the chairmanship; in 1975 the second-ranking Democrat was elected chairman in all three cases. And, finally, Aspin succeeded in the face of active opposition from Speaker O'Neill. Aspin appealed directly to the caucus, overcoming both the dictates of the seniority system, which insulated chairmen before the reforms of the 1970s, and the defensive maneuvers of the Speaker.

The Democrats have moved in yet other ways to increase avenues of participation for rank-and-file members and hold leaders accountable. In 1982 Democrats decided to require appointed Steering and Policy Committee members to rotate every two years instead of four, thus providing an opportunity for more members to serve on the committee that makes committee assignments and occasionally endorses legislation. At the start of the Ninety-ninth Congress, reformers succeeded in making the majority whip's position elective and convinced the Speaker to hold more frequent Steering and Policy Committee meetings to discuss policy. Democratic leaders also expanded the number of deputy whips from four to seven and the number of at-large whips from 21 to 31. This increased the leadership's resources but also enlarged the size of whip meetings at which party strategy is discussed. Several task forces were created within the whip organization in the Ninety-eighth and early Ninety-ninth Congresses to give whips additional opportunities to shape party strategy. An innovative change was the creation of a "speaker's cabinet" composed of top party leaders, top committee chairmen, and at-large members. The group is designed to expand the range of members with regular contact with party leaders on party strategy and scheduling. These changes, Gephardt explains, are designed to "include people, to practice participatory democracy, so the actions of the leadership, Steering and Policy, and the caucus come with a lot of sharing of informatijon and consensus."[45] Democratic leaders expressed reservations about many of these developments, but they offered no significant opposition to them.

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[44] Cohen, "Strains Appear as 'New Breed' Democrats Move to Control Party," p. 1330.

Thus the 1980s have seen even more efforts by House Democrats to broaden participation through the party caucus and to make the party leadership a more collective enterprise. The caucus is meeting more often, members have more opportunities to express themselves, there is less deference to committee chairmen, the leadership is expected to explain itself to the membership more frequently, and the caucus is seen increasingly as the vehicle for tapping the talent and stimulating the creativity of the membership. Whether these recent efforts reflect the tribulations of the out-party or represent a more permanent transformation is difficult to say. What is clear is that the gains toward more collegial processes will be difficult to reverse and that the likelihood for tension between decentralized and collegial processes is even greater.

The Senate

The recent record in the Senate is very different. Members of the new Republican majority, especially the newly elected Senators, sought to take full advantage of their new status. In the view of many observers, the result was even further abuses of the committee system and floor procedures. The extreme individualism that followed in the aftermath of the 1981 budget battles stimulated a reform effort in 1984 and led to the adoption of some committee assignment reforms in February 1985. Efforts to reform procedures received greater opposition, indicating the determination of Senators to protect their individual rights to participate actively and fully on the Senate floor.

The Senate reforms of 1977 had placed new limits on the number of committee and subcommittee assignments Senators could hold. They were permitted three full committee assignments and eight subcommittee assignments, although some were granted exemptions. Because Senators had to accept fewer subcommittee assignments, the total number of Senate subcommittees was cut by 32. The number of exemptions has grown in each Congress since then, however, and several committees have added subcommittees since the Republicans assumed control in 1981. By the end of the Ninety-eighth Congress (1983–84), nearly one-third of the Senators had more than three full committee assignments and well over a third had more than eight subcommittee assignments. Scheduling committee meetings and gaining a quorum became nearly impossible in many cases, and Senators themselves had become weary of conflicting committee schedules and overextended commitments.

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[45] Quoted in Diane Granat, "House Democrats Expand Leadership: Wright Claims Speaker's Job; Race On for Majority Leader," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 43 (February 9, 1985), p. 285.

In February 1985 the Senate adopted a reform resolution reestablishing the 1977 limit of three full committee assignments per Senator, thus cutting the number of slots available on "major" committees from 231 to 214.[46] However, the number of slots on minor committees was later increased by nine, in part to compensate Senators for lost major committee assignments, producing a very small net decrease of eight committee seats. Reformers failed to get the Senate or majority party caucus to impose a strict limit on the number of subcommittees that could be created by standing committees, but a number of committees complied with the Republican conference request to reduce the number of subcommittees. The Banking Committee, for example, abolished four subcommittees at the price of taking a subcommittee chairmanship away from one Senator. These voluntary committee actions reflected the widespread recognition that the proliferation of subcommittees had become a major problem. Nevertheless, the Senate still lacks a formal cap on subcommittees similar to the one imposed by the House Democratic caucus in 1981.[47]

Reform of floor procedures proved more difficult to achieve. Three aspects of floor procedure had come to be especially troublesome. First, despite the 1975 reform that made it easier to invoke cloture against a filibuster, filibusters and postcloture filibusters continued to be a major obstacle to orderly floor proceedings in the late 1970s and 1980s. Filibusters and threat of filibusters stimulated cloture motions more than five times as often in the 1970s as in the 1960s.[48] A 1979 rule limiting consideration of amendments after cloture to one hundred hours has been invoked, but has not been effective, as Senators have devised means to circumvent it.[49] Second, the Senate never has had a broad germaneness rule for amendments to legislation offered on the floor. As a result, committees have been bypassed on the floor through amendments to unrelated legislation, and a great deal of floor debate is devoted to issues extraneous to the legislation on the table. Finally, the informal practice of permitting Senators to place "holds" on legislation they object to blocked committee access to the floor and made floor scheduling very difficult for the majority leader. Majority Leader Howard Baker's 1982 announcement that he would no longer honor holds has not yielded a significant change in practice.[50]

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[46] The adopted rule reduced the number of slots on the 12 major committees and exempted 11 Senators from the limit of two major committee assignments, primarily to satisfy the committee party ratios that party leaders had agreed to earlier. Jacqueline Calmes and Diane Granat, "Senate Cuts Committee Slots, Members Assigned to Panels," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 43 (February 23, 1985), pp. 348-64.

[47] In 1981 the House Democratic caucus adopted a rule that provides that, except for Appropriations, standing committees are limited to eight subcommittees; committees with more than 35 members and fewer than six subcommittees may increase the number to six or, with the approval of the Steering and Policy Committee, may have seven. Two committees were forced to abolish subcommittees to meet the limit at that time.

[48] Bruce I. Oppenheimer, "Changing Time Constraints on Congress: Historical Perspectives on the Use of Cloture," in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered*, 3d ed., p. 398.

[49] See Walter J. Oleszek, *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*, 2d ed. (Washington: CQ Press, 1984), pp. 186-93.

These problems have created great frustration for nearly all Senators at one time or another as they have sought to pass legislation from their committees – and party leaders have become increasingly frustrated in their efforts to correct the problems by informal means. Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, argued that the Senate was "choking on its own processes," and the chairman of the Senate reform committee, Senator Dan Quayle, Republican of Indiana, stated that there was a "growing consensus that we ought to do something."[51] Senator John Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi and the dean of the Senate, complained that the Senate "has lost much in the way of ability to debate and be heard, transmit ideas to other leaders and thereby produce conclusions."[52] The collegial processes simply have been abused by the strong individualists of the Senate. As of mid-March, the outcome of the reform effort on floor procedures was uncertain, although some action seemed likely on a limit on debate over motions to proceed with the consideration of legislation and on germaneness.

The continuing weakness of Senate party leaders in their collegial yet decentralized chamber was evident in Majority Leader Robert Dole's effort to create a Republican budget package at the start of the Ninety-ninth Congress. On January 4, 1985, Dole announced that, with the help of committee chairmen and their staff, he would produce a Republican budget plan by February 1. Dole failed to do so, as some committee chairmen refused to support deep cuts in programs under their jurisdiction and a few simply did not recommend anything to Dole. Most chairmen did report to Dole, however, although several indicated that they felt that cuts in programs under their jurisdiction were contingent on the willingness of other committees to cut spending for other programs. Dole failed to attract a quorum of Republicans to a party caucus meeting to discuss the package just before the self-imposed deadline arrived. Dole seemed helpless in the face of delay and outright obstructionism from committee members and staff.

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[50] For Baker's announcement, see *Congressional Record*, daily edition (December 6, 1982), p. S13901.

[51] Quoted in Steven V. Roberts, "Panel Proposes Sweeping Changes in Senate Rules," *New York Times*, November 30, 1984.

[52] Quoted in "How Senators View the Senate: What Has Changed and What It Means," *New York Times*, November 25, 1984.

Prospects for the Near Future

The defense of collegial decisonmaking in the Senate and the search for more ways to improve participation for rank-and-file members in the House are unlikely to weaken in the forseeable future. There is no sign that a membership with a substantially different mix of personal political objectives will be elected to Congress. Weak local parties and independent campaigns will continue to produce a Congress whose members have weak ties to one another. And there is no reason to believe that members of Congress will become any more tolerant of organizational structures that limit their ability to participate in debates over major issues. No reversion to insulated committees or dominating party leaders can be expected. As a result, the near future offers a continuation of a mix of decentralized and collegial decisionmaking processes. Committees and their subcommittees will continue to have the dominant role in shaping policy, but their relation to party leaders, caucuses, ad hoc groups, and the floor will vary greatly. Because the two patterns are not fully consistent, party leaders will continue to be called upon to mold different decisionmaking processes for each major issue before Congress. Rank-and-file members will have very inconsistent views over time about the best combination of decisionmaking processes as their political interests vary. To the public, Congress will appear even more chaotic and confusing.

In this context, leadership in Congress will come from even more numerous and less predictable sources. Nonelected leaders will lead partisan efforts and noncommittee members will author major policy innovations. Successful party leaders will be those who recognize these new conditions, adapt to them, and take advantage of them. Party leaders will have to take advantage of collegial processes to direct their parties and of the mass media as an element of legislative coalition-building strategies.

Much of the change has made Congress appear more party-oriented and will continue to do so, but this is misleading. Many of the new opportunities for collegial activity have been created within the parties, especially in the House. To a limited degree, the collegial opportunities offered by party caucuses and committees will stimulate more party-centered policy debate and encourage standing committee members to think about policy questions in party terms. Yet much of the use of party mechanisms will continue to derive from the nonpartisan motivations of individuals or groups to influence policy through any process that works to their advantage. Because party mechanisms provide more flexible procedural settings, members seeking ways to participate in debate over important policy questions will use them frequently.

A reasonable question is whether the Republicans would retain the same mixture of decentralized and collegial practices if they should gain control of the House. Many of the reforms took the form of changes in the rules of the House, but others were the product of actions by the majority party caucus. Key rules guaranteeing independence of subcommittees – bill referral to subcommittees, management of legislation on the floor by subcommittee chairmen, written subcommittee jurisdictions – are a part of Democratic caucus rules. And many of the new avenues of participation for junior members have been created within organs of the House Democratic party.

While the political circumstances under which Republicans might organize the House cannot be foreseen, a few reasonable speculations, can be made. The Senate's experience after the 1980 elections suggests that a new House Republican majority would temporarily bypass normal decentralized processes to respond to the perceived mandate that carried them into office. However, it is unlikely that Republicans would permanently reverse the thrust of the Democratic reforms. New cohorts of Republicans during the last decade have been noted for their activism and independence of elected party leaders, and there is no foreseeable shift away from issues that attract the widespread interest of the membership. Republicans occasionally have complained about the inefficiencies in House decisionmaking created by the reforms of the 1970s, but it is difficult to separate the partisan from the nonpartisan in their criticism.

Will policy produced in this mixed system be less consistent or coherent than before? There is little reason to think so. It has been argued persuasively that a more complex process, one that has more stages and makes coalition building more difficult, reduces Congress's capacity to enact coherent policy and to do so expeditiously. But the more singularly decentralized system of the 1950s and 1960s, with its jurisdictional jealousies, awkward jurisdictional divisions, and autonomous committee chairman, was hardly more capable of producing coherent policy. A more collegial process does not solve the problem as a more centralized one might, but it does offer opportunities to overcome some of the obstacles of decentralization and it does so in a manner far more consistent with congressional egalitarianism.

CHAPTER VI

The role of the judicial branch and its place in democratic government are somewhat more difficult to comprehend than the contributions of the other two branches. This is largely because the work of the judiciary involves interpretation and review, and the judicial branch is not an initiator of policies and programs. The work of the Supreme Court involves breaking impasses between Congress and the President, reducing fear of swift and arbitrary executive action, resolving conflicts among private litigants, enforcing the criminal code, and reviewing laws. As an arbiter, the Supreme Court provides guidance in the implementation of statutes, and not infrequently its decisions bring out the inadequacies of laws and point up the need for corrective or new legislation.

Chapter VI gives numerous examples which show that, as an arbiter, the Supreme Court has deliberately taken a position subordinate to that of the policymaking branches of our government during crises involving national security. Although it has the power to overturn acts of the Congress and the President, it has generally been reluctant to exercise this power, especially in cases involving national security.

Most of the Court's decisions concerning national security have dealt with actions taken by the President acting as Commander in Chief, such as imposing martial law, suspending the writ of habeas corpus, imposing a blockade, ordering the trial of civilians by military tribunals where civilian courts were operating, calling up the National Guard over the protests of the governor of the affected state, ordering the forcible relocation and incarceration of American citizens solely because of their ancestry, and seizing industrial plants threatened by strikes during national emergencies. Because of its great reluctance to decide political questions and its deference to the constitutional powers of the President as Commander in Chief and Chief of State, the Supreme Court, with only one exception, has waited until a crisis has passed before ruling that a President has exceeded his constitutional authority. The history of the Supreme Court strongly indicates that, during a crisis, the justices will not knowingly interfere with the efforts of the policymaking branches to safeguard the Nation, even though constitutional guarantees may temporarily be suspended.

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VI

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Edwin Timbers

INTRODUCTION

Although the Supreme Court is one of the three great branches of the United States Government, it has had by far the least influence on national security. Although people generally have underestimated or ignored the power of the Supreme Court to affect national security, any tribunal possessing the power to overturn acts of either the President or Congress is a formidable force.

No other nation has had an institution which has arrogated to itself power to rule on the validity of the actions of its chief executive and its highest law-making body and to determine what is the supreme law of the land. Thus, the Supreme Court is a unique contribution of the United States to the art of governance, for no other nation permits a transient majority of nine judges to wield so much power.

Nowhere in the Constitution can be found the source of the Court's power to review and judge the constitutionality of acts of the President and Congress, but in 1803, this power was preempted by the Court in the famous case of *Marbury* v. *Madison.*[1] Since the court has exercised the power of judicial review without effective challenge, it is difficult to disagree with the late Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes who once said "The Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is."

Yet, despite newspaper articles to the contrary, the Court seldom uses its great power of judicial review, and its reluctance to do so has been especially pronounced in cases involving national security. There the Court is strongly inclined to follow the leadership of the President and Congress, as has been its practice in all grave national emergencies, economic as well as military. American constitutional history strongly supports the observation that when the survival, independence, and freedom of the Nation are at stake, the Court will support any action by the policymaking branches of government to serve these ends, even when constitutional guarantees are temporarily suspended.

The United States Constitution is an instrument of remarkable adaptability. The very generality of its language permits the three

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[1] *Marbury* v. *Madison*, 1 Cranch 137 (1803)

branches of the Govenment to adapt it to the exigencies of the times, although on three occasions it was bent to the breaking point – during the Civil War, the Great Depression of the 1930s, and World War II. In each of these instances, the Court stood aside until the crises had passed, for the Court has never regarded the constitution as a suicide pact or a straitjacket but as an instrument intended to ensure the survival of the Nation. While it makes ample provision for national security and has seen the United States through its most perilous hours, it has also placed a curb on constitutional dictatorship without equal.

Thus, the Constitution has generally struck a nice balance between the competing claims of liberty versus security, the reconciliation of which has been the ancient dilemma of government. As Thomas Hobbes once wrote, under unfettered liberty in a state of nature, there would be "a war of all against all" and life would be "poor, solitary, nasty, brutish, and short."[2] Perfect security, on the other hand, could be achieved only under absolute tyranny.

By its very nature, the military must be dedicated to preserving the Nation's security, even if this means temporarily constraining liberty during a crisis. The Bill of Rights and the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution – the 13th, 14th, and 15th – are guardians of American rights and freedoms. But grave crises have caused security to collide with liberty and given the Court an opportunity to function as a gyroscope in stabilizing the ship of state and enabling Americans to wage war successfully while preserving for themselves the greatest practicable degree of freedom and property rights.

The balance between liberty and security is continually shifting, however, according to the circumstances of the moment, for the greater the perceived urgency and crisis, the heavier will be the emphasis on security with a corresponding sacrifice of liberty. In trying to strike this balance, the Court, on several occasions, has clashed with the President acting as Commander in Chief and cheif executive officer.

Until 1973 the mandates of the Constitution, a long line of statutes since 1972, and the logic of history placed in the President's hands vast discretion in employing the armed forces to defend the Nation, execute the laws, and maintain national authority throughout the country. While this power is equally useful in peace and war, it is generally used in the context of the President's war powers, because it stems from his role as Commander in Chief and the fact that its most important applications have occurred during periods of armed conflict, especially during the Civil War and World War II.

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[2] Thomas Hobbes, *The Leviathan*, from the third volume of *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, edited by Moleworth.

MARTIAL RULE

The President's power of martial rule ranges the entire spectrum of military action from the mere threat of force to the imposition of martial law, and it consists of these elements: (1) the power to impose martial law; (2) the power to call out troops, from a squad to all of the armed forces; (3) the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus,[3] (4) blockade; (5) trial of civilians by military tribunals; (6) calling up the national guard, and (7) seizure of industrial plants.

In several major cases, the Supreme Court has had occasion to judge the authority of the President to circumscribe the normal liberties of the people in defense of the Nation. In the famous of *Martin* v. *Mott* in 1827[4] and *Luther* v. *Borden* in 1849,[5] the Court made its most important statements about martial law. Both decisions confirmed that the Federal Government possesses a power of martial law and that this power emanates from the Constitution and the common law. These decisions, furthermore, made it clear that, while Congress can declare martial law under the necessary conditions of crisis, from a practical standpoint this power belongs almost exclusively in the hands of the President, particularly in view of his constitutional powers and duties as Commander in Chief and chief executive officer. In both decisions, the Court manifested a genuine reluctance to speak where it perceived that its voice, even if heard, would have little or no effect.

HABEAS CORPUS

The next great national security issue to be addressed by the Supreme Court was the locus of the authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. While the Constitution assumes the existence of this power as a matter both of fact and common law, it grants this emergency power to no one. Although authorities have never doubted that Congress could suspend the writ during a crisis, sharp differences of opinion have arisen over whether the President possessed this power. A strict interpretation of the constitution would deny this power to the President, since in Article I, Section 9, clause 2, it forbids Congress to suspend the writ ". . . unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."[6] It is therefore clear that Congress has this power when the prescribed conditions are present.

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[3] Clinton Rossiter, *Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1948), pp. 9, 139-150, 215-217. Also see Rossiter, *The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).

[4] 12 Wheaton 19.

[5] 7 Howard 1.

[6] *U.S. Constitution*. See Edward S. Corwin, *Presidential Power and the Constitution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976); Corwin, *The President: Office and Powers* (New York: New York University Press, 1957); J.G. Randall, *Constitutional Problems under Lincoln* (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1926), chapter 6-8; and W. W. Willoughby, *The Constitutional Law of the United States*, 2d ed. (New York: Baker, Boorhis & Co., 1929), III, pp. 16611-1615.

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On the other hand, historical necessity has mandated that the President possess this power. During the Civil War, for example, President Lincoln suspended it several times on his own authority and without significant interference from either the Court or Congress.[7] To this day, the Court has not spoken directly on the constitutionality of the suspension of the writ by the President, but in 1861, Chief Justice Roger Taney, then sitting temporarily on the Circuit Court in Baltimore, denied vigorously in *Ex parte Merryman*[8] that the President could suspend the writ under any circumstances. In this instance, however, President Lincoln ignored Taney's decision and proceeded as he wished.

BLOCKADE

Another example of congressional and judicial acquiescence in the exercise by the President of his war power was the failure of either Congress or the Supreme Court to challenge President Lincoln's proclamation of April 19, 1861, which imposed a blockade on the ports of the seceded states, a measure previously regarded as contrary both to the Constitution and the law of nations, except when the Nation was engaged in a declared foreign war.[9] In *The Prize Cases*, the Supreme Court in 1863 directly sanctioned this blockade and extraordinary exercise of the war power by President Lincoln. The Court stated:[10] "(It) is a question to be decided by him, and this court must be governed by the decision and acts of the political department of the Government to which this power was entrusted . . . . He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands." In essence, the Court held that the President has the power, when he deems it imperative, to brand as belligerents all inhabitants of any area in general insurrection against the Federal Government. Consequently, he could treat them as if they were enemies of the United States and place them outside the protection of the Constitution. By pushing the President's power of martial rule to such an extreme, the Court established a new constitutional principle in the American system of government – temporary dictatorship.[11]

TRIALS OF CIVILIANS BY MILITARY TRIBUNALS

The most judicially vulnerable of all the arbitrary executive practices in which President Lincoln engaged was the trial of disaffected civilians by military tribunals in areas where the civil courts were open and functioning. In 1863, Clement Vallandigham, an anti-Union agitator, was arrested and convicted by a military commission, but the Supreme Court declined to hear his appeal on the technicality that the military tribunal which tried him was not a court of record of which the Supreme Court could take cognizance.[12] In 1866, however, after the war had ended, the Court faced this issue head-on in *Ex parte Milligan*,[13] in which it announced its unanimous decision that the President had acted unconstitutionally in instituting trial by military commission during the war in areas where the civil courts were open and operating. Coming over a year after hostilities had ceased, the *Milligan* decision had no influence on government policy or practice either at that time or since. Although the *Milligan* decision is sound doctrine in forbidding the establishment by the President of military commissions for the trial of civilians in areas where the civil courts are open, the controlling precedent in this matter is what President Lincoln did during the crisis and not what the Court said afterwards.

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[7] Willoughby, *The Constitutional Law of the United States.*

[8] Federal Cases, no. 9, 487. See Carl B. Swisher, *Roger B. Taney* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 547-560.

[9] Rossiter, *The Supreme Court and the Commander in Chief*, pp. 68–77.

[10] 2 Black 635.

[11] Rossiter, *Constitutional Dictatorship*, p. 230.

CALLING UP THE NATIONAL GUARD IN DEFIANCE OF A GOVERNOR

Between *Ex parte Milligan* and the second year of World War II, only one major case concerning the President's power of martial rule came to the Court for decision–*In re Debs* (1894).[14] In this case, a unanimous Court gave its unqualified sanction to the President's authority, even in defiance of the wishes of Governor Peter Altgeld of Illinois, to call out the Illinois National Guard to safeguard the national interest in the uninterrupted flow of interstate commerce and the mails. In its decision, the Court stated:[15]

> The entire strength of the Nation may be used to enforce in any part of the land the full and free exercise of all rights entrusted to its care. The strong arm of the national government may be used to brush away all obstructions to the freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails. If the emergency arises, the army of the Nation, and all its militia, are at the service of the Nation to compel obedience to its law.

The Spanish-American War raised no controversies of basic importance to the war powers, and the Court decided only one important case related to them during World War I–the Selective Draft Law Cases, a unanimous decision on January 7, 1918.[16] In his opinion, Chief Justice Edward D. White wrote that Congress is authorized to institute a compulsory draft of persons into the armed forces under its power to raise and support armies and the "necessary and proper" clause, both in Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution. Service in the military, he wrote, is one of the duties of a citizen in a "just government." Compulsory conscription, moreover, is not involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. World War II came and went without presenting the Court one opportunity to rule on such matters as habeas corpus, martial law, and the use of troops. There were, however, many other momentous constitutional issues raised during that war, and these will now be addressed.

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[12] *Ex parte Vallandigham*, 1 Wallace 243.

[13] 4 Wallace 2.

[14] 158 U.S. 564.

[15] Ibid. Also see "A Comprehensive Study of the Use of Military Troops in Civil Disorders," *University of Colorado Law Review* XLIII (1972), pp. 422–430.

[16] 245 U.S. 366.

THE SUPREME COURT DURING WORLD WAR II

World War II was a total, global war, and Franklin D. Roosevelt was a charismatic President who liberally conceived of his constitutional war powers. He was also keenly aware of the immense delegation of discretionary power which he already had or which Congress had given him for the duration of the crisis. During World War II, there were four instances in which the President, using his authority as Commander in Chief, imposed military power over civilians: first, President Roosevelt's Executive Order 9066 of February 19, 1942, served as the basic authority for uprooting approximately 70,000 Japanese-American citizens and 40,000 Japanese aliens from their Western homes and occupations; second, the unqualified declaration and maintenance of martial law in Hawaii; third, the creation of a military commission to try several German saboteurs arrested by the FBI in June 1942; and finally, the seizure of sixty odd plants and industries in which the President determined that labor disputes were damaging the war effort.

The Japanese-American Cases

The judicial history of the Japanese-American evacuation consists primarily of two leading cases–*Hirabayashi* v. *United States*[17] and *Korematsu* v. *United States.*[18] The Government officially justified the enforced mass evacuation of the west coast Japanese-Americans on the grounds of military necessity. The same explanation served to justify the maintenance of martial law in the Territory of Hawaii from December 1941 to October 1944. The military necessity envisioned by the Army was the possibility of a Japanese assault on the Pacific Coast and the unpredictable loyalty there of persons of Japanese ancestry. Because the main Exclusion Order was not issued until five months after Pearl Harbor, the Government made no attempt to distinguish the loyal from the disloyal, and because persons who were as little as one-sixteenth Japanese were affected, the basis for exclusion was patently emotional and racial. It should also be remembered that neither German-Americans nor Italian-Americans, aliens or citizens, living in coastal areas were relocated or interned. Of the 110,000 persons thus uprooted, 70,000 were full-fledged American citizens entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of any other citizen of the United States.

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[17] 320 U.S. 810 (1943).

[18] 323 U.S. 214 (1944).

Congress fully supported the President and by law ratified and confirmed the Exclusion Order. Nevertheless, in these two cases, the Supreme Court had clear opportunities to declare the evacuation unconstitutional and to offer the injured Japanese-Americans some belated relief. It refused to do so, however, despite the fact that the decisions were rendered in June 1943 and December 1944, when judicial invalidation of the evacuation would have no effect on the war effort.[19] Perhaps the final chapter of this sorry episode in American history was written on May 17, 1984, when a Federal court rejected the class-action suit brought by the surviving Japanese-Americans, who had been deprived of their liberty and property without due process of law, on the ground that they had waited too long to commence legal action.[20]

The lessons to be learned from these decisions are that the President could exercise dictatorial power in a crisis without legislative, judicial, or popular opposition; that the Supreme Court demonstrated its continued unwillingness to interefere with the war powers of the United States; and that the most fundamental rights of a large group of American citizens could be denied under certain conditions during total war.

Martial Law in Hawaii

The story of martial law in Hawaii is considerably less disturbing and enjoyed a happier ending. On December 7, 1941, the "day of infamy," the Governor of Hawaii, acting on a clear grant of authority in the Organic Act of the Territory of Hawaii, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, declared martial law throughout the islands, and turned over to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the exercise of all his normal powers during the emergency and until the danger of invasion was removed. He sent a telegram to President Roosevelt requesting confirmation of this action, and confirmation was immediate. Under the circumstances, the swift establishment of martial law as judicious and fully warranted, but after the Battle of Midway, martial law was

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[19] Eugene V. Rostow, "The Japanese American Case – A Disaster," *Yale Law Journal*, CIV (June, 1945), pp. 489-533; Morton Grozdins, *American Betrayed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949).

[20] Fred Barbash, "Judge Says Suit Filed by Interness Too Late," *The Washington Post* (May 18, 1984), p. A2.

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no longer required in Hawaii. Although the strong protests of the governor had resulted in the return of eighteen functions of civil government to the civil authorities in March 1943, the military continued to maintain a qualified martial law.

Not until February 1946, in the case of *Duncan* v. *Kahanamoku*[21], did the Supreme Court get a chance to review the constitutionality of the time extension of martial law after the initial Japanese threat had passed. The issue for decision was the validity of prison sentences imposed by military tribunals upon two civilians for separate civilian crimes. The Court held that the military courts had no jurisdiction over either defendant and that they should be released from custody. Thus, the Nation's highest jurists implicitly reasserted the military doctrine of *Ex parte Milligan*, but again, as in the *Milligan* decision, after the crisis had passed.

Trials of Enemy Saboteurs by Military Commission

The *Milligan* doctrine does not extend, however, to protect enemy saboteurs who illegally enter the United States in time of war intending to commit hostile acts against the Nation. Over them the power of the President is absolute. In the case of *Ex parte Quirin*[22], decided in 1942, German saboteurs, who had landed from submarines on Long Island and Florida, planned to blow up various factories and bridges. Before they were able to execute their plans, FBI agents arrested them and a military commission using military procedures, swiftly tried and convicted them. This case reached the Supreme Court by a writ of certiorari, and the Court unanimously decided that the military commission had been lawfully constituted and that the saboteurs were subject to its jurisdiction. The Court made five points in its decision; first, it was not necessary to discuss the President's power as Commander in Chief to create the commission, since Congress had authorized the trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions; second, the offenses charged against the saboteurs were contrary to the law of war, which has always recognized that unlawful combatants are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals; third, the procedural guarantees of the Constitution were never intended to apply to military trails; fourth, *Ex parte Milligan* was inapplicable to this situation; and fifth, the President could validly fix the procedures to be followed by such a commission.

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[21] 327 U.S. 304. See Charles Fairman, "The Supreme Court on Military Jurisdiction," *Harvard Law Review*, LIX (1946), pp. 833-882.

[22] 317 U.S. 1. See Cyrus Bernstein, "The Saboteur Trial," *George Washington University Law Review* XI (1943), pp. 131-190; Robert E. Cushman, "The Case of the Nazi Saboteurs," *American Political Science Review*, XXXVI 1942, pp. 1082-1091; and Edward S. Corwin, *Total War and the Constitution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp. 117-121.

Seizure

Finally, there was the spectacular display during World War II of the President's power of martial rule in his seizure before, during, and after hostilities of some sixty privately owned and operated plants and industries in which labor disputes had jeopardized or impeded the war effort. The seizures may properly be regarded as part of the President's power, since Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, acting as Commander in Chief, used Federal troops when they engaged in this practice.

Wartime seizure is a relatively recent development. In World War I, President Wilson seized factories or industries on two occasions, in each instance under a grant of statutory authority.[23] President Roosevelt, however, based seizure on the President's constitutional authority. The pattern governing the exercise of this power was established in June 1941, when President Roosevelt seized the North American Aviation plant in Inglewood, California, pursuant to the unlimited national emergency which he had already declared. He announced that he was acting under the powers vested in him by the Constitution and laws of the United States both as President and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. In addition to this constitutional authority, in 1943, the Smith-Connally (War Labor Disputes) Act, specifically granted the President the power of seizure.[24]

Only once during the war was this power challenged in the courts. On December 28, 1944, by order of the President, the Secretary of War took possession of nine of the plants and facilities of Montgomery Ward and Company. This seizure was accompanied by an action in the Federal district court in Chicago to establish the legality of the seizure and for an injunction forbidding the officers of the company to interfere with the Government's possession. This quest for judicial approval was prompted by the fact that Montgomery Ward's plants, unlike the other plants that the Government had seized, were engaged in distribution rather than production.

In its arguments, the Government made two points: first, the seizure was justified under the Smith-Connally act, and, second, even though Montgomery Ward was not engaged in manufacturing, production, or mining, as the act specified, the President could seize these plants under his general war powers. On appeal, the Circuit Court held that the term "production" included "distribution" within the meaning of the Smith-Connally Act and that the seizure was therefore lawful. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari, the properties had been returned to the control of Montgomery Ward, thereby rendering the case moot.[25] Thus, the Supreme Court made no decision concerning this exercise of the President's war powers. There can be no doubt, however, that under the conditions of modern war, the President has a broad constitutional power to seize and operate individual facilities where work has stopped.

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[23] In *Northern Pacific Railroad Co.* v. *North Dakota ex rel William Langer*, 250 U.S. 135 (1919), the Supreme Court validated President Woodrow Wilson's assumption in 1918 of control of all telephone and telegraph lines in order to set rate schedules.

[24] War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, sec. 1; 57 Stat. 163 (June 25, 1943). See Clinton Rossister, "The President and Labor Disputes," *Journal of Politics*, XI (1949), pp. 100–105.

The second important seizure case was *Youngstown Sheet and Tube* v. *Sawyer* in 1952[26], involving no less an issue than the inherent power of the President of the United States. To avert a strike in the steel industry during the Korean War, President Truman, on April 8, 1952, under his authority as Commander in Chief, ordered Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to seize most of the Nation's steel mills. In justifying this order, President Truman invoked "the aggregate of his constitutional powers" as chief executive and Commander in Chief. This presidential claim of power to act without legislative authorization raised great questions pertaining to civil liberties. Although ample procedural grounds existed for sustaining the order's validity, the Court examined its substantive merits and overturned it. The Court, thus, chose deliberately to address a constitutional question that had been left undetermined throughout the Nation's judicial history. In this case, two facts governed: first, Congress had given the President a clearly prescribed procedure in the Taft-Hartley (National Labor Relations) Act of 1947 for resolving labor disputes affecting the national security, which President Truman had deliberately ignored; and, second, the United States was engaged in a "United Nations police action" in Korea rather than a war which Congress had declared. With the exception of this decision, the Court has never interfered with the President's interpretation of his war powers.

VIETNAM AND THE SUPREME COURT

During the war in Vietnam, the Supreme Court avoided any determination of the war's constitutionality, nor did it specify reasons for rejecting appeals from the decisions of the lower courts. It can only be deduced, therefore, that a majority of the Court viewed the issue of the war's constitutionality as a "political question" which the policymaking branches of the Government should decide. With regard to presidential war powers, the Court has generally felt that traditional judicial standards and reasoning cannot be utilized where delicate questions of military judgment and foreign policy are involved. Traditional remedies, such as injunctions, could cause undesirable and unpredictable consequences in war and should therefore be avoided if possible. Since such issues are political and have distinctly political consequences, the Supreme Court has deemed them to be beyond judicial competence.[27]

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[25] *Montgomery Ward* v. *United States*, 326 U.S. 690 (1945).

[26] 343 U.S. 579. See Edward S. Corwin, "The Steel Seizure Case," *Columbia Law Review*, *LIII* (1953), pp. 53–66; Paul A. Freund, "The Year of the Steel Seizure Case," *Harvard Law Review*, LXVI (1952), pp. 89–95; and Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., *The Presidency in the Courts* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).

FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN WARTIME

In the case of *The New York Times* v. *United States*[28], better known as "The Pentagon Papers Case," the Supreme Court was, on short notice, confronted with the need to reconcile a head-on collision between the freedom of the press, guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution, and the Government's need to protect national security.

On June 17, 1967, Secretary of Defense McNamara commissioned a massive, top-secret history of the role of the United States in Indochina. Eighteen months later, a 47-volume study covering the Nation's involvement there from World War II to May 1968 was completed.

Dr. Daniel Ellsberg transported eighteen of these volumes to the offices of the Rand Corporation, where he was a consultant. Later he removed some of these volumes from Rand's files without authorization and, assisted by another Rand employee, photocopied them. They then returned the original volumes to Rand's files. Ellsberg revealed the existence of the Papers to Senator J. William Fullbright, then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and to Senator George McGovern, both of whom urged Ellsberg to reveal these documents to the public. Following their advice, Ellsberg, in March 1971, gave photocopies of some of the Papers to the editor of *The New York Times*, who had them copyrighted.

On June 13, 1971, *The Times* began to publish excerpts. The next day, Attorney General John Mitchell requested *The Times* to cease publishing the Papers, but *The Times* refused. Mitchell then sought a temporary injunction against *The Times* to halt the continued publication of these documents. On June 15, 1971, a Federal district court issued the requested injunction. Thus, for the first time in American history, the Federal Government sought an injunction padlock to suppress the publication of a major article in a leading newspaper. On the other hand, never before had a newspaper published top-secret information that would allegedly endanger national security.

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[27] Fritz W. Scharpf, "Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Fundamental Analysis," *Yale Law Journal*, LXXV (1966), pp. 517-597.

[28] 403 U.S. 713. See Louis Henkin, "The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review*, CXX (1971), pp. 271-280; Peter D. Junger, "Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers," *Case Western Reserve Law Review*, XXIII (1971), pp. 3-75; and Martin M. Shapiro, ed., *The Pentagon Papers and the Courts: A Study in Foreign Policymaking and Freedom of the Press* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1972).

As soon as the injunction was issued against *The Times*, *The Washington Post* commenced to publish the Papers. On June 19, 1971, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia enjoined *The Washington Post* from continuing their publication. Acting with unprecedented haste, the Supreme Court, on June 30, 1971, rendered its judgment.

The basic questions before the Supreme Court were: did publication of the Papers constitute a grave and immediate threat to national security and, if so, did national security considerations outweigh First Amendment guarantees in the hierarchy of American constitutional values? To each of these questions, the Court replied in the negative. The Government had failed to show an immediate and grave threat to the Nation's security which would justify a prior restraint on publication. In *Near* v. *Minnesota*[29] and since that decision the Supreme Court has consistently held that any prior restraint on publication bears a heavy presumption against its validity, and the Federal Government bears an equally heavy burden for justifying the imposition of such a restraint.

One of the major factors influencing the Court's decision was the absence of congressional guidance and direction in such matters as those in *The Times* case, without which the Court was unwilling to make policy. It is apparent that, unless Congress enacts a law giving the Attorney General authority to prevent the publication of sensitive Government documents, newspapers cannot constitutionally be enjoined from publishing them. The Constitution did not provide for government by injunction in which the courts and the executive branch can conspire to make law in disregard of Congress. In this case, President Nixon had not requested that Congress amend the Espionage Act to give him power to prohibit the publication of material, the disclosure of which would pose a "grave and immediate danger to the security of the United States." Instead, the executive branch, through the Attorney General, came to the Court and requested that it be granted power which Congress had previously refused to grant. Had the Court interjected its injunctive power and joined with the President in upholding this prior restraint on publication, the Court and the President, in the absence of authorizing legislation, would have been the actual lawmakers. Thus, this decision is clearly aligned with *Youngstown Sheet and Tube* v. *Sawyer*. This decision, moreover, did not affect Federal criminal laws for espionage, theft, and conspiracy, and Daniel Ellsberg and his accomplice were indicted under them. But because of unlawful governmental activities in gathering evidence against them, they were granted a mistrial and thereupon freed.

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[29] 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

THE DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL PARTICIPATION

During the 1970s, the political question doctrine began to disintegrate noticeably, and the deference to this doctrine, which was assumed to be a judicial fact of life in the immediate post-World War II years, could no longer be taken for granted. In the Berk-Orlando-Da Costa series of cases[30], only one of which reached the Supreme Court, the lower Federal courts asserted that Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution requires that there be some evidence of "mutual participation" by Congress and the President in prolonged hostilities and that this judicial standard has been satisfied by Congress' continuing appropriations for the war, the extension of the Selective Service Act, and the adoption of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. But whether explicit congressional authorization was required was a political question which congress alone could decide.

The case of *Holzman* v. *Schlesinger*[31] reached the Supreme Court in 1973 and consisted of a series of cases decided as one. In July of that year, Congresswoman Elizabeth Holzman of New York State and four Air Force officers asked the Federal courts to order the United States to cease bombing in Cambodia. In the only case of its kind known to American constitutional law, a Federal district court enjoined the further use of air power, but the Court of Appeals subsequently lifted the injunction. This court concluded that the nature of the military tactics used by a President to deescalate a war posed a political question beyond the capacity of the courts to judge. It was, furthermore, beyond the judicial function to determine whether a military situation had changed to such an extent that renewed authorization was required from Congress. This decision, nevertheless, reaffirmed the principle of requiring the mutual participation of the President and Congress in waging war. Speaking through Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals: ". . . as a matter of substantive law, it seems likely that the President may not wage war without some form of congressional approval – except, perhaps, in the case of a pressing emergency or when the President is in the process of extricating himself from a war Congress once authorized.[32]

The doctrine of mutual participation was expressed legislatively in the War Powers Resolution of 1973,[33] an action which Congress took to remedy the failure of the courts clearly to determine the scope of presidential power to commit troops abroad. The resolution requires a President to report to Congress within 48 hours the circumstances, the scope of military action, and the basis of his authority if he commits troops to armed action or substantially increases the number of troops prepared for combat in a foreign country. Such operations must cease unless Congress gives affirmative approval within 60 days, with the exception that a commitment can continue for 30 days longer if such action is necessary to protect American forces. At any time from the date of initial commitment of troops, Congress may order, by a concurrent resolution not subject to the President's veto, the commitment of troops to end.

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[30] *Berk* v. *Laird*, 429 F. 2d. 301 (2nd Cir., 1970); *Orlando* v. *Laird*, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D. NY, 1970); *Berk* v. *Laird*, 433 F. 2d 1039 (3 = 2d Cir., 1971); *Da Costa* v. *Laird*, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973), 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir., 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972).

[31] 414 U.S. 1304.

[32] Ibid., 1311-1313.

[33] Public Law 93-148, 50 U.S.C. 1541. See Thomas Ehrlich, "The Legal Process in Foreign Affairs: Military Intervention – A Testing Case," *Stanford Law Review*, XXVII (1975), pp. 637-652; J. Terry Emerson, "The War Powers Resolution Tested: The President's Independent Defense Power," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, LI (1975), pp. 187-216; Thomas F. Eagleton, *War and Presidential Power* (New York: Liveright, 1974); and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 301-307.

THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

From the moment of its enactment, authorities expressed serious doubts about the constitutionality of the legislative veto embedded in the War Powers Resolution. In June 1983, the Supreme Court resolved these doubts in a case unrelated to national security–*Immigration and Naturalization Service* v. *Chadha*[34], which declared that the legislative veto is unconstitutional.[35] This decision nullifies only the fourth operative part of the War Powers Resolution, which provides that the President must withdraw troops introduced into hostilities even before the end of 60 days if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution. This ruling, however, is unlikely to have significant impact on the way national security policy is conducted. Since the War Powers Resolution, the United States has committed no forces to long-term hostilities. It is doubtful, however, that Presidents have refrained from such commitments merely because of the legislative veto in the Resolution. But the Vietnam War and the involvement of Marines in Lebanon make it clear that a President cannot sustain a military involvement without congressional and public support.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing discussion leads to the following conclusions:

1. During large-scale wars, such as the Civil War and World War II, the Supreme Court will not overrule the President's exercise of his war powers, even when presidential acts infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed rights of Americans. The courts will not interfere with the efforts of the policymaking branches of the Government to wage war successfully. As Chief Justice Hughes once said, "We have a

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[34] 103 S.Ct. 2764.

[35] "Legislative veto" is a term describing a variety of statutory devices that were meant to give Congress legal control over the actions of executive departments and agencies by means other than the enactment of laws. Such provisions have been included in statutes since 1932.

fighting Constitution," and during crises the imperative of national survival forces liberty to yield to security.

2. After the crisis has passed, the Court has taken a much stronger position in defense of constitutionally guaranteed rights and has generally acted to give broad protection to such rights.

3. During a so-called "police action," such as the Korean War, when Congress has clearly prescribed a procedure that the President must follow when interfering with property or other rights, the Court can be expected to overturn those acts of the President which deliberately ignore or violate the prescribed procedure. The President's insistence that he has acted pursuant to his authority as Commander in Chief and chief executive officer will probably prove insufficient to overcome constitutional objections.

4. Since *Youngstown Sheet and Tube* v. *Sawyer*, the Court has increasingly regarded the war powers as being shared by Congress and the President and has favored mutual participation where emergencies do not require the swift, unilateral action of the President.

5. Where First Amendment freedoms have been circumscribed without either specific congressional authorization or a grave national emergency, the Court has protected these freedoms.

6. When Congress attempted to overturn acts of the President, executive departments, and agencies through concurrent resolutions and sought thereby to control the exercise of faithfully delegated powers, the Court, in the *Chadha* decision, declared such resolutions to be unconstitutional. The Constitution requires all acts of Congress to be pursuant to the Constitution and that all bills, to become law, be signed by the President or, if vetoed by him, that they be overridden by not less than two-thirds of the membership of each house of Congress. The consequences of this decision remain to be seen, but it could affect important long-term changes in the relationship of the Congress and the President.

7. When the President and Congress have collaborated in exercising the war powers of the United States, their position, on the basis of historical precedent, may safely be regarded as unassailable in the courts.

In summary, the Constitution was written by men fresh from war. They established a more perfect union, in part, to defend themselves better from military attack and thereby protect their lives, liberties, and property. In so doing they deliberately centralized military power and responsibility in the President. Keenly aware that the Founding Fathers designed our "fighting Constitution" to enable this Nation to wage war successfully, the Supreme Court most probably will never knowingly detract from the capability of the executive branch to do so.

CHAPTER VII

Public opinion polls have increasingly come into use as a political tool much as market surveys are used as a business aid. The legislative and executive branches use opinion polls widely to help in the policy formulation process and to assess public reaction to proposed or ongoing programs. Candidates for public office as well as incumbents, Defense managers, and other persons concerned with national security policy-making or decisionmaking must take public opinion into account.

Public opinion on national security issues has fluctuated markedly since the late 1960s after being relatively stable through the 1950s and into the mid-1960s. Public support for national security was lowest in 1969–1973 because of the failure of American leaders to bring the war in Southeast Asia to a successful conclusion. The emphasis given to détente in U.S.-Soviet relations also tended to weaken support for national security. The debates between "hawks" and "doves" during this period centered on the size of the Defense budget and the related competition of resources which came largely from a stronger constituency for social programs.

The Angolan situation in 1975, with rebel forces supported by the Soviet Union, in many respects marked a reawakening of the American public to the Soviet threat and the weakening of détente. By 1977, the balance between hawks and doves, as reflected in polls, was about even. After 1977, public opinion tended to favor a strong defense posture. Public support for a larger defense budget increased significantly following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979.

The reading which follows provides data on the fluctuations in public opinion which have been outlined above. Other key questions which Russett and Deluca, the authors, discuss are the changes in the constituency for defense and the shifts in American public opinion concerning the use of U.S. forces to defend our allies. Polls indicate that proximity to the United States and common economic interests tend to have the greatest impact on the public.

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VII

"DON'T TREAD ON ME": PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EIGHTIES

Bruce R. Russett and Donald R. Deluca

Public opinion on national security issues has proven to be extraordinarily changeable. At the beginning of the 1970s it turned extremely "dovish" on such matters as reduction of the American defense budget and the defense of United States' overseas allies. Indeed it reached a level of dovishness unprecedented since the early days of the cold war, inspiring some of us to write articles with grandiloquent titles like "The Revolt of the Masses" and "The Americans' Retreat from World Power."[1] Coming as it did after a period of stability at a moderately "hawkish" level from the early 1950s well into the 1960s, and following the wrenching tragedy of Vietnam, it looked for a time as though public opinion might well stabilize on a new and relatively dovish consensus, forcing a sharp and long-lasting reduction in the American military establishment and alliance commitments. Furthermore, many Americans, including "elite" professionals, admitted to having changed their minds about preferred security policies and elaborated what appeared to be convincing reasons for their turnabouts.[2] Too, the new dovishness seemed concentrated among younger voters (especially those under thirty, who would presumably remain in the electorate for a long time) and among citizens of upper socioeconomic status (who presumably would be especially effective as "opinion leaders," in molding the attitudes and voting preferences of others). In this light, and given some evidence of long-term generational variation in American attitudes toward foreign policy over the previous two centuries, it was not unreasonable to hypothesize that a rather stable shift to dovishness had occurred.[3]

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[1] Bruce Russett, "The Revolt of the Masses: Public Opinion on Military Expenditures," John P. Lovell and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds., *New Civil-Military Relations* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1974), and Bruce Russett, "The Americans' Retreat from World Power," *Political Science Quarterly* 90 (Spring 1975): 1-22.

[2] Bruce Russett and Elizabeth C. Hanson, *Interest and Ideology: The Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Businessmen* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975), especially chapter four.

[3] See, for example, Bruce Russett and Miroslav Nincic, "American Opinion on the Use of Military Force Abroad," *Political Science Quarterly* 91 (Fall 1976): 411-432, and Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms," *Political Science Quarterly* 89 (Fall 1974): 563-588. The generational argument is substantially contradicted by more recent data in Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, "Does Where You Stand Depend on When You Were Born?" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 44 (Spring 1980): 1-22.

Not unreasonable, perhaps, but wrong. It is now clear that public opinion has again shifted, back toward a much more assertive, or hawkish, posture in world affairs, toward a widespread determination to rebuild American military capabilities and to reaffirm a readiness to use those capabilities in defense of perceived interests abroad. The purpose of this article is to document this recent change, using public opinion survey material where virtually identical questions have been asked many times over a long time-period. We also will suggest some reasons for this turnabout, even though this is necessarily a much more fragmentary and speculative enterprise.

BILLIONS FOR DEFENSE

We begin with responses to a question that has been asked very frequently in national surveys almost since the beginning of scientific opinion polling. The precise wording sometimes varies slightly, but is now asked regularly in a standard form by the American Institute for Public Opinion (AIPO, Gallup Poll) and some other national survey organizations. This standard question is now phrased: "There is much discussion as to the amount of money the Government in Washington should spend for national defense and military purposes. How do you feel about this? Do you think we are spending too little, too much, or about the right amount?"[4] The responses on 31 different national surveys since late 1968 are arrayed in table 4 and figure 3. This is, to our knowledge, a comprehensive list of all comparable questions on this topic asked over this time span by these organizations.

From July 1969 to September 1973 Americans expressed low sentiment in favor of more defense (and conversely, high sentiment in favor of less defense). After that period the shift begins, to the point where by 1976 or 1977 the two proportions are about equal. Thereafter sentiment grows ever more strongly in favor of increased defense spending, perhaps under the impact of claims and counterclaims by the proponents and opponents of SALT II (strategic arms limitation talks). This trend becomes a virtual landslide after the seizure of American hostages in Iran in November 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in January 1980. (Unfortunately no survey was conducted between these two events, so there is no way to disaggregate the relative effect of each event.) This new peak of preference for a larger

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[4] We now have enough experience with survey methods to have some idea of what changes in wording are likely to make any significant difference in the responses. Where any differences from this standard form occur in the following table, we have indicated that, but these differences we judge to be trivial and not to have a significant impact on the longitudinal trend portrayed.

TABLE 4. PUBLIC PREFERENCES FOR INCREASED OR REDUCED U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING, 1969–81

Survey	Date	Defense Spending? Too much (percent)	Defense Spending? Too little (percent)
AIPO 784	7/69	53	9
AIPO 793	11/69	46	7
AIPO 814	9/70	49	11
AIPO 825	3/71	50	11
Harris	10/71	49	11
AIPO/Potomac	8/72	42	9
Harris	8/72	38	11
AIPO 864	2/73	42	8
AIPO 878	9/73	46	13
AIPO/Potomac	4/74	37	17
AIPO 914	9/74	44	12
Harris/CCFR*	12/74	44	12
NBC	12/75	41	25
AIPO 945	1/76	36	22
AIPO/Potomac	5/76	24	28
Harris	12/76	32	13
NBC	12/76	41	26
AIPO 979	7/77	23	27
NBC	10/78	21	28
AIPO/CCFR	11/78	16	32
NBC	12/78	22	24
NBC	9/79	16	38
AIPO 1145-G	12/79	21	34
NBC	12/79	9	51
NBC	1/80	8	63
NBC	1/80	5	69
CBS/New York Times	1/80	14	46
AIPO 1147-G	1/80	14	49
CBS/New York Times	3/80	5	76
NBC	3/80	13	55
AIPO 1186-G	1-2/81	15	50

*Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.

Questions for CBS/*New York Times* January 1980 and all AIPO questions except September 1970, August 1972, April 1974, May 1976, and November 1978 are identical with questions given in text; others differ trivially. The AIPO/Potomac question asked whether "spending for defense and military purposes should be increased, kept at the present level, reduced, or ended altogether?" The percentage of people responding "too much" in the above tables includes both "reduced" and "ended altogether."

defense budget not only exceeds anything since 1968, it is approximately at the historic high registered in the early cold war years of the late 1940s and early 1950s.[5]

Table 5 and figure 4 present responses to a somewhat different type of question. Here, instead of asking the respondent to express an opinion about defense or military spending only, the interviewer lists a variety of Federal expenditures (education, health, welfare, space ex-

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[5] Russett, "Revolt of the Masses." Inferences from sample surveys to attitudes in the general population are always subject to sampling error. In light of that, and because of slight differences in question wording and survey procedures employed by different organizations, percentage differences from one survey to another of less than five should not be treated as substantively significant.

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

NOTE: When there were two or more surveys in the same month, we used the average.

FIGURE 3. PUBLIC PREFERENCES FOR INCREASED OR REDUCED U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING, 1969–81



NOTE: When there were two or more surveys in the same month, we used the average.

FIGURE 4. PUBLIC PREFERENCES FOR DEFENSE SPENDING WHEN PRESENTED WITH LIST OF EXPENDITURES

ploration) and asks the respondent, sequentially, whether spending on each is too much, too little, or the right amount. In this context the budgetary or tax tradeoffs between one category and another are likely to be more apparent to the respondent (though the respondent is rarely asked to make those tradeoffs explicit). This question also has been

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TABLE 5. PUBLIC PREFERENCES ON DEFENSE SPENDING WHEN PRESENTED WITH LIST OF EXPENDITURES

Survey	Date	Spending for defense Too much (percent)	Too little (percent)
Roper	10/71	34	15
NORC	Spring 73	37	11
Roper	12/73	32	14
NORC	Spring 74	31	17
Roper	12/74	32	13
Harris/CCFR*	12/74	42	14
NORC	Spring 75	31	17
Roper	12/75	27	20
NORC	Spring 76	27	24
NORC	Spring 77	23	24
NORC	Spring 78	22	27
CBS/New York Times	1/79	16	34
NORC	Spring 80	11	56
CBS/New York Times	1/81	7	61

*Chicago Council on Foreign Relations.
SOURCE: Surveys on deposit in The Roper Center Archive.

asked in virtually identical form by four different national survey organizations over the past decade.[6]

The pattern here is almost exactly the same as shown in the first table and figure, save that the recent upswing to "more defense" is perhaps diminished slightly by the more apparent tradeoffs. The shift toward greater willingness to spend on *defense,* moreover, is much greater than that – in either direction – for any other kind of spending. Only one expenditure item moves by as much as 14 percent in the Roper and National Opinion Research Center (NORC) surveys – the environment from an early high of 65 percent favoring more spending to a more recent low of 51 percent. The only other category of spending to show a significant shift of public sentiment in favor of increasing expenditures is "the space exploration program," which rose from a low of 8 percent in 1973 to a high of 20 percent in 1980. Space exploration of course also has defense and national security overtones.

DEFENSE OF ALLIES

A similar trend over time can be seen in survey questions about Americans' willingness to use military force to defend other countries against an attack by the Soviet Union or other communist country. Here there is somewhat less precision in comparing responses due to

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[6] The National Opinion Research Center and the Roper Organization have used identical question wording: "We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little, or about the right amount." The Harris and CBS/*New York Times* prefatory wording varies slightly.

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fewer instances of question use in comparable form, but the pattern is nonetheless obvious in table 6, which measures the public's willingness to use military force to defend Western Europe against a Soviet attack.

Two other questions (in a form not fully comparable to the one reported in the table above) also asked about willingness to defend Western Europe. In December 1974 and February 1980, Louis Harris Associates asked: "There has been a lot of discussion about what circumstances might justify U.S. military involvement, including the use of U.S. troops. Do you feel that if Western Europe were invaded you would favor or oppose U.S. military involvement?" This question, not explicitly mentioning the Soviet Union as the invader, produced the same trend but slightly lower levels of willingness to use the military: 39 percent favored such use in 1974, rising to 67 percent in 1980; the percentage opposed fell from 41 percent in 1974 to 23 percent in 1980. Surveys by the Roper Center in July 1978 and by the AIPO organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) in November 1978 found 43 percent and 54 percent, respectively, in favor of using military force: "There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. . . . Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops if the Soviet Union invaded Western Europe?" Table 7 shows similar results over time for hypothetical attacks on several other countries.

Despite the uniform rise in willingness to defend essentially all areas or countries, American public opinion still varies substantially on what areas warrant military involvement, and against what kinds of threats. Earlier work demonstrated this selectivity, showing that the proportion of the American population willing to use military force to defend another country varied especially with the geographical proximity of that country to the United States, and to a lesser degree was higher for helping noncommunist governments (whether democratic or not) and states with substantial trade linkages to the United States.[7] There are not enough comparable items to make a systematic test of those results here, but table 8 shows that this selectivity did not hold very well in 1980.

As it happens, proximity now appears relatively unimportant. While we do not have recent data on willingness to defend spots in the Western Hemisphere, it is nonetheless notable that two quite distant areas, Japan and the Persian Gulf, do about as well as Western Europe in attracting over two-thirds of the populace as willing to use force on their behalf. Similarly, Iran and Pakistan are fairly high, clearly indicating–along with the Persian Gulf region–a perception that U.S.

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[7] Miroslav Nincic and Bruce Russett, "The Effect of Similarity and Interest on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 33 (Spring 1979): 68–78.

TABLE 6. PUBLIC WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND WESTERN EUROPE AGAINST SOVIET ATTACK

Defend Europe	1972	1974	1975	1976	1978	1979	1980 (Feb)	1980 (July)
Agree	52	48	48	56	62	64	70	74
Disagree	32	34	34	27	26	26	17	19
Don't know	16	18	18	17	12	10	13	7

SOURCES: Surveys for Potomac Associates, 1972-1979 and July 1980, excerpted from William Watts, *Americans Look at Asia: A Need for Understanding* (Washington: Potomac Associates, 1980), p. 48. February 1980 excerpted from William Watts and Lloyd Free, "Internationalism Comes of Age . . . Again," *Public Opinion*, April-May 1980, p. 48.

TABLE 7. WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND OTHER COUNTRIES, 1972–80: PERCENTAGE WILLING TO USE MILITARY FORCE

	1972	1974	1975	1976	1978a	1978b	1978c	1979	1980a	1980b
Japan "if attacked by Russia or China"	43	37	42	45	NA	42	50	54	57	68
Taiwan "if attacked by China"	NA	17	NA	NA	16	20	32	34	NA	43
Yugoslavia "if the Soviets invade"	NA	11	NA	NA	16	18	NA	NA	NA	36
South Korea "if North Korea invades"	NA	14	NA	NA	19	21	32	32	NA	38

SOURCES: Data for 1972, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978c, 1979, 1980b (except Yugoslavia) from William Watts, *Americans Look at Asia: A Need for Understanding* (Washington: Potomac Associates, 1980), p. 48; 1978a from *Roper Reports* July 1978, reported in *Public Opinion*, March-May 1979, p. 26; 1978b from AIPO survey for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations; 1980a from William Watts and Lloyd Free, "Internationalism Comes of Age . . . Again," *Public Opinion*, April-May 1980, p. 48; 1980b Yugoslavia comes from Louis Harris Associates s/s 1,198 of February 1980; NA indicates data not available for given year.

access to oil is truly a vital national interest. The countries with the smallest percentage of the American public willing to defend them are either communist states (China and Yugoslavia) or very distant ones (Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand). It also makes a significant difference how and whence the threat is posed. A passive and indeterminate description of Western Europe as "invaded" invokes 7 percentage points fewer than does "attacked by the Soviet Union," and three of the four bottom items refer to an attack by a state other than the great rival superpower, the Soviet Union.

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TABLE 8: WILLINGNESS TO DEFEND VARIOUS COUNTRIES OR AREAS IF ATTACKED BY VARIOUS ANTAGONISTS, 1980

Country (attacked by or invaded by)	Percentage favoring military force	Percentage opposing military force
* Persian Gulf, where oil comes from (Russians)	75	18
Major European allies (Soviet Union)	74	19
* Western Europe (invaded)	67	23
Japan (Russia/China)	68	28
* Pakistan (Russia)	53	35
* Iran (Russia)	53	37
China (Russia)	45	42
Taiwan (China)	43	42
South Korea (North Korea)	38	51
* Yugoslavia (Soviet Union)	36	48
Thailand (Vietnam)	30	55

*These refer to "U.S. military involvement, including the use of troops," and are from Louis Harris Associates s.s. 1,198 of February 1980. All others not marked by an asterisk refer to "the United States should come to the defense of ________ if it is attacked by ________," and are from Watts, *Americans Look at Asia*.

PERCEPTIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Americans' willingness to defend other countries is also closely linked to general favorable or unfavorable perceptions of those countries. A standard question frequently used on AIPO and NORC surveys asks respondents to rate various countries on a scale from plus five to minus five in order to yield a general approval score. It was asked for a large number of countries in 1976, and there are data from 1975 on willingness to defend. The results for those 10 countries included in both surveys are displayed in figure 5.[8] The correlation between the two is very high ($r^2 = .74$).

It is impossible to separate entirely the individual effects of various influences on popular perceptions of other countries, but it seems likely that willingness to defend is dependent on – in addition to proximity and economic interest – this general dimension of "favorability." Favorability in turn has earlier been shown to result substantially from a combination of "objective" economic (trade and investment) and military (U.S. bases and personnel there) interest and socioeconomic similarity to the United States (based on race, religion, language,

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[8] Figure 4 displays responses to the following questions: "If _____ were attacked by communist backed forces" would respondent be willing to "send American troops, send military supplies but not send American troops, or refuse to get involved." We include only individuals willing "to send American troops." The survey is by AIPO, reported in *Current Opinion*, June 1975, 56. The favorability question is, "Here is an interesting experiment." Respondents were handed a card with 10 numbered boxes running from plus five to minus five. "You notice that the boxes on this card range from the highest position of plus five – for something you have a very favorable opinion of – all the way down to the lowest position of minus five – for something you have a very unfavorable opinion of. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate _____?" The survey is by AIPO, reported in *Gallup Opinion Index*, November 1976. We report the percentage of all respondents ranking a given country as at least plus one.

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

SOURCE: Based on surveys by the American Institute for Public Opinion, reported in *Current Opinion* 56, June 1975, and *Gallup Opinion Index*, November 1976.

FIGURE: 5. PERCENTAGE WILLING TO DEFEND PARTICULAR COUNTRIES ATTACKED BY COMMUNIST BACKED FORCES, AND PERCENTAGE EXPRESSING A FAVORABLE OPINION OF THOSE COUNTRIES, 1975

political system, and level of economic development). Indicators for these two dimensions "explain" about two-thirds of the variance in favorability.[9] Clearly all these aspects – similarity, interest, favorability, and willingness to defend – are closely if somewhat amorphously linked in popular opinion.

These perceptions, however, are not static. Favorable impressions of

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[9] Nincic and Russett, "The Effect of Similarity and Interest on Attitudes toward Foregin Countries."

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other countries can wax or wane over time, depending in large part on the role of those countries in American foreign policy and in world politics generally. Figure 6 shows trends in the percentage of the American population expressing a generally favorable opinion of particular countries over a fairly long time period, sometimes extending back to 1956. Changing perceptions of world politics clearly matter, most obviously in the rise (which peaked at 45 percent favorably perceived in 1973) and then the fall (to 13 percent in 1980) of détente with the Soviet Union. Not only has the Soviet Union's popularity fallen off since the mid-1970s, a similar rise and fall (albeit from still lower levels of favorability) has occurred for Cuba, while Communist China – now a major antagonist of the Soviet Union – was by 1980 favorably perceived by 42 percent of the population. Iran, having moved from a status as America's close ally to that of the hostage keeper, dropped below 7 percent perceiving it favorably.[10] And Egypt, following the Camp David accord and its new alignment with the United States, is virtually as well liked as is Israel. Favorable perceptions of America's long-term allies, for example, Canada and Germany, persist.

To probe the phenomena of behavior in world politics as affecting perceptions of other countries it is useful to look at a systematic collection of events data on international behavior. Edward Azar has collected and made generally available information on states' behavior toward one another on a variety of symbolic, economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. He and his colleagues have counted events as reported in both standard and sometimes obscure sources and, with the help of "expert" judgments, coded them for the degree of confict or cooperation manifested.[11] Table 9 arrays those scores for the first 11 months of 1976, along with the favorability scores that have been compiled from November 1976 for 25 countries.

The data reflect events or initiatives only during the 11-month period – not the longer-term temperature of interstate relations – but public perceptions are likely to be most affected by recent events except where there is major incongruity between recent and longer-term developments. Judgments of the degree of conflict or cooperation involved in any particular act of one state toward another are unavoidably subject to some variation in interpretation, but Azar's scores, applying a standard score for all acts of a given type (for example, troop movements, economic sanctions, state visits, extending loans) are generally well regarded.

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[10] It may be worth noting that whereas only 6 percent of American whites had any favorable opinion of Iran in 1980, 14 percent of nonwhites expressed favorable opinions. Among them, sympathies with postrevolutionary Iran as an antagonist of imperialism and the white global establishment were not trivial.

[11] Edward E. Azar, "The Conflict and Peace Data Bank Project," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24 (March 1980): 143-152.



SOURCE: AIPO and NORC data as reported in Nincic and Russett, "Attitudes toward Foreign Countries," p. 76. AIPO surveys 1123-G and 1138-G conducted in February and September 1979, from Roper Center archive, and *Gallup Opinion Index*, March 1980. First datum for West Germany is 1954 rather than 1956.

FIGURE 6. PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION FAVORABLE TOWARD VARIOUS COUNTRIES, 1956–80

There is a modest but far from perfect fit between public attitudes toward particular countries and the acts being directed to or by the governments of those countries. Generally favorable attitudes, and good relations, apply to most of America's traditional allies. There is evidence, both in the opinion and events data, of strained relations with the South American military regimes of Argentina and Chile. A significant lag is apparent in public perceptions of some of the relationships long embittered by the cold war. Public attitudes toward Egypt and China remained largely unfavorable (especially in China's case) despite substantially warmer diplomatic relations with each country in the years just prior to Azar's study, and the existence of détente (indicated by not-too-conflictful events scores) found little reflection in the public. Perceptions are very slightly more strongly correlated with what the

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TABLE 9. FAVORABLE OPINION AND INTERNATIONAL EVENTS BY COUNTRY, 1976

Country	U.S. public favorable (percent)	Cooperation conflict score U.S. as actor (mean)	Cooperation conflict score U.S. as target (mean)
Canada	91	11.00	11.25
Switzerland	88	23.75	27.00
England (U.K.)	87	7.31	3.60
Australia	85	16.88	10.13
Holland	85	0.00	6.00
Sweden	77	20.50	27.00
West Germany	77	16.88	18.44
Japan	75	7.46	5.14
France	74	4.20	3.67
Mexico	74	3.00	-0.50
Philippines	74	8.67	-11.40
Italy	68	-1.00	3.67
Brazil	66	18.33	11.75
Israel	65	6.09	-0.90
Poland	60	29.00	0.00
Argentina	60	-3.00	6.00
India	56	2.75	2.56
Taiwan	55	2.83	31.00
South Africa	54	8.36	13.83
Chile	51	-4.22	5.67
Egypt	49	14.43	10.52
Iran	48	1.84	2.67
Soviet Union	21	1.30	-4.11
China	20	14.50	7.75
Cuba	15	-13.54	-14.75

SOURCE: These scores were kindly provided by Edward Azar; public opinion data are as cited in Nincic and Russett, "The Effect of Similarity and Interest on Attitudes toward Foreign Countries," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 33 (Spring 1979): 76.

American Government is doing toward other countries (r^2 = .15) than with what other states are doing and saying to the United States (r^2 = .13).

EXPLAINING OPINION SHIFTS

How then can analysts hope to explain shifts in popular attitudes on foreign policy and national security issues, especially the great changeability evidenced in the willingness to spend more on defense? The puzzle is intensified by knowledge that the American public's experience has not been shared widely with American allies. For example, the fluctuations in public attitudes in Japan and Great Britain on this issue are much more moderate than in the United States, and there is no sign of a significant recent upsurge in attitudes strongly in favor

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of increased defense spending.[12] (*Figure 7*) This is attributable in part to the much smaller impact of the Vietnam War on those societies a decade ago, but also it seems clear that neither country shares current American worries about the global military balance.

Americans, in wishing to increase the share of their resources devoted to military purposes, are responding to world events–or at least to their *perceptions* of world events. This is clear from examining responses to another standard question, regularly asked by the AIPO organization, concerning what Americans consider the "most important problem" facing the country. In the 1950s and 1960s, foreign affairs and national security issues typically were cited as "most important" by 50 or 60 percent of the population, reflecting strong, persistent fears about communism and the danger of war. In the mid-1960s, this concern was overtaken by the civil-rights movement, and then returned (though not to the previous heights) during the Vietnam War period. After Vietnam it dropped to absolutely unprecedented lows, being replaced by the economy and inflation, from which it only recently emerged in highly volatile fashion. Figure 8 illustrates this movement since 1968.

Comparing this with the fluctuations in defense-spending preferences, especially as shown in the more detailed depiction of figure 3, shows a peculiar reversal in the relationship. From 1969 to 1973, concern for foreign affairs once again appeared very high, at a time when willingness to spend money on defense was very low. In this period it would seem that the salience of foreign policy was associated with antimilitarism, but that may be deceptive. The category "foreign affairs" was, overwhelmingly, in fact Vietnam, which then accounted for roughly 70 to 90 percent of the items so categorized. But in February 1973, after Richard Nixon's second inaugural, the percentage of the population mentioning Vietnam dropped to only 3 percent, never rising above that point thereafter, and indeed soon was dropped from the coding scheme. From February 1973 onward, the salience of foreign affairs is very closely related to the desire to spend more on defense. For the last eight years, it seems that the salience of foreign affairs really indicates a sense of *threat from abroad,* presumably to be

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[12] Figure 7 displays the responses to the following questions.

Britain: "Do you think the Government is spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on armaments and defense?" Reported in Connie de Boer, "The Polls: Our Commitment to World War III," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45 (Spring 1981): 243.

Japan: "The defense budget for fiscal 19___ amounted to $___ billion, or approximately ___ percent of the national budget shown. From the standpoint of national defense, do you think this should be increased, maintained at its present level, or reduced?" Reported in Japan Defense Agency Public Information Division, *Defense Bulletin,* III (September 1979): 21-22.



FIGURE 7. PERCENTAGE FAVORING INCREASED DEFENSE SPENDING IN BRITAIN AND JAPAN, 1968-80



FIGURE 8. PERCENTAGE CHOOSING FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING THIS COUNTRY

met with a stronger military establishment.[13] The Iranian hostage affair and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan thus immediately precede the peak in both the salience of foreign affairs and the sentiment favoring increased defense spending.

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[13] The relevant survey question is "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" Data through 1976 are from Tom W. Smith, "America's Most Important Problem: A Trend Analysis" (paper presented to annual meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, June 1979). Data since then are from Roper Center files. Save for the most recent defense-spending question, we have been able to find a "most important problem" question either on the same survey, or on another occurring no more than two months from the survey asking the defense question. The most recent gap is three-and-a-half months from the "most important problem" data point (early October 1980) to the defense datum (January-February 1981). Sometimes we have had to use the same "most important problem" response to correspond with more than one defense response. Technically this gives some difficulty in computing a correlation coefficient, as certainly does the problem of autocorrelation where the intervals between data points in time series are unequal. Hence the visual juxtaposition of the two trendlines should be taken more seriously than any correlation coefficient.

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Yet the examples of Iran and Afghanistan are merely examples, however dramatic. It is easy enough to imagine other foreign-affairs events that might have triggered a strong popular response as measured by the polls – the Yom Kippur War and oil embargo of 1973, the fall of the Shah in January 1979, or the "discovery" of the Soviet brigade in Cuba in the summer of 1979 – but they did not. The holding of American hostages in Iran, by contrast, became a media spectacular in both countries, with television coverage playing a key role in the bargaining. Curiously, most efforts to uncover a systematic relationship between world events and public opinion on national security issues have failed. That is, if instead of starting with a jump in opinion and looking for the event that might have triggered it one starts with an "objective" coding of events by their seriousness and then looks at the opinion data, the results are inconclusive.

A study by Sophia Peterson, for example, found no relationship between public favorableness toward the Soviet Union and conflictual actions, whether those actions were initiated by the United States or by the USSR. Similarly, Mark Mellman found no relationship whatever between a "state of the world" indicator from the Azar data of world conflict directed toward the United States and preferences for defense spending. Farid Abolfathi did find a relation between defense-spending attitudes and international tension levels, but the analysis is so seriously flawed methodologically that it is of doubtful utility. Recall the weak cross-sectional relationship found earlier in this article between "favorableness" and Azar's events data on relationships between the United States and other countries. Finally, John Mueller uncovered a small but significant relationship between changes in the international environment and public expectations of war. His measure of the changing international environment, however, was derived from another study of front-page coverage of events in the *New York Times.* In other words, it showed a relationship not between opinion and events, but between opinion and what a major news medium chose to *identify* and *interpret* as events.[14]

Thus the relationship between events and public opinion on specific issues is at best tenuous, and although further, more sophisticated studies may uncover something, at the moment inconclusive findings predominate. Some other efforts to provide a systematic explantion of changes in American public opinion on foreign policy also have been inconclusive. Louis Kriesberg and Ross Klein, for example, document the shift in public opinion on defense spending but are unable to account for it. They examine aspects of personality, generational experience, ideology, and economic experience, but none of those have varied enough in the population over the past decade even remotely to account for the change in defense and security attitudes.[15] (Possibly the shift toward a more conservative ideology may show enough variation, but the correlation/causation inference to be made there is very dubious.)

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[14] Sophia Peterson, "Events, Mass Opinion, and Elite Attitudes," in *Communication in International Politics*, ed. Richard Merritt (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1972); Mark Mellman, *New Media and Public Opinion toward Defense Spending* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, forthcoming); Farid Abolfathi, "Threat, Public Opinion, and Military Spending in the United States, 1930-1990," in *Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies*, vol. 5, *Threats, Weapons, and Foreign Policy*, eds. Pat McGowan and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980); and John E. Mueller, "Public Expectations of War during the Cold War," *American Journal of Political Science* 23 (May 1979): 301-329. Abolfathi's coding of events is extremely simple and appears very subjective; moreover, his "survey data" for 15 of the 44 years are not hard data at all, but are either interpolations from other years or subjective estimates. There are serious technical problems in Mueller's analysis as well.

THE ROLE OF THE MASS MEDIA

Explanation, because it is speculative, is thus much more difficult than description. Nevertheless, there are clues–for example, in Mueller's mildly positive findings using the *New York Times* events coverage and in the relationship we found between defense-spending attitudes and perceptions of the "most important problem." A further hint is contained in the well-established relationship between socioeconomic status and defense-spending attitudes. In the 1950s and early 1960s, when military spending was popular, those favoring cuts in it were drawn disproportionately from low-income, low-status groups. At the peak of antimilitary sentiment during the Vietnam War, however, antimilitary attitudes were concentrated disporportionately among professional groups, and among those of high income and considerable education–precisely among those most likely to take an interest in international affairs. Moreover, these very groups shifted opinion again at the end of the decade, when military preparedness again became popular. In January 1980, for instance, 49 percent of the general populace was in favor of increased military spending, but 52 percent of the college-educated population favored it, as did 55 percent of those with incomes over $23,000 per year.[16]

In the early years of the cold war, Gabriel Almond worried about the volatility and "instability of mood" that he thought characterized American attitudes about foreign policy. Several more recent analyses have implied that public opinion on foreign policy, at least on central, continuing issues, is not especially volatile.[17] Some stability also can be seen in our data, but opinions are hardly set in concrete–people do change their minds.

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[15] Louis Kriesberg and Ross Klein, "Changes in Public Support for U.S. Military Spending," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24 (March 1980): 79-111.

[16] *Gallup Opinion Index*, February 1980, p. 10.

[17] Gabriel Almond, *The Amercian People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950); William Caspary, "The 'Mood' Theory: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June 1970): 536-547.

The association of change with upper-status characteristics suggests how this may happen. People of upper socioeconomic status are also the most likely to be exposed to those elements of the mass media that discuss foreign affairs and security policy. For example, higher-status individuals were most likely to change their opinions on the Vietnam War as it ran its course. The higher a person's exposure to the mass media the more likely he or she was to turn against the war. A content analysis showed that media coverage of the Vietnam War had greater impact on Johnson and Nixon's popularity than did any other kind of news, and another study found that the media coverage of the Tet offensive by the Viet Cong in 1968 had a massive psychological effect on the American public.[18] In an empirical analysis too elegant to summarize justly here, Mark Mellman has shown that although there is no discernible association between systematic measures of events and opinion on military spending, there is a close relationship between the treatment of events on national network television news and the public's opinion on military spending. That is, the greater the evaluative content of television news suggesting the need for stronger defense forces, the greater the immediately subsequent sentiment for such forces in mass attitude surveys. Also, great symbolic content, as compared with merely "factual" content, of the media favoring greater defense carried an additional impact. The mass media, as interpreters of the world to Americans, appear to be powerful shapers of opinions on foreign policy and national security.[19] Administrations, and lobbyists on all sides, do their best with news conferences, briefings, and leaks, to influence media coverage.[20]

International and security issues are remote for most Americans, even those of upper socioeconomic status. Only a small proportion of the population benefits directly from the "military-industrial complex"; in any given year relatively few Americans travel abroad and even fewer directly obtain much information relevant for evaluating complicated foreign-policy issues. Americans know they can be incinerated instantly in a nuclear war – but few of them have immediate experience with which to formulate policy for dealing with that threat. The kind of experiential relationship they are likely to have with economic issues (unemployment or inflation), or even with some social issues such as race or abortion, is less tenuous. Foreign policy is thus a prime candidate for what Donald Kinder and his colleagues have termed "symbolic" or "sociotropic" politics.[21] In an earlier era Americans, in addition to depending on newspapers, magazines, and radio, depended heavily on personal contact with "opinion leaders" who relayed information and interpretations from elites to masses.[22] In the electronic era, John Chancellor, Dan Rather, and Frank Reynolds occupy key pumping stations for more direct flow.

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[18] Richard Brody and Benjamin Page, "The Impact of Events on Presidential Popularity: The Johnson and Nixon Administrations," in *Perspectives on the Presidency*, ed. Aaron Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975), and Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977).

[19] Mellman, *News Media and Public Opinion*. Importantly, Mellman also shows that the media coverage of events also is little related to objective measures of the overall degree of conflict and cooperation directed toward the United States. Media coverage thus is very selective and not at all random.

[20] On the dependence of media coverage on offical sources of information see David L. Paletz and Robert M. Entmann, *Media Power Politics* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1981).

Now, even after some reconsolidation after the wrenching effect of the Vietnam War, Americans remain deeply divided in their attitudes on foreign-policy questions. This division provides both a potential constraint on public policy and an invitation to leaders to try to win a majority of the populace to their side (for example, Jimmy Carter's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan). Simple left-right, hawk-dove, internationalist-isolationist characterizations will not do, partly because the opinion structures themselves are complex and partly because Americans do not divide on such dichotomous lines. A large proportion of elite Americans fall somewhere between the hawk and dove extremes, but even within that centrist group there exists no consensus on lessons to be learned from Vietnam or on the proper means for conducting foreign policy.[23] At least, many have become convinced that the policies of the immediate post-Vietnam years – a diminished willingness and capability for military intervention abroad – are no longer compatible with the security of a dynamic capitalist economy. The speed with which the conviction spread from elites through the population is impressive. While we cannot provide a full political and sociological explanation, the following elements are worth consideration.

Opponents of the "activist" American foreign policy that was mainstream until the late 1960s were diverse, including assorted leftist, pacifists, and libertarian isolationists as well as many disillusioned "centrists." Thus they failed to produce a coherent and widely accepted ideology to counter that of resurgent "cold war liberals" and traditional conservative hawks. In addition, the spreading acceptability of conservative domestic economic ideology may have helped legitimate convative or hawkish foreign-policy prescriptions, even though the logical connection between the two might seem tenuous.

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[21] Donald R. Kinder, "Presidents, Prosperity and Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Spring 1981, pp. 1-21; Kinder and R.D. Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgements in Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 3 (1979): 495-527. See also D.O. Sears et al, "Self Interest vs. Symbolic Politics in Policy Attitudes and Presidential Voting," *American Political Science Review* 74 (September 1980): 670-685. David R. Segal, "Communication about the Military; People and Media in the Flow of Information," *Communication Research*, January 1975, also suggests the special direct relevance of media on military issues precisely because they are of low salience for most people and are infrequently discussed in everyday conversation (pp. 68-78).

[22] Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (New York: Free Press, 1955), and Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on a Hypothesis," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21 (Spring 1957): 61-79.

[23] Ole Holsti and James Rosenau, "Cold War Axioms in the Post Vietnam Era," in Holsti, Randolph Siverson, and Alexander George, eds., *Change in the International System*, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), and Holsti and Rosenau, "Vietnam, Consensus, and the Belief Systems of American Leaders," *World Politics* 32 (October 1979): 1-56.

Opponents were unable to muster an effective use of symbols to counter the powerful impact of apparent American humiliation in Iran, portrayed on the world's mass media.

The doves, unlike the hawks, lacked a clear base of economic interest. Groups that stood to benefit materially from détente (for example, multinational corporations seeking markets in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) faced only prospective gains, wherease groups like military contractors faced real, immediate losses from antimilitary sentiments. People, including many in the "establishment," who felt damaged by the major social dislocation resulting from the Vietnam War did not feel so endangered by "ordinary" peacetime military spending and alliance maintenance. Moreover, the basic economic prosperity of the country has seemed threatened by shortages of raw materials (especially oil) from abroad.

Meanwhile, analysts should be impressed by how much they do not know about the causes or stability of foreign-policy attitudes. It would seem foolhardy to make very firm predictions about whether present attitudes will remain constant for long.

CHAPTER VIII

Lobbying is defined as the conducting of activities through personal contacts or the dissemination of information with the objective of influencing public officials. Although it particularly concerns contacts with members of a legislative body about legislation and policy matters, lobbying also includes activities to influence members of the executive and judicial branches of government. Special interests engaged in what amounted to lobbying in the first U.S. Congress, but the word "lobby" did not appear in congressional annals until 1808.

In recent years, there has been a growing acceptance of lobbying as a respectable and constructive part of the governmental process. Through the 19th century and well into the 20th, however, lobbying had connotations of corruption and scandal. Most states adopted statutory regulation of lobbyists, generally requiring registration and reports of spending. Congress first placed restrictions on lobbying in 1913, but the first law to regulate lobbying in general was not enacted until 1946. In that year, the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act required registration and financial reports from any person or organization receiving or spending money for the principal purpose of influencing legislation or action in either house of Congress. Political committees already regulated were excepted. Quarterly reports of money received and spent were required of paid lobbyists. In effect, the 1946 law required disclosure, not regulation. On the issue of increasing or decreasing controls on lobbying, the problem for Congress and the courts has been how to curb dishonest and corrupt activities without interfering with the constitutional rights of free speech and petition. Following the Watergate scandal, efforts by both houses of Congress to enact a new lobbying law failed.

Lobbyists represent the whole spectrum of interest groups found in American society and also some foreign interests. The number of interest groups and lobbies in Washington has multiplied rapidly since the 1960s, a period which witnessed increased citizen participation, particularly on public-policy issues such as pollution and consumer welfare. Lobbying on national security and defense matters, too, has grown and gained attention. Chapter VIII, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American National Government," discusses the organization of interests into tightly knit relationships of congressional subcommittees, executive bureaus, and private organizations and the tendency of such power triangles to fragment and weaken decisionmaking.

A word needs to be added on political action committees (PACs), which have become a major new weapon for lobbies. Organized to promote a particular cause, these committees have gained great influence in elections and in determining the outcome of public-policy debates through

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their fund-raising activities. A political action committee does not have party affiliation. It gives financial support to those candidates or officials who are most likely to give PAC representatives access to the decisionmaking centers of government and opportunities there to further their objectives.

In late 1986, there were more than 4,100 PACs as compared to 608 in 1974. It is estimated that more than 4.5 million persons were involved in PACs in 1986. Since the mid-1970s, the amount spent by U.S. Senators and Representatives in their campaigns for election has risen significantly. For example, the average winning candidate in the Senate spent $2.9 million in 1984 as compared to $.6 million in 1976.

A Common Cause study based on House and Senate candidate reports filed with the Federal Election Commission found that the 68 Senate candidates and 796 House candidates up for election in 1986 raised a total of $410.38 million during the combined years 1985 and 1986. This represented a 20 percent increase over the 1984 election cycle when $342.56 million was raised. Political action committees gave a total of $130.3 million to all House and Senate general election candidates in 1986, an increase of 27 percent over the 1984 election cycle. Data from the Federal Election Commission also reveal that from January 1, 1985, through June 30, 1986, PACs raised $254 million and spent $205 million.

Contributions from PACs overwhelmingly favored incumbents and individuals in key positions. Incumbent representatives received $65 million from PACs while challengers received $8 million, according to the Common Cause study of 1986 House races. The study found the number of representatives receiving 50 percent or more of their campaign funds from PACs had risen as indicated in the following data:

Year	*Number*
1986	*194*
1984	*163*
1982	*94*
1980	*85*
1978	*63*

Some argue that the large number of contributors, estimated at 4.5 million in 1986, indicates a more democratic trend, while others believe that PACs tend to give increased influence to money in the political process and pose a threat to the power of the major political parties to influence elections. Action by public-interest groups continues as a means to curb the influence of PACs.

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VIII

INTEREST GROUPS, IRON TRIANGLES, AND REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Thomas L. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and Jack L. Walker[*]

President Carter will perhaps be remembered most for his perceived incompetence, an impression produced largely by his inability to forge coalitions in Congress, and by his failure as an "outsider" to intervene effectively in the established policymaking processes in Washington. In his farewell address, Carter alluded to what he believed to be the source of his troubles – the fragmentation of power and decisionmaking exploited by influential special interests.[1] Carter believed that he was trapped in a web of organized groups allied with well-placed congressional and bureaucratic sympathizers seeking to protect their narrowly defined interests and frustrating his own broader vision of the public good.

President Carter was not alone among chief executives in experiencing such frustration. Triangular relationships among interest groups, Congress, and the bureaucracy "came as a rude shock" to President Nixon and his White House staff. Their desire to fracture these relationships in order to gain control of the bureaucracy was the primary motive behind their plans for extensive governmental reorganization.[2] Indeed, many scholarly commentators have complained about the pernicious influence of "cosy little triangles" of private, congressional, and administrative actors more durable than any single presidential Administration.[3] Studies of interest group-congressional-bureaucratic relations are filled with references to subgovernments, policy subsystems, iron triangles, or "whirlpools of special social interests and problems."[4]

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[*] Institute of Public Policy Studies, the University of Michigan. Thanks are due to the Earhart Foundation for a grant that originated this research, and to the National Science Foundation, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars for grants that maintained it. Reprinted with permission from "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles, and Representative Institutions in American National Government," by Thomas L. Gais and others, in *British Journal of Political Science* 14 (April 1984).

[1] "President Jimmy Carter's Farewell Address," 14 January 1981, *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 39 (17 January 1981), p. 156.

[2] Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization*, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 116.

[3] The best known is Theordore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1969). Also see, for example, Dorothy Buckton James, The Contemporary Presidency (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 126; Thomas E. Cronin, *The State of the Presidency*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980), pp. 177-8, 335-9; and William W. Lammers, *Presidential Politics: Patterns and Prospects* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), pp. 19-20, 146-7, 258-61; and Lawrence C. Dodd and Richard L. Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State* (New York: John Wiley, 1979).

[4] "Subgovernments": Douglass Cater, *Power in Washington* (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 17; "policy subsystems": J. Leiper Freeman, *The Political Process: Executive Bureau – Legislative Committee Relations*, revised ed. (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 11; and "Whirlpools": Ernest S. Griffith, *The Impasse of Democracy* (New York: Harrison-Milton Books, 1939), p. 182.

But just as this vision of the American system as a frustrating maze of autonomous and impermeable iron triangles has become popular with journalists and departing Presidents, several scholars have begun to question its utility as a guide to the policymaking process. In Heclo's view, fluid new "issue networks" are emerging made up of technical specialists, journalists, administrators, and political entrepreneurs. Most recent changes in public policy have been fashioned within these networks which also are the seedbeds for coalitions advocating new legislation. In Heclo's words:

> Based largely on early studies of agriculture, water, and public works policies, the iron triangle concept is not so much wrong as it is disastrously incomplete . . . the conventional view is especially inappropriate for understanding changes in politics and administration during recent years. . . . Looking for closed triangles of control, we tend to miss the fairly open networks of people that increasingly impinge upon government.[5]

Because this "kaleidoscopic" new system of issue networks lacks the structure and internal homogeneity of subgovernments, Heclo believes it serves to "complicate calculations, decrease predictability, and impose considerable strains on those charged with governmental leadership."[6] Other observers go further, viewing the decline of subgovernments as part of a pronounced atomizing trend in American political life that makes the task of creating majorities, in the words of Anthony King, "like trying to build coalitions out of sand."[7]

Occupants of the White House might find themselves frustrated as much by a fluid, permeable system prone to surprising shifts in policy as by a decentralized system of entrenched special interests. In both systems the will of Presidents will often be thwarted and extensive bargaining will be necessary in order to achieve even the simplest policy goals. Even though there are similarities in the operational requirements of the two systems, however, there are also many important differences. The classic system of iron triangles would be more sympathetic to the desires of large vested interests in the society and its policy outputs would be more predictable. Budget shares would be more nearly fixed and lines of authority, even though decentralized and complicated, would be clear and understandable to the system's insiders. In a shifting, conflictual, accessible system of the type described by Heclo, authority would be fleeting. Insiders would often be surprised by the rapid mobilization of new coalitions and the unexpected enactment of legislation thought to have little chance of passage. Conflict would suddenly flair up in policy areas that had been stable for years. A system of subgovernments has strong built-in barriers against all efforts at redistribution. New Programs could be added as long as the established system was not disturbed, but efforts to eliminate programs or change budget shares in order to free resources could be successful only if political leaders were willing to make extremely large investments of energy and prestige. In a more amorphous system, redistribution and shifts in budget shares are more likely, but also less controllable. Initiatives for change may begin with the President or congressional leaders, or they may begin with an ambitious first-term Senator or a crusading political activist.

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[5] Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment," in Anthony King, ed., *The New American Political System* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 88.

[6] Heclo, "Issue Networks," pp. 94–105.

[7] Anthony King, "The American Polity in the Late 1970s: Building Coalitions in the Sand," in King, ed., *The New American Political System*, p. 391.

We believe that during the last three decades just this kind of conflictual, permeable, unpredictable system has evolved in the United States. Many iron triangles remain in operation, but their influence is less pervasive than in the 1940s and 1950s, and the system can no longer accurately be characterized as a loose collection of subgovernments.

We realize that such broad generalizations cannot be fully substantiated by data from any single source. We are arguing that the fundamental outlines of American politics have been altered and we are aware that this transformation has been the result of many different influences. This paper provides data, however, on one of the most important causes of the change – the rapid expansion in the number and variety of interests that have achieved formal representation in the American system. We describe the increasing scope of the representative system and provide an explanation for its growth. We also describe the policy goals of different types of groups, the contrasting strategies, and the response of the policymaking system to their efforts. These changes in the structure and behavior of interest groups have led to important changes in the operation of both the Congress and the Presidency. By summarizing the findings of recent research, we outlined several important changes in the incentives and opportunities facing the President and members of Congress, and we conclude the paper with speculations about future developments in the process of policymaking in America.

THE WIDENING SCOPE OF CONFLICT

Under a regime of subgovernments, national government would be controlled by an elaborate pattern of interest communities, each capable of developing and administering public policy within its narrow realm without significant opposition from elsewhere in the governmental system. These arrangements could be altered slowly as personalities came and went or when economic or social changes undermined their foundations, but such changes typically would occur over many years. The participants would remain the same through several different presidential Administrations and their fortunes would not be materially affected by the shifting partisan balance in the Congress. Interest groups in a mature subgovernment would enjoy an intimate, cooptive relationship with government, and would seldom be directly challenged by hostile groups fundamentally opposed to their interests.[8]

According to Freeman, Kariel, and McConnell, structural decentralization and a vigorous tradition of local control, often constitutionally sustained or reinforced, were the primary institutional features of the American political system that led to the development of subgovernments.[9] In their view, the resulting fragmentation of authority in the Congress and administrative autonomy of bureaucratic agencies allowed private interests to cultivate relationships with relatively small sets of governmental actors who possessed the authority necessary to resolve most policy issues. While the constitutional structure of the American system has not changed, there have been vast changes in the size and scope of the Federal Government. Hundreds of new programs have been inaugurated and the Federal Government has been thrust into many areas like elementary and secondary education, urban mass transportation, and pollution control, which were once considered primarily matters of local concern. These developments might expand the number of opportunities for the creation of subgovernments, and need not alter the decentralized structure of policymaking.

The growth of the welfare state, however, has accentuated the ideological content of the public policy debate and has challenged the domination of commercial interests in the policymaking process. Many of the new programs enacted during the post Second World War surge in the growth of government have been intended either to constrain business or to redistribute wealth. One of the principal arguments of Ripley and Franklin in their classification of the variations in subgovernment influence is that subgovernments thrive best in areas where policies begin or can soon come to be regarded as distributive in nature.[10] Subgovernments require the kind of policy which allows for accommodative bargaining. Distributive policies continue to be introduced, but it is not an overstatement to describe the years from 1960 to 1980 as a regulatory and redistributive revolution in American public policy. There was an important upsurge of redistributive policymaking during the Kennedy-Johnson years, and an expansion of the regulatory powers of the national government continued well into the Nixon Administration.

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[8] The development of this concept of subgovernments began when Freeman studied the Bureau of Indian Affairs from 1928 to the late 1940s. Freeman, *The Political Process*, p. 67. Arthur Maass investigated the Army Corps of Engineers in the 1940s, *Muddy Waters – The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951); Grant McConnell concentrated on business, agricultural, public works, and public lands groups operating up to the end of the early post-war period. *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966); and Henry Kariel summarized literature from the pre-war and early post-war period in *The Decline of American Pluralism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).

[9] Freeman, *The Political Process*, p. 22; McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy*, pp. 6-7, 244, 339; and Kariel, *The Decline of American Pluralism*, p. 11.

[10] Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy*, revised ed. (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1980), pp. 8-20, 90, 212. Also see Theodore Lowi, "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice," *Public Administration Review* 32 (1972), 298-310.

If Ripley and Franklin are correct, these new regulatory and redistributive policies should have produced a quite different system of conflict resolution from that found within subgovernments. Redistributive and regulatory issues prompt the formation of coalitions of interests in opposition to one another, and decisions are made not in subcommittees or bureaus, but more often by the full Congress and in the White House, frequently with the direct involvement of the President.[11]

The enactment of new legislation in civil rights, environmental protection, consumerism and safety brought narrowly focused, occupationally based interests into contact with many more decisionmakers in diverse parts of the government. An interview with the president of the National Agricultural Chemicals Association, for example, revealed that environmental laws have increased the number of agencies with which his association communicates. The organization's research division continues its ties with the Department of Agriculture, but the more recent relationship established with the Environmental Protection Agency, regulating chemicals, may be of even greater importance. In addition, regulations governing the conveyance of chemicals brings the groups into contact with the Department of Transportation. In short, single subgovernments are no longer capable of handling the range of issues with which these associations must concern themselves, which contributes to the complication of the subgovernment picture, if not to its fundamental alteration.

Once the President and congressional leaders become directly involved in debate over an issue, the controversy naturally attracts the attention of larger numbers of people. The mass media begin to transmit information about the policy questions and personalities involved, and members of the public are tempted to make their preferences known to their elected representatives. In Schattschneider's terms, possibilities increase for a widening of the scope of conflict to include groups and citizens outside of Washington.[12]

During recent decades the attentive public, those most likely to become involved at the early stages of conflict expansion, has steadily grown in size, making it somewhat easier to trigger the process of conflict expansion. In 1952, 15 percent of a random sample of the population drawn in the University of Michigan's national election study reported some college level education; that percentage more than doubled by 1978. The same studies showed that the proportion of the population reporting that they had written a letter to a government official increased from 17 to 28 percent between 1964 and 1976. There were also increases in the proportions of those reporting contributions to election campaigns or discussions with others about how they would vote in coming elections.[13]

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[11] Ripley and Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy*, pp. 123-4, 152-6, 212.

[12] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

The American middle class, in short, become more deeply involved in politics during the 1960s and 1970s, and a large potential audience emerged for the appeals of political entrepreneurs. The growth of the attentive public, along with important advances in communications technology, such as computerized systems of direct mail and WATS line long-distance telephone systems, offered new means of political mobilization that were outside the settled boundaries of the subgovernment system. New constituencies could be reached who were more likely to respond to ideological appeals, and less likely to care about the maintenance requirements of large private organizations or their coopted allies in the public sector.

CHANGES IN THE SYSTEM OF INTEREST GROUPS

Changes in the types of policy issues at the center of attention in American politics and the rapid growth of the attentive public provided fertile ground for bold new efforts at political mobilization during the sixties and seventies. One of the most important recent developments has been the rise to prominence of contentious new interest groups claiming to represent broad collective interests in civil rights, occupational health and safety, environmental protection, and consumer affairs. An initial surge of groups with liberal sympathies, growing out of the early successes of the civil rights movement, was later matched by groups calling for the promotion of fundamentalist religious values, prohibition of abortions, and many other conservative political and economic causes. Once these new groups of the Left and Right became permanent fixtures in Washington, the conditions that had nurtured the decentralized system of subgovernments were fundamentally altered.

Evidence of these changes in the group system are found in data collected in a survey by mail conducted in 1980 of all voluntary associations in America that are open to membership and are concerned with some aspects of public policy at the national level.[14] This survey did not cover trade unions or business corporations, both of which greatly increased their concern with national public policy during the past two decades, and it also excluded hundreds of nonprofit corporations, public interest law firms, university based research centers, independent commissions, newsletters, consulting firms, and the increasingly active national lobbying efforts of public agencies and state and local governments. All of these entities are integral parts of the representative system and a truly comprehensive survey of changes in the system of conflict resolution in America would have to include them all. This article would be stronger if data were available on the entire system of interest aggregation, agenda setting, and influence, but the data we have collected will adequately demonstrate the importance of the arrival on the political scene of many new interest groups organized around ideological causes rather than narrow commercial or professional interests.

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[13] For a summary of these data, see Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, *American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook: 1952-1978* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).

[14] See the Appendix at the end of this chapter for a description of the survey.

In table 10, our sample of groups is divided into four types: (1) profit sector occupational groups made up of trade associations and professional societies with members at work mainly in the profit-making sector; (2) nonprofit sector occupational groups comprised of associations of universities, not-for-profit hospitals, and state and local government agencies, along with professional societies whose members work mainly for government or for social welfare, educational, or cultural agencies; (3) a small number of mixed sector occupational groups (such as the National Association of Broadcasters, the American Hospital Association, the Society of American Foresters, and the National Society of Professional Engineers) whose membership is evenly spread between profit and not-for-profit enterprises; and (4) citizen groups that are organized around a cause or an idea and that are open to all, regardless of occupational background, such as Common Cause, Citizens for Clean Air, and Young Americans for Freedom.

Table 10 demonstrates that the interest group system in 1980 was dominated by associations firmly based in occupational or commercial communities – only 20.7 percent of the respondents to our survey could be classified as citizen groups – but anyone familiar with the theory of groups might be surprised that even one-fifth of our sample would be composed of associations seeking to obtain broad collective goods. Olson has shown how difficult it would be for citizen groups to organize for collective action.[15] Even individuals who might benefit from a public good would be rational if they acted as "free riders" and refrained from making contributions to citizen groups, since they would enjoy the public good if it were successfully obtained whether they made any contribution or not. Moe has suggested that the rise of so

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[15] Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

TABLE 10. THE TYPOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONAL ROLES: A CLASSIFICATION OF INTEREST GROUPS ACCORDING TO BASES FOR AFFILIATION WITH THE GROUP AND THE ORIGINS OF THE MEMBERSHIP

	Occupational profit sector	Occupational mixed sectors	Occupational non-profit sector	Non-occupational citizen groups
Percent	31.7	11.9	36.6	20.7
N	(179)	(67)	(201)	(117)

many citizen groups during the past two decades may have been the result of an unusual rise of public expectations expressed in an enhanced willingness to join and contribute to citizen movements.[16] The past two decades may have been extraordinary times, but our data indicate that the citizen groups have not been sustained entirely by an upsurge of membership. Only about 22 percent of the citizen groups receive as much as 70 percent of their budgets from dues. Instead, as the data in figure 9 make clear, most citizen groups are supported by a mixture of gifts from foundations, grants and contracts from government agencies, and gifts from a small number of wealthy individuals.

Further analysis shows that the key to organizational growth for citizen groups is their success in securing patronage from sources outside of their immediate membership. As figure 10 demonstrates, the relationship between staff growth and the organization's reliance on dues is especially striking when the staff size of groups is held constant. Both occupational and citizen organizations with large staffs are more likely to grow than organizations with small staffs, but only among citizen groups is there a strong, consistent relationship between outside patronage and staff growth. It appears that the leaders of citizen groups have found a way to maintain themselves even without the financial support of a large membership. Citizen groups are likely to remain as active participants in the American system for as long as they are able to maintain their sources of outside patronage.[17]

The emergence of citizen groups as stable participants in the policymaking process is important because they have distinctive objectives and strategies. The differences between citizen and other groups became plain when respondents to our survey were asked about their general ideological preferences concerning the role of government in society. In table 11 the results of these questions are displayed with the groups classified according to the typology of occupational roles.

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[16] Terry Moe, "Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups," *Journal of Politics* 43 (1981), 531-43. Also see Moe's book: *The Organization of Interests* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

[17] For a discussion of the significance of patrons see Jack L. Walker, "The Origins and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America," *American Political Science Review* 77 (1983), 390-406.

Systematic differences appear in both cases, but with interesting contrasts. It is clear that, in 1980, there was much less support for government regulation than for the government's provision of social services. Profit sector occupational groups are solidly opposed to expansions of either regulations or services and, in fact, show heavy majorities in favor of the contraction of each. On the opposite side, citizen groups solidly favor an expansion of government activity in both realms, establishing a clear line of ideological cleavage within our sample. Between the two opposing sides, the mixed sector and not-for-profit sector groups shift first to one side and then the other. Both types favor the expansion of government services – the mixed groups by only the slimmest of margins – but a majority of both types express opposition to the government's recent infringements on occupational self-regulation.

There has been little discussion in the literature on subgovernments about ideological cleavages within the interest group structure, but fairly clear expectations emerge from the literature about the patterns of conflict one might expect to find. According to the subgovernment thesis, decentralization reduces overt conflict by delegating policymaking authority to virtually independent, segmented communities of like-minded participants. These communities might be afflicted with factionalism or might be thrown into conflict with each other, but one would not expect to see a consistent pattern of group conflict of the kind that appears in our data. Figure 11 shows the percentage of groups within each category of the typology of occupational roles that reports the existence of another group working in direct opposition to its interests. What emerges is a clear U-shaped pattern of conflict perception, with the profit sector occupational groups and the citizen groups perceiving the most overt opposition to their views.

It would be an overstatement to infer that the conflicts being reported in figure 11 are uniformly the result of direct confrontations between the profit sector and citizen groups. Unfortunately, our data do not allow precise monitoring of patterns of conflict, but it is certain that citizen groups are involved on both sides of the intense struggles over abortion or nuclear disarmament. It is also certain that conflicts exist between groups representing different kinds of industries, or between occupational groups in both the profit and not-for-profit sectors. Yet even though such intra-sectoral conflicts are common, it is also clear that much of the group conflict of the past two decades over expanding the welfare state, protecting the environment, advancing the rights of minorities, protecting unwary consumers, or promoting a greater emphasis upon occupational health and safety has involved direct clashes between business interests on the one side and citizen



FIGURE 9. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MEMBERSHIP BASE OF INTEREST GROUPS AND DEPENDENCE ON FOUR SOURCES OF REVENUE

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groups on the other. Much of the conflict being reported by our sample of groups, in other words, matches the ideological differences reported in table 11. A set of groups seeking to remedy presumed deficiencies in the operation of the market economy are often directly opposed by organizations representing the business firms whose behavior the citizen groups are attempting to constrain.

The existence of stable citizen organizations with distinctive sources of financial support and contrasting ideologies could present a challenge to the subgovernment thesis. If, however, these new groups would be willing to resolve their differences through bargaining and compromise with other participants within established subgovernments, without appeals either to higher political authority or to the general public, the integrity of the system of subgovernments could be maintained. If citizen groups were willing to be accomodating, there is no reason why they could not eventually be made a functioning part of a segmented, decentralized system of conflict resolution.

One test of whether citizen associations are being integrated into a system of subgovernments might be whether they are gaining any form of routinized access to the decisionmaking process. All groups in our sample were asked whether staff members served on formal advisory committees for agencies, whether they were consulted by agencies prior to the formulation of policy, and whether they served regularly as agency consultants – three measures of institutionalized access. We found that groups of all types that reported that they were engaged in conflict with opposing groups were much more likely to enjoy institutionalized access, indicating that conflict among groups leads to an increase in formal efforts at consultation. Occupational groups of all kinds, however, were more likely to enjoy higher levels of institutionalized access than citizen groups, as illustrated in figure 12. The differences in the percentage of groups reporting access are not dramatic, and we have no way of knowing whether citizen organizations have been gaining greater access during the past few years. The system of subgovernments may be slowly absorbing these new arrivals, but at least in 1980 when these data were collected, the process of digestion was not complete.

Citizen groups will never fit easily into a system of subgovernments until they are willing to cooperate in the process of bargaining and consultation upon which such arrangements are based. Our survey provided many indications, however, that most citizen associations have not adopted such cooptive, "inside" strategies. Citizen groups, once they experience conflict, are twice as likely as all types of occupational groups to appeal to the public through the mass media and to engage in various forms of grass-roots lobbying at the local level. Citizen organizations are also much less likely to engage in lobbying of admin-



*"Small" includes groups having ten or fewer full-time staff members, ten being the sample median. "Large" staffs have more than ten full-time employees.

FIGURE 10. RELATION BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONAL STAFF GROWTH AND RELIANCE ON MEMBER DUES FOR OCCUPATIONAL AND CITIZEN GROUPS, CONTROLLING FOR STAFF SIZE

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TABLE 11. RELATION BETWEEN THE TYPE OF INTEREST GROUPS AND THEIR POLITICAL DEMANDS

	Profit (%)	Mixed (%)	Nonprofit (%)	Citizen (%)
*A. Percentage of interest groups which prefer various levels of government regulation of the economy, by group type**				
Group prefers more regulation	7	15	13	46
Group prefers present level of regulation	5	13	33	26
Group prefers less regulation	88	72	54	28
	100	100	100	100
N	(158)	(39)	(138)	(70)
B. Percentage of interest groups which prefer various levels of government provision of social services, by group type†				
Group prefers greater provision of services	13	40	69	67
Group prefers present level of service provision	19	22	18	17
Group prefers less provision of services	68	38	13	17
	100	100	100	101
N	(120)	(37)	(141)	(72)

* "In general, do the policy positions of this association tend to call for: Much more government regulation of business and industry? Some additional government regulation of business and industry? Present level of regulation? Less government regulation of business and industry? Much less government regulation of business and industry?"

† "In general, do the policy positions of this association tend to call for: Much more government provision of social services? Some additional government provision of social services? Present level of social services? Less government provision of social services? Much less government provision of social services?"

istrative agencies than all types of occupational groups, although we found no appreciable differences among groups in their willingness to lobby the Congress. To illustrate the sharp differences that exist in the strategies adopted by citizens and occupational associations, we created an index of "inside" strategies – lobbying the Congress or administrative agencies – and an index of "outside" strategies – appeals to the public through the mass media, staging large informational conferences open to the public, and engaging in protest demonstrations. The dramatic differences between types of groups is illustrated in figure 13 where the balance between inside and outside strategies is portrayed. This graph shows plainly the contrast between the occupational associations – both in the profit and nonprofit sectors – which concentrate their efforts on institutional lobbying, and the citizen groups that are trying to expand the scope of the conflict rather than allowing policy to be established within the network of subgovernments.[18]

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[18] For further analysis of the choice of tactics by the interest groups in our survey, see Thomas L. Gais and Jack L. Walker, "Pathways to Influence in American Politics: Factors Affecting the Choice of Tactics by Interest Groups" (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (April 1983)).

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

*"Are there associations or groups with whom this association finds itself in disagreement or opposition?"

FIGURE 11. RELATION BETWEEN THE MEMBERSHIP BASE OF INTEREST GROUPS AND THEIR PERCEPTION OF GROUP OPPOSITION

Business organizations have not been untouched by the emergence of citizen groups. Indeed, the expansion of policy conflict brought about by such groups may have helped to ignite a countermobilization by American business. Since the beginning of the period of enhanced conflict over redistributive and regulatory policy, groups in the profit sector have been especially likely to move their headquarters to the Nation's capital. Of groups in our sample established before 1961, 28 percent of the profit-sector organizations have since moved their headquarters to Washington, while 19 percent of the associations representing the nonprofit sector and only 4 percent of the citizen groups have made the same move. The most important response to the changing circumstances in Washington, however, has not come from trade associations. In the last decade there has been a rapid growth of direct action by large firms themselves. Individual corporations have increased the amount of representation they maintain in Washington,[19] and cor-

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[19] See the estimates of growth summarized in the introduction to: *Washington Representatives: 1981* (Washington: Columbia Books, 1981), pp. 5-10; the discussion by Hugh Heclo, "Issue Networks"; Graham K. Wilson, *Interest Groups in America* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); and Philip Shabecoff, "Big Business on the Offensive," *New York Times Magazine* (9 December 1979), pp. 134-46.

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

An organization is coded as having institutionalized access if it meets two out of three of the following criteria: (1) the organization claims that "the executive director or any member of the permanent staff currently hold(s) a position on an official government advisory committee or commission"; (2) the organization agrees that "this association (is) regularly consulted by government agencies when they are considering new legislation or changes in policy"; and (3) the organization replies that 'serving as consultants or advisers to operating agencies of the Federal, state, or local governments' is a "very important" or "important" activity of the association.

FIGURE 12. PERCENTAGE OF INTEREST GROUPS WHICH HAVE INSTITUTIONALIZED ACCESS TO ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONMAKING, BY MEMBERSHIP BASE AND PERCEPTION OF CONFLICT

porate political action committees have been established at a rate far greater than committees associated with any other institutions.[20]

This countermobilization notwithstanding, citizen groups are still more sensitive than groups in the profit sector to ideological issues, and they make greater efforts to mobilize people into their policy networks. They are also more sensitive than occupational groups to shifts in partisan control of the presidency. The organizations in our study were asked whether they had experienced any change in cooperation with government as a result of the transition from Republican President

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[20] Joseph E. Cantor, *Political Action Committees: Their Evolution and Growth and Their Implications for the Political System* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1982), p. 62.

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

The inside-outside index is a standardized combination of five, equally weighted standardized variables, two of which measure inside strategies and three of which measure outside political strategies. The formula for the index, before standardization, is:

$$IOI_i = ZMM_i + ZLC_i + ZPP_i - ZLL_i - ZAL_i$$

where ZMM_i = group's use of the mass media, standardized;
ZLC_i = group's sponsoring of lay conferences, standardized;
ZPP_i = group's involvement in public protests and demonstrations, standardized;
ZLL_i = group's involvement in legislative lobbying, standardized; and
ZAL_i = group's involvement in administrative lobbying, standardized.

For each of the five questions, the organization is asked whether an activity is "Very Important," "Important," "Not Important," or not performed. The activities are the following: "Organizing or carrying out public demonstrations or protests"; "Organizing conferences and meetings for interested laymen, citizens, or other nonspecialists in this field"; "Developing publicity for the association or drawing the attention of the mass media to important developments in this field"; "Working for the passage of needed legislation at the local, state, or national level"; and "Working to improve the administration of government programs being conducted in this field."

FIGURE 13. INDEX OF BALANCE BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE STRATEGIES, BY MEMBERSHIP BASE AND PERCEPTION OF CONFLICT

Gerald Ford to the Democratic President Jimmy Carter. These two Administrations did not advance radically different positions on many issues, but they contrasted enough to create consistently different evaluations among the groups of our sample. As illustrated in table 12, 46 percent of the citizen groups reported an increase in cooperation from the Carter Administration while, in contrast, 27 percent of the profit sector occupational associations indicated that cooperation had decreased. Twenty percent of the not-for-profit occupational groups

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TABLE 12. REPORTED EFFECTS OF THE 1977 CHANGE IN ADMINISTRATION ON COOPERATION BETWEEN INTEREST GROUPS AND FEDERAL AGENCIES, BY GROUP TYPE*

Change in agency cooperation	Profit (%)	Mixed (%)	Nonprofit (%)	Citizen (%)
Increase in cooperation	11	10	20	46
No change in cooperation	62	79	68	46
Decrease in cooperation	27	10	12	8
	100	100	99	100
N	(171)	(58)	(181)	(109)

* "How did the change in 1977 from Republican to Democratic control of the Presidency affect the amount of cooperation and consultation between this association and Federal agencies? Important increase in cooperation? Moderate increase in cooperation? No change in the relationship? Moderate decrease in cooperation? Important decrease in cooperation? This association had no contact with Federal agencies at that time."

also reported an increase in cooperation, while most of the occupational organizations in the mixed membership category reported no change in their relationship with government.

These judgments about cooperation are correlated with differences in the ideologies of the groups. Answers from groups on an index of ideology – based on responses reported in table 11 to questions about increased social services and government regulation – were related to their reports about the changes in cooperation experienced after the transition from the Ford to the Carter Administration. This relationship appeared for all types of groups, although it was much stronger among citizen groups (Kendall's tau-*b* = 0•60) than among profit sector groups (tau-*b* = 0•26) or groups in the nonprofit sector (tau-*b* = 0•14). Profit and nonprofit occupational groups, enjoying a high degree of institutionalized access and relying mainly upon "inside" strategies of influence, were able to insulate themselves from the relatively mild ideological shift engendered by Carter's election. Citizen groups, however, heavily engaged in "outside" strategies and enjoying less institutionalized access, were much more in tune with changes in the partisan or ideological character of the Presidency.

Theses empirical findings from our survey are evidence of a transformation of the American system of policymaking. Important new institutions and individuals have recently appeared that are willing to serve as patrons for political action in pursuit of broad collective goals. Citizen movements have always been a part of American politics, but during the years since the Second World War it appears that a means has been found to create relatively stable organizations that can remain in operation even during periods of waning public enthusiasm for their causes. Political leaders are finding it much more difficult to dissipate citizen movements by making symbolic gestures, when these movements are represented by concrete organizations run by experienced political operatives who have increasingly efficient means for mobiliz-

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ing their members to place pressure on the government at short notice. The American system is acquiring the capacity, due to the rise of a distinctive new element in its leadership structure, to sustain a virtually continuous confrontation between the representatives of private commercial interests, and for lack of a better term, representatives of the public interest backed by private foundations, wealthy individuals, and the government itself. These challenging groups are highly sensitive to ideological issues and have not been able to achieve as much routinized access to government agencies as the occupationally based associations. They are also more likely to make attempts to increase the level of conflict by appealing to new participants outside of Washington. These data indicate that the decentralized system of subgovernments is definitely being threatened. A new set of citizen groups is available as willing participants in coalitions working for broadscale social reform, providing the organizational base for sustained attacks on the system of subgovernments by challenging political entrepreneurs.

THE WIDENING SCOPE OF CONFLICT AND REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS

Our survey of interest groups has uncovered the basis for a higher level of conflict in American politics, anchored by ideological differences between commercial interests and newly established citizen groups attempting to obtain broad public goals. The expansion of the representative system and the greater emphasis being placed upon ideological questions has created pressure for change in the country's principal representative institutions, the Congress and the Presidency.

Congress

The emergence of organized representation of citizen interests and the countermobilization of business injected many new conflictual issues into legislative deliberations. Citizen groups search constantly for issues and new policy proposals. Their goal is to attract the attention of their members, justify themselves before patrons, and appeal to entrepreneurial members of Congress who are trying to build national reputations as protagonists for new policies.[21] As citizen groups have gained organizational stability and become recognized elements in the interest group system, congressional committees have felt compelled to recognize their concerns by accepting as members legislators who do not embrace the narrow preferences that have dominated subgovernments in the past. Representatives of consumer interests have joined the Agriculture Committees, and members with preservationist sentiments have been added to the House Interior Committee.[22] Dissension within congressional committees caused by their new composition has been broadcast to the rest of the membership and to the public at large. Even the House Appropriations Committee, which always valued consensus among its members, has been unable to maintain its tradition against dissent in committee reports;[23] and dissidents in the Ways and Means Committee have exploited rule changes to carry their tax reform proposals to the House floor or to the Democratic caucus.[24] Though high turnover in Congress, changing social values, and slow economic growth have been important causes of the decay of committee autonomy, an important contributing factor has also been the emergence of the citizen groups.

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[21] Jack L. Walker, "Setting the Agenda in the U.S. Senate: A Theory of Problem Selection," *British Journal of Political Science* (1977), 423-5.

The openness of Congress to the political conflicts raised by the citizen groups does not mean that it will be able to resolve these disputes. Citizen groups are organized in many congressional districts and in most states, thus their enhanced activity increases the potential for conflict within most members' constituencies and increases the problems that legislators must face in devising successful strategies for reelection.[25] Faced with this difficulty, legislators are tempted to divert these controversies into other policymaking forums. The struggle over women's rights, for example, was diverted into state legislatures by way of the constitutional amendment process. Authority to make potentially controversial rules or regulations can be delegated to the Federal bureaucracy or passed on to state or local governments along with grants-in-aid.[26] By avoiding the electoral risks posed by an increasingly representative system of interest groups, Congress participates in the diminution of its own influence over policy.

But even when Congress attempts to make choices on the new regulatory and redistributive issues, the committees are often unable to achieve a consensus, and disputes spill out onto the floor, where numerous amendments are offered. New ideas and a wide range of opinions surface in floor debates, but these often lead to the defeat of the amended legislation or to a reduction in the influence of detailed, programmatic expertise on the legislative product, expertise that perhaps can only be applied in deliberations of the substantive committees. The movement of the locus of congressional policymaking from the committees to the floor also suggests that coalition-builders, be they members of Congress or the Administration, must invest greater resources in order to ensure the passage of legislation. The strain on legislative leadership may be so great that passage cannot be attempted for more than a few major bills during any single Congress.

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[22] Change in the range of interests represented within the House Agriculture Committee is manifested in the establishment of the Subcommittee on Domestic Marketing, Consumer Relations and Nutrition, chaired by Representative Fred Richmond, a Democrat from Brooklyn, New York. Indeed, the Agriculture Committee has changed from its position as the most conservative of all House Committees in the 1960s to one whose central ideological tendency does not diverge much from that of the parent chamber – see John F. Bibby, Thomas E. Mann, and Norman J. Ornstein, *Vital Statistics on Congress, 1980* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980), p. 110. On change in the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, see Richard F. Fenno, *Congressmen in Committees* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 285.

[23] Allen Schick, *Congress and Money* (Washington: Urban Institute, 1980), p. 432.

[24] Catherine E. Rudder, "Committee Reform and the Revenue Process," in Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds, *Congress Reconsidered* (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 126–7.

[25] Morris Fiorina, *Representatives, Roll Calls, and Constituencies* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1974).

[26] Michael T. Hayes, *Lobbyists and Legislators* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981); Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: Norton, 1979).

Ironically, the loosening grip of the committees and the increasing conflict among broad coalitions of groups may reinforce some of the more parochial tendencies of the Congress. When ideological questions are being debated, the conflict generated by the issues creates incentives for congressional leaders to manipulate the geographical distribution of policy benefits in order to stabilize policy coalitions and to compensate members for the electoral risks that accompany stands on controversial matters.[27] Similarly, individual members of Congress may seek greater electoral security in the face of uncertain political circumstances through an emphasis on casework, aided by growing staffs and a cooperative Federal bureaucracy. Legislators demand pork-barrel benefits and constituency services in an effort to recoup the electoral losses they incur from policy struggles on polarizing issues.[28] Though some commentators consider congressional behavior to be increasingly particularistic, others believe there are tendencies towards a more ideological style of legislative politics.[29] It is possible that both of these seemingly contradictory interpretations are correct because growing congressional particularism may be, in fact, a result of increased congressional openness to ideological conflict.

An expanded range of permanently organized interests, therefore, weakens the control of Congress over policy outcomes. Responsiveness to majorities in the parent chambers is enhanced as group conflicts shift a greater amount of discretion onto the floors. Decisionmaking on the floor does not allow for coherence, attention to detail, or control by substantive experts and thus leaves many important choices to be made by the executive branch. In addition, when group conflict intensifies and member participation expands, it becomes more costly to make decisions, both in leadership resources and electoral security for members. The changing group structure may transform the Congress into a more sensitive and accurate reflector of the fundamental issues that divide the American people, but it may also reduce its authority over the resolution of these issues and make it even more dependent on the Presidency for direction and coordination.

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[27] On the use of the geographical distribution of benefits to stabilize policy coalitions, see R. Douglas Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

[28] Morris P. Fiorina and Roger G. Noll, "Majority Rule Models and Legislative Elections," *Journal of Politics* 41 (1979), 1081-101.

[29] Compare, for example, Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer, "The House in Transition," in Dodd and Oppenheimer, eds., *Congress Reconsidered* (New York: Praeger, 1977), with Morris P. Fiorina, *Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment* (New Haven: Yale, 1977).

The Presidency

Critics of the system of subgovernments have complained about the constraints that such a decentralized system places upon the President.[30] They have argued that any President wishing to place his own stamp upon policy has had to break the hold of subgovernments, a task that has often required a prohibitively heavy expenditure of political capital. Presidents must bargain within the framework and on the terms established by subgovernments. Consequently, where subgovernments have flourished, negotiation has replaced command as a presidential instrument of bureaucratic control; presidential objectives, especially those involving domestic policy, have often been frustrated; and symbolic actions have taken the place of substantive policy initiatives. Further, these observers have charged that the system has isolated the process of policy formation from the normal mechanisms of democratic accountability, such as political parties, presidential nominations, and elections.

Although a system of subgovernments has several shortcomings, it should be remembered that this system has worked to protect the Presidency from a potentially unmanageable flood of disputes and technical policy questions that must be resolved somewhere within the government. A system of subgovernments insulates the Presidency from conflicts in many policy areas that may otherwise demand intervention, forcing the President to take positions on issues that might best be left to others. These protective and insulating functions permit chief executives to shape the agenda of the highest levels of government, choosing issues that will enhance their reputations and increase their future influence. A system of subgovernments can be allowed to run itself, while Presidents concentrate their time and resources upon a more manageable set of central policy concerns. Further, in the absence of other significant institutional links, such as strong political parties, subgovernments may create informal ties between the legislative and executive branches, providing mechanisms that skilful Presidents might employ in order to achieve their own favored policy outcomes.[31]

As the decentralized system of conflict resolution organized around distributive policy issues is displaced by a process characterized by programmatic disputes over mainly redistributive or regulatory issues involving more elaborate coalitions of groups, the Presidency itself often emerges as the focus of conflict.[32] Each executive decision becomes a threat to some element of the President's electoral or governing coalition that supports the Administration as it struggles to resolve disputes that were either ignored in the past or settled out of public view behind the walls of insulated subgovernments. As the White House intervenes in a wider range of issues, Presidents, historically viewed as central policy actors, are seen by most citizens as bearing even greater responsibility for the outcome of government policies, linking their popularity and chances for reelection more closely to events over which they have little effective means of control. The presidential agenda becomes cluttered with all sorts of issues unable to find resolution at lower levels of administration. The danger arises that the President will lose control over what to decide as the expanding number of the policy issues which confront a modern government are thrust upon the relatively small circle of presidential assistants and advisers, forcing them to deal with questions that require considerably more expert knowledge and careful analysis than they can possibly supply.[33]

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[30] See, for example, Cronin, *The State of the Presidency*, pp. 177-8, 335-9; Lammers, *Presidential Politics*, pp. 20, 146-7, 258-61; Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power*, pp. 38, 162, 164; James, *The Contemporary Presidency*, pp. 126-7; and Charles M. Hardin, *Presidential Power and Accountability: Toward a New Constitution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 135.

[31] King, *The New American Political System*, p. 391.

As the President has grown in importance as a conflict manager, his staff has expanded, described by Thomas Cronin as "the swelling of the Presidency."[34] The presidential establishment has ballooned through the addition of numerous special advisers and council, and through the development of direct channels of communication between the President and interest groups maintained by the Office of Public Liaison (OPL).[35] Indeed, these relatively recent efforts by the Presidency to cultivate direct ties with interest organizations reveal, according to Joseph Pika, "much about the political and social pressures acting on the Presidency over the last several decades." Pika's research has shown that most of the associations with formal and enduring access to the White House are citizen groups – the type that has enjoyed the greatest growth in the 1960s and 1970s.[36]

Formal contacts with a wide range of interest groups have increased the potency of the chief executive in the political struggles of Washington, as exemplified by the successful efforts in the Carter Administration to mobilize support for the Panama Canal Treaty, and by the cooperation businesses and trade associations extended to President Reagan during congressional action on the FY 1982 budget.[37] These dramatic success stories may, however, exaggerate the effectiveness of efforts at presidential alliance building. The increase of routinized contacts between the Presidency and interest groups may encourage the groups to appeal more of their policy disputes directly to the highest levels of government, thus furthering the President's involvement in conflict resolution, and probably necessitating additional growth in the already swollen White House establishment.

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[32] The problem faced by Presidents has been further aggravated in the 1970s and 1980s by the change in issues towards those which create many more enemies than potential supporters, such as energy or welfare reform. Paul Light, *The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p. 206

[33] Stephen Hess makes this argument in *Organizing the Presidency* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 159.

[34] Cronin, *The State of the Presidency*, pp. 243–7.

[35] Hess, *Organizing the Presidency*, p. 159. See also Elizabeth Wehr, "Public Liaison Chief Dole Reaches to Outside Groups to Sell Reagan's Programs," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, No. 39 (6 June 1981), 975-7.

[36] Joseph A. Pika, "Dealing with the People Divided: the White House Office of Public Liaison" (paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1982), pp. 6, 50.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

There may never have been a period when the American political system was organized around a pervasive set of politically autonomous iron triangles. Since no systematic historical data exist, we must rely upon the insights provided by case studies written mainly in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, and by our survey of interest groups conducted in 1980. In that year, at least, we detected a higher level of group conflict than might have been anticipated after reading the literature on subgovernments. Newly invigorated occupationally based groups from the profit sector, backed by corporate patrons and focused on immediate commercial interests, were being confronted by a set of organizations claiming to represent broad collective interests backed by a diverse set of patrons, including private foundations, wealthy individuals, and the permanent government bureaucracy.

The citizen groups were not following the same tactical path to political influence travelled by most profit and nonprofit sector occupational groups in the past. They advocated proposals for the redistribution of resources and for increases in government regulation that would not lend themselves to resolution through log-rolling, long-term agreements, or through exclusive, face-to-face negotiations. By mobilizing supporters and making efforts to move conflicts into broader political arenas whenever possible, the citizen groups diminished the automony of subgovernments, made policy outcomes less predictable, and forced the policy debate into forums open to public view.

There may have been a period in which groups so closely tied to social movements simply faded away once the general public lost interest in their policy area. In the 1980s, however, even during periods when public interest or enthusiasm for their causes declines, the support extended to citizen groups by their patrons allows them to remain in existence, promoting public concern for their issues, and standing ready to provide guidance and leadership whenever there is a new burst of public enthusiasm.

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[37] Pika, "Dealing with the People Divided," pp. 15, 20. See also Bill Keller, "Special Interest Lobbyists Cultivate the 'Grass Roots' to Influence Capitol Hill," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, No. 39 (12 September 1981), 1740-1.

Several fundamental social and economic trends have led to the rise of the citizen groups. The growth of a vast, educated middle class in the years since the Second World War has greatly expanded their potential membership, and that has also created a large new audience for ideological appeals. A revolution in communications technology has provided the means by which this new element of the population can be reached. New patrons of political action provided needed organizational stability, and many controversial regulatory and redistributive issues crowded onto the political agenda. Citizen groups might eventually become more adapted to "inside" strategies of influence if they are ever able to reach their policy goals and develop a stake in the established configuration of American public policy. These groups, however, have come to depend upon provocative program material that can be used to maintain the interest of their far-flung memberships and gain the attention and support of patrons.

The changing structure of the policymaking system in America and the new modes of conflict resolution that are emerging are creating changes in the country's representative institutions. Many new controversial issues are being pushed onto the agendas of both the Congress and the Presidency, requiring action even though the political system does not often furnish the tools for successfully resolving these disputes. Political leaders sometimes respond by dodging these difficult decisions and passing them on to lower levels of government, the bureaucracy, or other representative bodies in the system, thus protecting their political livelihoods by reducing the power of the institutions they control. At other times, representatives strive to create more opportunities to distribute individualized benefits and services to constituents, which they hope will compensate for the opposition they are sure to engender when they take stands on highly controversial, ideological issues.

While elected representatives often seem about to be overwhelmed, the elaboration of the interest group structure and the rising concern with ideological issues also create new opportunities for political leaders to expand their power and influence. It is even possible that a new national ruling coalition might be brought into being by leaders skilful enough to attract some of the new patrons of political action, build alliances with clusters of sympathetic interest groups, create the right mixture of ideological appeals and devise new mechanisms for coordination of these forces that would help to recruit leaders, aggregate demands, and carry out the crucial agenda-building functions of a national political party–even if the new organizational creation were called by some other name.

We cannot predict that such a grand realignment of political forces will take place in America. It seems unlikely that a decentralized system of autonomous subgovernments could be reestablished, but a newly centralized, competitive system based upon ideologically consistent political parties is certainly not the only possible future for the American system. It is perhaps more likely that a penetrable, unpredictable competitive system of conflict resolution will emerge that would frustrate almost all efforts to provide it with national focus and leadership. Walter Lippman wrote in 1914 that the most important political question facing Americans was primarily institutional: would it be drift or mastery?[38] The social, economic, and political developments since the Second World War have created new pressures that make Lippman's question more pertinent than ever.

APPENDIX: POPULATION, SAMPLE DESIGN AND BIASES, RESPONSE RATES, AND QUESTIONNAIRE

We sought to study all the voluntary associations in America that were open to membership and were concerned with some aspects of public policy at the national level. We chose as our sample all associations found in Congressional Quarterly's *Washington Information Directory* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1979). Several reasons led us to select the *Directory*. It is produced by an organization with a long history of comprehensive coverage of national governmental affairs. Whatever biases it possesses, such as its probable overrepresentation of large, Washington-based associations, should not badly distort our understanding of how interest groups relate to national governmental institutions. The alternatives, morever, are even less satisfactory. *The Encyclopedia of Associations* misses several important groups but includes many nonmembership organizations and associations which are entirely apolitical. Serious problems of coverage or accuracy are found in sources like the *New York Times Index*, lists of witnesses at congressional hearings, groups filing for tax exemption from the Internal Revenue Service, the Washington telephone directory, and several other commercial directories.

Questionnaires were delivered by mail to all 913 interest groups mentioned in the *Directory* and usable responses were received from 564, yielding a response rate of 61.8 percent. Profit sector groups had the lowest response rate (55 percent); groups representing the nonprofit sector produced the highest rate of return (72 percent); and citizen and mixed category groups fell in between with rates of 59 and 60 percent respectively. Our data therefore tend to underrepresent profit sector groups and overrepresent nonprofit sector groups.

Questions in the survey instrument were generally closed-ended and covered a variety of subjects, including the organization's history, its present membership, the benefits provided to members, the size and background of the permanent staff, the organization's budget and sources of revenue, its political environment, and its activities.

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[38] Walter Lippman, *Drift and Mastery* (New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 1914).

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIPO	American Institute for Public Opinion
CCFR	Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
ERA	Equal Rights Amendment
GOP	Grand Old Party (Republican)
NORC	National Opinion Research Center
OPL	Office of Public Liaison
PAC	Political action committee
SALT	Strategic arms limitation talks

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